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Max is a truck driver. He climbs into the cab of his truck between 5 and 6 am each 
day. When he arrives at a glass factory in Limburg at around 11 am, he must first 
wait for another truck to unload. Pausing the meter above his head, Max uses this 
time to work off half an hour of his break. Drivers must take a 45-min break for each 
4.5 h they spend behind the wheel; they otherwise risk being fined. But for Max 
there is no rest. He uses this time to clean the truck’s tires, to loosen the tarpaulin 
and to fill in forms. While the much-touted self-driving truck may be safer, Max 
does not fear for his job in the short term. The individual loads and routes, combined 
with loading, unloading and other essential tasks, will make automating everything 
difficult. “Even if it comes to that, you’ll still need someone to check the machine.”
Bouchra is a homecare worker. She begins her daily rounds at 7.30 am. She can 
see on her phone who her next clients are and how much time she has with each: 
15 min, support stockings for Mrs. A; 35 min, showering Mr. C. But you must never 
let clients notice that you are watching the clock, she says. No one likes that. 
Bouchra must deal with people with all kinds of health issues, mental as well as 
physical. “You shouldn’t do it for the money”, she says. “It’s for the heart.” Bouchra 
is delighted that she recently received a permanent contract, which has finally given 
her a sense of “stability and security”. “Maybe I can buy a house now.”
Max and Bouchra’s working days provide us with windows on two common 
professions. They also highlight three major developments in the world of work 
with repercussions for workers, businesses and institutions in the Netherlands 
and beyond:
 – Automation: new possibilities created by robots and artificial intelligence have 
far-reaching consequences for the nature and amount of work people do.
 – Flexibilization: although the rise of flexible contracts in the labour market has 
created employment, it also means job and income insecurity for workers and 
their families.
2
 – Intensification: having to work more intensively, faster or under greater emo-
tional stress places heavier demands on workers, in the workplace as well as 
at home.
The central question of this book is how the automation, flexibilization and 
intensification of labour are affecting the quality of our working lives. Good work 
for everyone who can and wants to work, we argue, is of urgent concern for govern-
ments, public institutions, businesses and organizations representing workers and 
employers. Good work is important for both individuals and for overall prosperity – 
for the economy to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by new technolo-
gies, and for society so that everyone can participate.
1.1  Three Major Developments: Automation, Flexibilization 
and Intensification
While the future of work has received ample attention from academics, govern-
ments, citizens and civil society organizations,1 most studies focus on two develop-
ments: the emergence and application of new technologies and the rise of the flexible 
labour market. This book covers these two developments as well, and adds a third: 
the intensification of work. We introduce them in turn below.
1.1.1  Automation: Robots, Cobots and Algorithms
The first development is the emergence of technologies that allow the digitization 
and robotization of labour, with far-reaching consequences for the scope and nature 
of work. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee2 argue that we have entered the 
“Second Machine Age” in which it is possible to automate not only physical but 
also intellectual tasks.3 This is due to growing computing power, improved sensors, 
big data, the use of algorithms (artificial intelligence), output technology such as 3D 
printers, robots and “cobots” – collaborative robots that work together with people. 
New technologies also enable platforms such as Uber and Airbnb to act as online 
intermediaries between the providers of work and individuals willing to carry it out. 
1 The German government’s white paper Future of Work 4.0: Reimagining Work (Federal Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs, 2017), the uk government’s The Future of Work: Jobs and Skills in 
2030 (ukces, 2014) and the Nordic Council of Ministers’ The Nordic Future of Work (Nordic 
Council of Ministers, 2018) are but a few examples.
2 Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014).
3 See also Baldwin (2019).
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Although the gig economy4 remains in its infancy in the Netherlands – involving 
34,000 people or just 0.4% of the working population5 – it is already posing funda-
mental questions about the position of workers and the quality of work. What does 
it mean to have an algorithm as your boss? Who is responsible for Uber drivers or 
Deliveroo riders who become incapacitated?
Discussion about these new technologies has evolved in recent years, with wild 
speculation about millions of evaporating jobs giving way to more nuanced and 
realistic appraisals. Fears of a robot apocalypse in the foreseeable future have 
proven unfounded, with some reports even predicting a shortage of human workers 
able to do all the new work created by new technology. For the most part, people 
look set to share their workspaces with robots and algorithms. Still, many jobs will 
change under their influence – as will the demands placed upon workers.
It may be a cliché, but new technological possibilities create both opportunities 
and threats (see Fig. 1.1). Will robots in the workplace leave humans side-lined and 
disempowered? Or will new technologies lead to more interesting tasks for humans? 
How we apply new technology is not a given. Technology does not just happen to 
us; there is room for human agency and decision-making.
1.1.2  Flexibilization of Work
The second development changing the world of work is the decline of permanent 
contracts and the rise of flexible work. While employment levels in the Netherlands 
were rising before the Covid-19 pandemic, the country is a European leader in the 
use of temporary contracts. The proportion of the self-employed – freelances and 
sole traders, officially classified as “self-employed persons without staff” – is high, 
twice that of Germany. Although the United Kingdom also has high rates of self- 
employment, fewer workers are on temporary contracts (see Figs. 1.2 and 1.3). The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in a 2019 report voiced 
its concerns about the extent of labour flexibilization in the Netherlands. On aver-
age, the oecd claims, “job quality tends to be lower among non-standard workers… 
and non-standard work results in significant inequalities between workers”.6
While there were “only” one million flexible workers in the Netherlands 15 years 
ago, their numbers surpassed two million in 2018 when Statistics Netherlands (cbs) 
recorded 985,000 temporary employment contracts, 556,000 on-call and casual 
workers, 308,000 agency workers and 149,000 “unspecified hours” contracts. An 
additional 1.1 million people were self-employed. Adding these categories together, 
36% of the active workforce in 2018 no longer had a permanent contract (see Chap. 
4 “In the gig economy, people are hired and paid per individual job (taxi ride, meal delivery, clean-
ing session, repair). The platform then charges a commission for each agreed job it has mediated” 
(Frenken & Van Slageren, 2018).
5 seo (2018).
6 oecd (2019a: 35).
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3, Fig. 3.1). Almost everyone in the Netherlands is now familiar with the uncertainty 
of flexible work, either personally or through a colleague, partner, neighbour 
or child.
This uncertainty often means that people cannot or dare not start a family or find 
a home of their own. Almost no one chooses a temporary job if a permanent position 
is available. On the other hand, many self-employed individuals – this is the positive 
side of labour flexibilization – are happy with their work and are less at risk of burn-
out.7 It has also become easier for people to switch between positions over the 
course of their careers, moving for instance from a temporary job into a full-time 
position and then reverting to part-time to take on freelance assignments. This 
“hybridization” of work means that people can simultaneously occupy several 
7 tno (2019).
Fig. 1.1 Robots and platforms: opportunities and threats
Source: Kool & Van, Est, 2015
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different positions in the labour market or change course over their careers to 
accommodate their family lives and care-giving responsibilities.
Attitudes towards flexible labour are changing in the Netherlands. When the self- 
employed are discussed in policy texts, ornithological metaphors abound.8 A few 
years ago, the freelance worker was a “free bird” or – due to their supposed prowess 
at innovation – “the goose that lays the golden eggs”. But more recently, they have 
become the “cuckoo in the nest”, exerting unfair competitive pressure. No bird rep-
resents them all; the self-employed flock is diverse in its plumage. But although 
most self-employed individuals claim to be satisfied with their work,9 only some 
can spread their wings financially. Many are scratching out a living near the pov-
erty line.
Criticism of temporary work is mounting. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis points to unfair competition and increasing inequalities caused by 
labour market flexibilization10 while the oecd has called on the Netherlands to rein 
in tax incentives for flexible work.11 Critics argue that flexible work should no 
8 See, for example, the introduction to the Dutch interdepartmental policy study on “self-employed 
persons without staff” (Rijksoverheid, 2015).
9 Eighty-one percent of self-employed individuals are satisfied with their work, compared with 















Fig. 1.2 Temporary employees as a percentage of all employees in the Netherlands and other 
European countries, 1998–2018
Source: Eurostat (Labour Force Survey)
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longer be seen as inherent to business operations but as a means to cope with peaks 
and sickness – and only when it suits the nature of the work.12
The oecd concludes that the flexibilization of the labour market alongside 
declining trade union membership has undermined the bargaining power of work-
ers.13 While employees on personalized contracts can still cause collective embar-
rassment – and new forms of solidarity and action are emerging in the platform 
economy and among freelance workers14 – individualized work is not conducive to 
collective bargaining. If all workers strive for individualized contracts, there will be 
little collective action. With platform companies, flexible jobs and self-employment, 
the traditional relationship of mutual responsibility binding employer and employee 
is no longer self-evident. It necessitates a thorough review of who is responsible for 
the risks and necessary investments in the new world of work.
12 See also Kremer et al. (2017b).
13 oecd (2018a); see also awvn (2018).















Fig. 1.3 Self-employed individuals as a percentage of all employees in the Netherlands and other 
European countries, 1998–2018
Source: Eurostat (Labour Force Survey)
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1.1.3  Intensification of Work
The third trend is the intensification of work – the change in its pace and nature. 
Consider home care workers who have less time with each client although many 
have complex problems, IT system administrators who must complete all their 
reports as a matter of urgency, and primary school teachers who now have many 
additional non-teaching tasks such as administration and catering to children with 
specific needs, not to mention their increasingly vocal parents.15 In recent decades, 
both men and women in the Netherlands have been working longer and longer hours 
(Chap. 5). And their work has become more intensive.
What does the intensification of work look like in practice? We distinguish 
between two forms. In its narrow, quantitative definition, the intensification of work 
means that people have to do more work in the same allotted time.16 The Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research finds that it creeps in slowly and insid-
iously: in 2008, some 34% of the workforce said they “often” or “always” had to 
work fast to complete their allotted tasks in time; by 2018, it was 38% (see Fig. 1.4).17 
While excessive workloads have recently become a focal point of dissatisfaction in 
the Dutch public sector, the problem does not end there. The latest collective agree-
ment for the security industry also includes reduced working hours to ease the bur-
den on security guards. Many employers now see combating excessive pressure 
from work as their number one priority.18 More and more people are taking work 
home or putting in overtime because they cannot finish their tasks during normal 
working hours.19
The intensification of work is a broader issue than time alone. The nature of 
work has changed as well, with more workers having to more often deal with cli-
ents, customers and colleagues. A growing number of people thus experience work 
as more emotionally demanding (10.7% in 2018 versus 9.4% in 2007; Fig. 1.4). 
While professionals in education and healthcare suffer the most, a broad spectrum 
of workers report greater emotional strain – from the ict systems administrator who 
has to juggle conflicting demands to the security guard facing an increasingly 
aggressive public.20
Working intensively is not necessarily a problem; it can make jobs more varied 
and challenging.21 But if it goes too far or lasts for too long, it can threaten the well- 
being of workers and their families.22 Whether workers are able to cope largely 
15 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
16 Korunka and Kubicek (2017).
17 Houtman et al. (2020).
18 van Echtelt et al. (2019b).
19 Not in table. van Echtelt et al. (2016), see Chap. 5.
20 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020). This working paper was commissioned by the wrr for the 
report underlying this book.
21 See, for example, Johnson et al. (2018).
22 See also Fried and Heinemeier Hansson (2018).
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depends on the support they receive from managers and colleagues, including the 
extent to which they are able to organize their own tasks. Although more and more 
people in the Netherlands are educated to higher levels, autonomy at work is declin-
ing (Fig. 1.4) – a contributing factor to the rising incidence of burnout. Although the 
intensity of work has long been a focus of Dutch labour policy, it now seems to be 
taking a higher toll than ever before.
While new technologies can intensify work – in for example just-in-time manu-
facturing23 – it is also a product of the shift towards the service economy, which puts 
a premium on social skills and teamwork.24 In the words of Amy Edmondson: “few 
individuals simply do their work and then hand the output over to other people who 
do their work, in a linear, sequential fashion. Instead most work requires people to 
talk to each other to sort out shifting interdependencies. Nearly everything we value 
in the modern economy is the result of decisions and actions that are interdependent 
and therefore benefit from effective teamwork.”25 As individual employees have 
more and varied tasks, cooperation in the workplace becomes necessary. While this 
23 For example, the parcel service dhl in Bergen op Zoom has been experimenting with “smart 
glasses” that project the employee’s assignments onto the lens. Productivity has increased by 10%, 
meaning that staff must move more items in the same time. The staff council has stipulated that 
working in this way must be limited to no more than 6 h a day (Heuts 2017).
24 van den Berg et al. (2018).
25 Edmondson (2019).
Frequent or permanent heavy workload 
and time pressure 













Regular lack of autonomy
Burnout symptoms
Fig. 1.4 Trends in the intensification of work, autonomy and burnout symptoms, 2007–2018 
Source: nea 2007–2018 (tno/cbs), Houtman et al. (2020)
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can make work more interesting,26 it also demands much from the working person 
as a colleague.
Technological developments are also blurring the boundaries between work and 
private life. More and more people are reporting that they can be called in at any 
moment, including on weekends and holidays; others feel compelled to check 
e-mail outside of their formal working hours. We will examine the causes and con-
sequences of this intensification of work and what can be done to counter it.
1.2  Better Work as a Societal Mission
The automation, flexibilization and intensification of work have consequences for 
the amount of work people do and who participates in the paid workforce. Paid 
work for all has been a central Dutch policy goal since the 1990s.27 The European 
Commission has likewise sought to increase employment levels across the European 
Union, with the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 proclaiming a target employment rate of 
75% by 2020. This target has long been achieved in the Netherlands, which now has 
one of the highest levels of employment in Europe. In the fourth quarter of 2019, 
some 316,000 people in the Netherlands were registered as unemployed, amounting 
to 3.4% of the workforce (seasonally adjusted).
Although the Netherlands has created many new jobs in recent decades, there is 
still not work for everyone. Many remain side-lined in the labour market, including 
1.6 million people on benefits; while not all can work, one million would like to 
work or work more. This group includes people with occupational disabilities, 
whose participation in the workforce actually fell between 2003 and 2017, from 
45.6% to 38.2% (Chap. 6). This is in part a side-effect of the Netherlands’ intensive, 
high- productivity economy, which excludes less productive workers. That many 
people are side-lined in this way has major repercussions. A job is not only a set of 
tasks; employment provides people with income, self-esteem and the feeling that 
they are part of society.
This involuntary side-lining has negative consequences for the economy and 
society. The economy grows when productivity increases, when we work more 
hours or add more value per hour of labour. If people who wish to work are pre-
vented from doing so without good reason, we all lose out. This is why the wrr in 
its 2013 report Towards a Learning Economy28 emphasized that everyone is needed 
to help build the economy – the more so because demographic changes will likely 
lead to structural labour shortages in the future.
26 See, for example, the study of “dirty work” by Deery et al. (2019).
27 The wrr report Work in Perspective made an important contribution towards this (wrr, 1990).
28 wrr (2013a). A summary in English can be found at: https://english.wrr.nl/publications/
reports/2013/11/04/towards-a-learning-economy
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The slogan of Dutch labour market policies since the 1990s  – “work, work, 
work” – needs updating, to focus on the quality of work. But what constitutes good 
work? Although perceptions here have changed as educational levels have risen and 
women have entered the paid workforce, we can distil from the sociological, eco-
nomic and psychological literature and from international comparative studies29 
three basic conditions for good work: (1) control over income, an appropriate wage 
and income security; (2) control over work, sufficient autonomy and social support 
in the workplace30; and (3) control in life, good work-life balance. If work is accom-
panied by constant insecurity, we cannot describe it as good. The same applies when 
people have no control over their working lives, or if they have lost their work-life 
balance.
The automation, flexibilization and intensification of labour potentially have 
major consequences for the quality of work. Although technology can turn workers 
into mechanical appendages, there is no need for it to do so. Flexible working 
arrangements, when one can be called in to work at any time, can be hard to com-
bine with caring for young children. But again, it does not have to. The question is 
how we can – now and in the future – create good work for as many people as pos-
sible. As David Coates writes, “Work is good for us, but work is only really good for 
us if it is ‘good work’.”31
1.3  Concerns About the Quality of Work
Dutch workers are generally satisfied with their jobs; three-quarters even say they 
“greatly enjoy” their work.32 Asked the lottery player’s question – “What would you 
do if you won a large sum of money?” – most answer that they would keep work-
ing.33 The “bullshit jobs” made famous by American anthropologist David Graeber34 
is not yet an issue in the Netherlands, where only 5% of workers doubt the impor-
tance of their work.35
But dissatisfaction is rising.36 Statistics Netherlands reports that strikes have 
reached their highest level in two decades,37 with bus drivers, airline pilots, teachers, 
home care workers and university lecturers among those who have resorted to 
29 Such as oecd (2016a) and Eurofound (2017).
30 For example, opportunities for participation and learning (Pot, 2017b). There is limited, although 
growing, interest in this area among European policymakers (Pot et al., 2017).
31 Coates (2009).
32 Wennekers et al. (2019).
33 van Luijk (2011).
34 Graeber (2018).
35 Dekker (2018).
36 de Beer and Conen (2019).
37 There were 32 strikes in the Netherlands in 2017, more than in any year since 1989. 150,000 
people took part, the highest number since records began in 1901. Logistics and manufacturing 
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industrial action. While some protests are classic wage disputes, others focus on 
workloads, especially the burden of overtime and administrative duties. In recent 
walkouts, primary-school teachers have been demanding “a fair salary, less work 
pressure”. Theirs are not “bullshit jobs”, they say. But they do have too many 
“bullshit tasks” within their jobs. What they want is the freedom to do their jobs well.
Disturbing exposés of contemporary working life are all-too-common. In Hired,38 
British investigative journalist James Bloodworth reveals what it is like to be an 
order picker at Amazon, where he worked undercover. The company monitors 
employee activities, including toilet visits, with digital wristbands. Breaks are lim-
ited and there are penalties for reporting sick. Zero-hour contracts are the norm and 
almost no one has a permanent job. Similar reports have been published in the 
Netherlands about what it is like to work for the taxi service Uber and online retailer 
Bol.com, in the meat-processing industry and in logistics.39
More work does not necessarily lead to less poverty. The proportion of the Dutch 
population classified as “working poor” has been rising since 1990.40 In 2014, this 
applied to about 320,000 people (4.6% of all workers), of whom 175,000 were 
wage-earners and 145,000 were self-employed.
1.3.1  The Quality of Work as a Distribution Issue
Higher-skilled persons do not always have good jobs; lower-skilled persons do not 
always have bad jobs. There are, however, structural differences between these 
groups. Paul de Beer finds that lower-skilled people in the Netherlands, in both 
absolute and relative terms, were more likely to be employed “in 2016 than a person 
with similar characteristics (age, gender, domestic situation, origin) in 1990”. But 
there was also a downside: “the chances of this person being in flexible employment 
and on low wages were higher in 2016”.41 The oecd notes in its report on the 
Netherlands that “non-standard work results in significant inequalities between 
workers. Workers on non-standard contracts earn less, suffer from higher insecurity 
and are less likely to participate in collective bargaining and training”.42
There are further concerns about the declining quality of work. Workers today 
have less say over how they perform their duties; in other words, their autonomy at 
work is declining (Fig. 1.4). Although occupational health is generally good, the 
were the sectors most frequently affected; the greatest loss of working days was in education (cbs, 
2018e, 2019a).
38 Bloodworth (2018). Or see, for example, Adler-Bell (2019, August 3).
39 See Van Bergeijk, 2018. Investigative journalism platform Investico recently published Uitgebuit: 
Het verhaal van de Nederlandse werkvloer (Exploited: the story of the Dutch workplace; 
Woutersen, 2019).
40 scp (2018, October 3).
41 de Beer (2018a).
42 oecd (2019a).
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proportion of employees reporting symptoms of burnout shot up from 11.3% in 
2017 to 17.5% in 2018.43 Although widespread across the working population, 
burnout is more common among the better educated. While work is a fine remedy 
for poverty, depression and poor health, it can also make you ill.
Public-sector professionals have been sounding the alarm about their working 
conditions – their wages being too low and their workloads being excessive – for 
some time. Especially teachers and healthcare staff want more autonomy to do their 
jobs well. The Professional Ethics Foundation has highlighted the mistrust police 
officers, teachers and nurses face from their superiors, which manifests in excessive 
control and enforced record-keeping.44 What is at stake is “the recognition of one’s 
own professionalism”.45
Although job satisfaction in the Netherlands generally remains high, many peo-
ple when asked the “lottery question” say they would continue working, but with 
the caveat “under different conditions”. What workers want most is the space to do 
their jobs well. Compared to two decades ago, workers today have higher expecta-
tions. As well as good colleagues, they want jobs that are interesting, which allow 
them to make the most of their abilities and which give them a sense of achievement 
(Table 2.3).
Although not everyone needs to be ecstatic at work,46 there are sound reasons to 
pay more attention to well-being in the workplace. Good work is about mutual 
engagement between employers and employees and about bringing out the best in 
people, with long-term benefits for workers, businesses,47 the national economy and 
society. Better work improves occupational health, reduces absenteeism and encour-
ages innovative workplace behaviour. Contented workers come up with creative 
ideas to improve products and services – all essential for a flourishing economy.
1.3.2  The Netherlands in Europe
Although the Netherlands is not performing badly on indicators that measure the 
quality of work, it could be doing much better. The country is a European leader in 
some areas, but by no means in all. Recent rankings by both the oecd48 and the eu 
research agency Eurofound49 place the Netherlands mid-table, with the oecd 
describing the country as an “average performer” alongside Mexico, South Korea, 
43 Houtman et al. (2020).
44 www.beroepseer.nl
45 Tjeenk Willink (2018).
46 Davies (2015). In the words of The Economist (2019): “Work can be irritating but, as any unem-
ployed person will tell you, it is better than the alternative. It gives purpose to people’s days and, 
on occasion, can even be fun. But not every day.”





Japan, France, Belgium and Sweden; nations that score better include Denmark, 
Finland, Australia and Austria. According to Eurofound, some 40% of Dutch work-
ers have “poor quality” jobs and are “under pressure” – more than in the uk or 
Belgium. What explains the Netherlands’ middling position? Part I of this book 
seeks to provide some answers.
1.4  Better Work and Well-Being
Our focus on good work dovetails with national and international initiatives to look 
beyond gross domestic product and employment rates. While the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals said nothing about work,50 “decent work” is part of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) agreed in 2015. SDG 8 reads: “Promote 
sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employ-
ment and decent work for all.” While the long explanatory text mentions “decent 
work for all” several times,51 what it means in concrete terms is up to individual 
nations to work out; implementation can and will differ across countries. The Dutch 
government has endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals, while ministries52 
and companies53 have begun working to achieve them.54
1.4.1  Focus on Well-Being
While policymakers have long privileged economic growth and gdp, these indica-
tors alone cannot gauge a nation’s overall prosperity and the well-being of its inhab-
itants. Gdp as a measure of economic performance was never meant to do this.55 
Since the French government’s Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress published its report56 in 2008, international 
50 In 2005 a new goal 1B was added: “Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for 
all, including women and young people.” See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml
51 Luebker (2017).
52 At www.sdgnederland.nl we read: “Since January 2016, the [Dutch] central government has 
gone to great lengths to translate the SDGs into national policy. The report Nederland Ontwikkelt 
Duurzaam [The Netherlands developing sustainably], a ‘plan of action for implementation of the 
SDGs’, states that eight ministries have compiled an SDG inventory of government policy. Does 
this reflect the 17 goals and 169 subgoals?”
53 See, for example, vno-ncw (2018, November 30).
54 The pursuit of better work is also in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights, signed in 
2017. It includes the right to lifelong learning so that citizens can continue to participate in the 
labour market, guidance into work and good work-life balance.
55 Coyle (2014), Hoekstra (2019), Hueck and Went (2015, January 25); Stiglitz (2018, December 
3); Went (2015, January 30).
56 Stiglitz et al. (2009).
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 organizations have been at the forefront in advocating for a broader view of prosper-
ity and well-being. Numerous reports and books have addressed the limitations of 
gdp and proposed alternative ways to quantify happiness, well-being and prosperi-
ty.57 To track more than just the evolution of gdp, national and international organi-
zations have developed new indicators and composite indices.58
Interest in well-being has grown in the Netherlands as well. The debate in the 
House of Representatives following the wrr’s report Towards a Learning Economy59 
led to a parliamentary committee on “Defining General Well-Being”. The commit-
tee’s report in 2016 led to further debate60 and the House of Representatives voting 
to request Statistics Netherlands to develop a Monitor of Well-Being.61 Since 2018, 
this report has been published annually on Accountability Day when the national 
government and its ministries present their annual reports to the House of 
Representatives.62 The concept of well-being63 has been gaining traction in  local 
politics as well, with the City of Amsterdam’s Research, Information and Statistics 
Department issuing its first Monitor of Well-Being for the Amsterdam Metropolitan 
Region in June 2018.64
1.4.2  Work Is Important for Our Well-Being
As Statistics Netherlands declared in its first Monitor of Well-Being, work is central 
to human welfare and a key factor in shaping well-being in its broadest sense.65 The 
section on the distribution of well-being breaks down unemployment data by social 
groups; the chapter on policy themes and Sustainable Development Goals provides 
57 Clark et al. (2018a), Coyle (2014), Davies (2015), Pilling (2018).
58 Stiglitz et al. (2018), Went (2019).
59 wrr (2013a).
60 Tweede Kamer (2016).
61 cbs (2018c, d).
62 “General well-being refers to the quality of life in the here and now, but also to the extent to 
which that is achieved at the expense of future generations or people elsewhere in the world” 
(cbs, 2018d).
63 Many indicators and dashboards are being developed to measure well-being, happiness and 
broad prosperity, including the oecd’s Better Life Index (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) and, in the 
Netherlands, Utrecht University and Rabobank’s Comprehensive Indicator of Well-Being (Brede 
Welvaartsindicator, bwi). See also Went (2015, January 30).
64 See www.amsterdam.nl/onderzoek-informatie-statistiek/projecten-data/brede-welvaart/
65 The first edition of the Monitor of Well-Being states: “Both work and leisure time contribute 
significantly towards general personal well-being in the here and now. Work is important to people 
for generating income, for participation in society and for self-esteem. If people cannot or are no 
longer able to work even though they want to, this often has negative effects upon their general 
well-being at a later date. It is important for many people that they can find work, that they do not 
remain unemployed for too long, that they are in a suitable form of employment (permanent, flex-
ible or self-employed) and that they can work free of excessive stress or insecurity”(cbs, 2018c).
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indicators related to labour, workforce participation and leisure time. Having a job 
is a determining factor of well-being; so too is the kind of work one does. As the 
Taylor Review of modern working practices for the British government put it: 
“While having employment is itself vital to people’s health and well-being, the 
quality of people’s work is also a major factor in helping people to stay healthy and 
happy, something which benefits them and serves the wider public interest.”66 These 
findings all argue in favour of paying greater attention to the quality of work.67
1.5  In this Book
We argue that improving the quality of work for all people willing and able to work 
is a key societal and organizational challenge for governments, public institutions, 
businesses and organizations representing workers and employers. This dovetails 
with the oecd’s new jobs strategy which “goes beyond job quantity and considers 
job quality and inclusiveness as central policy priorities”68 – a strategy based on 
evidence that countries which focus on improving inclusion and the quality of work 
outperform countries that solely privilege labour market flexibility.69 Focusing on 
good work for all is also in line with the International Labour Organization’s 
“human-centred agenda for a decent future of work”,70 which advocates long-term 
investments in human development and well-being.
The oecd emphasizes that there are no standard policy recipes to achieve good 
and inclusive work. Each nation must pursue its own analysis of the opportunities 
and weaknesses in its labour market and formulate appropriate measures. In its 
submission to the Netherlands Independent Commission on the Regulation of Work, 
the oecd states that “the future of work will largely depend on the policy decisions 
countries make”. The Netherlands, it adds, is “at an important juncture and urgent 
decisions need to be taken about the kind of labour market that is desired in the 
future”.71
This book should be read in this context. It analyses key developments in the 
Dutch labour market, examines their potential consequences and formulates policy 
recommendations. Our analysis is based on international and interdisciplinary sci-
entific research; on the working papers we commissioned from the Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research, the Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and Tilburg 
66 Taylor et al. (2017).




71 oecd (2019a: 9).
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University72; on policy reports, studies and evaluations from the Netherlands; and 
on conversations with policymakers and stakeholders, including discussions of our 
previous studies Mastering the Robot73 and For the Sake of Security.74
We hope that the analysis of the Netherlands presented in this book will provide 
researchers and policymakers in other countries with actionable insights on the 
importance of good work and how new technologies, flexible labour markets and 
the intensification of work are affecting its quality – and what governments, employ-
ers, trade unions and others can do create better work. If the Netherlands, known for 
its knowledge-based economy and employee satisfaction, is wrestling with these 
issues, this will be the case in other countries as well. As the developments we anal-
yse are occurring everywhere, we hope that the proposals and recommendations we 
present will provide some food for thought.
1.5.1  Covid-19 Pandemic
This book was written shortly before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 
crisis has not rendered our analysis out of date but has highlighted the urgency of 
our study. First, the Dutch labour market has become one of the most flexible in 
Western Europe; there is a chasm between people with and without permanent con-
tracts and income security. Much of the economic shock is being absorbed by tem-
porary and self-employed workers, disproportionately affecting young people, 
women, and ethnic minorities. The pandemic’s economic impact, and the immedi-
ate financial support given by the Dutch government to the self-employed, reveals 
vulnerabilities in the labour market and the necessity of rethinking current social- 
security systems and reforming labour regulations to create stable work.
Second, the pandemic is revealing the need for renewed and expanded active 
labour-market policies as workers look for jobs in different sectors and governments 
face enormous challenges in helping job seekers find new employment. This 
requires adequate resources as well as administrative creativity when assistance 
must be provided digitally; in the absence of sufficient resources, those who are 
easily placeable are helped quickly while the most vulnerable are not.
72 These working papers can be downloaded at www.wrr.nl.
73 Went et al. (2015). Part of this work has been translated into English as Mastering the Robot: The 
Future of Work in the Second Machine Age and can be downloaded here: https://english.wrr.nl/
publications/investigation/2015/12/08/mastering-the-robot.-the-future-of-work-in -the-second- 
machine-age. See also Kremer and Went (2018).
74 Kremer et  al. (2017c). Part of this work has been translated into English as For the Sake of 
Security. The Future of Flexible Workers and the Modern Organisation of Labour and can be 
downloaded here: https://english.wrr.nl/publications/investigation/2017/05/01/for-the-sake-of-
security. The site contains a visual summarizing the book.
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Third, while professionals in healthcare, social care and education are now 
deemed “heroes”, they still suffer from highly demanding jobs, comparative low 
pay, high work pressure and relatively little control over their work. The current 
crisis once again underlines the importance of fair pay and sufficient autonomy for 
public professionals.
Fourth, the pandemic is revealing the importance of good work-life balance. Due 
to the measures taken to prevent the spread of the virus, many workers are now 
working from home, with many parents doubling as teachers. While working from 
home may become the new normal for many, it once again raises questions about 
healthy working conditions and investments in childcare.
Finally, from developing contact tracing apps to video-conferencing with co- 
workers, the Covid-19 crisis has been a catalyst for technological change. While the 
latest technological developments may ultimately have both positive and negative 
consequences for workers, it underlines our analysis of the importance of develop-
ing and implementing technologies in such a way that it leads to better work.
1.5.2  In the Following Chapters…
Drawing on the scientific literature, we first outline why work is important and what 
constitutes “good work” (Chap. 2). Then, in Part I, we examine how the quality of 
work in the Netherlands has been affected by the three trends at the heart of our 
study – the automation, flexibilization and intensification of labour (treated respec-
tively in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5). In Part II, we discuss the consequences of these trends 
for the ability of different parts of the population to find and retain work (Chap. 6). 
In Part III, we discuss how globalization and new technologies inform the space 
available to national governments and labour organizations to invest in good work 
for everyone willing, able and needing to work (Chap. 7). Finally, Chap. 8 advances 
suggestions about how governments and other stakeholders can actively contribute 
towards “better work” for all.
Between the chapters are portraits of some common professions. By following 
the working day of truck drivers, home care workers and many others, these por-
traits reveal how the three trends at the heart of this book are experienced in daily 
life as well as just how important good work is.
1.5 In this Book
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 A Day at Work: The Truck Driver
Max climbs into the cab of his truck between 5 and 6 am each morning. He 
works for a small family business, hauling loads ranging from sugar beet and 
lime to glass for recycling. Today’s route takes him to several destinations in 
the Netherlands and then to Belgium. It is exactly 7 am when Max arrives at 
his first stop: a glass processing plant where he delivers coarse coloured glass 
and picks up a load of white rinsed fine glass.
Max joined the company two years ago as it allowed him to work more 
“normal” hours. But he still finds it difficult to lead a normal life. He spends 
between 50 and 60 h each week on the road, which makes it a tough job. 
“With breaks included, you’re away from home for the best part of 65 hours. 
The planner back at the office designs the routes and schedules, so it’s better 
to stay in his good books”, Max says with a smile. The planner can follow 
drivers using their GPS trackers. “If he spots you cutting corners, he’ll take it 
out on you.” Tonight, Max wants to be home no later than 7 pm as it is his 
brother’s birthday. To compensate, he has accepted a night shift for this 
Saturday, which pays a premium for unsocial hours. But this will force him to 
cancel his Sunday football match, ruining his weekend.
When Max arrives at the glass factory at around 11 am, he must first wait 
for another truck to unload. Pausing the meter above his head, he uses this 
time to work off half an hour of his break. Drivers must take a 45-min break 
for each 4.5 h they spend behind the wheel; they otherwise risk being fined. 
But for Max there is no chance to rest. He uses this time to clean the truck’s 
tires, to loosen the tarpaulin to ready for unloading and to fill in forms. An 
hour after arriving, he can set off again, on his way to Belgium.
Max keeps his cabin spotlessly clean: “I spend whole days in here – this is 
my home.” Behind the seats is a made-up bed; Max sleeps on the road an aver-
age of twice a week. Curtains hang from the windows and under the bed is a 
fridge containing his lunch. There will soon be a TV as well.
To his relief, Max arrives at the Belgian company just before the shift 
change, when the whole place shuts down. “It’s always a hassle here. You wait 
for ages and then they complain that your freight compartment isn’t clean.” 
The piles of glass reach impressive heights. The glass itself is so fine that it 
looks like sand and the wind blows it around. It tickles and stings everywhere. 
“You should see my socks at home”, says Max. “They’re all shredded.”
Once he has loaded and weighed the truck and filled in all the forms, Max 
is on his way again. He chats on his CB radio with other Dutch truckers who 
are approaching the same factory, annoyed as they will arrive during the shift 
change. Although Max is alone in his cab all day, “I never feel lonely with this 
thing.” He spends the whole day chatting with colleagues driving nearby.
It is 2:30 pm and Max has been behind the wheel for 9 h now. He still has 
some time left, he says with a big smile. Suddenly, he must slam on the brakes. 
A car has just cut in front of him to exit from the motorway. Forty tonnes of fine 
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manages to keep control. Long days or not, Max must stay alert. A recent acci-
dent in which a fellow driver died has left a deep impression on him. He talked 
about it with his colleagues. “It makes you think. If it ever comes to it, I just 
hope I’m not trapped for ages. That would be horrible. I’d rather die instantly.”
From a safety point of view, it might be preferable to completely automate 
freight transport with self-driving trucks. While Max often hears about this 
future scenario, he does not fear for his job in the short term. The individual 
loads and routes, combined with loading, unloading and other essential tasks, 
will make full automation difficult. “Even if it comes to that, you’ll still need 
someone to check the machine.”
At about 4:30 pm he delivers the fine glass and collects his final consign-
ment of the day, a load of “coarse brown” which must go to Drenthe. But Max 
is finished for the day; this will be his first delivery tomorrow. He drives his 
truck back to the company depot, fills the tank – 540 litres, which takes a 
while – and completes more forms. Finally, at 6:15 pm, about 13 h after he 
began his working day, Max gets into his own car and drives home, just in 
time to celebrate his brother’s birthday.
At the beginning of 2019, some 109,000 people worked as truck drivers in the 
Netherlands. Almost all were men, roughly half with only basic education and 
half with upper secondary schooling. The vast majority (nine out of ten) were 
employed, increasingly on flexible contracts which now account for almost a 
quarter of trucking jobs. While the number of jobs in the sector were falling 
for over a decade due to competition from Eastern Europe, economic growth 
and an ageing workforce have led to a shortage of drivers in the past two 
years. Truck drivers typically earn €1800–2400 gross per month, excluding 
overtime premiums. The average (modal) income in the Netherlands in 2020 
will be just over €2800 euros per month, excluding holiday pay. Truck drivers 
work long and irregular hours. Although they experience little work-related 
pressure compared to other professions, it is increasing due in part to the 
wider use of digital tracking systems.
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Chapter 2
The Importance of Better Work
For most people, work is a source of economic independence, social contact and 
identity. Who we are is largely determined by what we do. Work is often where we 
connect with others; some of us spend more time with colleagues than with friends 
or loved ones. Unemployment has major consequences for individuals, for their 
social environments and for society, while the importance of paid work is most tan-
gible for those who do not have it.
This chapter draws on the extant scientific literature on the importance of having 
a job, in particular the importance of having good work. Above all, it seeks to pin-
point what good work entails. We first discuss the functions of paid work and the 
consequences of unemployment for individuals and societies  – a subject about 
which a great deal is already known (Sect. 2.1). We then turn to what economists, 
sociologists and psychologists have written about good work (Sect. 2.2). From this 
literature we distil three core characteristics of good work, which also align with 
survey findings about what people in the Netherlands expect from their jobs (Sect. 
2.3). We then discuss why good work is so important for individuals, companies, the 
economy and society (Sect. 2.4) before concluding the chapter (Sect. 2.5).
2.1  The Meaning of Paid Work
The importance of paid work is most obvious to those who do not have it: the unem-
ployed. Social psychologist Marie Jahoda and sociologist Paul Lazersfeld visited 
Marienthal, Austria, in the 1930s in the wake of a local factory closure which had 
made the majority of the village workforce redundant (see Box 2.1). From their field 
research and an extensive literature study, Jahoda and Lazersfeld identified six 
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functions of work which are as applicable today as they were then.1 First and fore-
most, work (1) furnishes an income. But apart from this, work also provides (2) 
daily structure, (3) personal development, (4) social contacts and experiences, (5) 
the opportunity to contribute to society and (6) status and identity. To a considerable 
extent, work determines a person’s position in society.
Jahoda emphasized the social functions of work. Because people find their place 
in society through employment, it has taken over some of the functions of 
Box 2.1 from Marienthal to Janesville: Studies of the Unemployed
During the depression of the 1930s, Marie Jahoda and Paul Lazarsfeld accom-
panied a team of researchers to Marienthal, an Austrian village where the only 
factory had been forced to close. The result was the first large-scale study of 
the consequences of unemployment. Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: Ein 
soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen langandauernder 
Arbeitslosigkeit (The Unemployed of Marienthal: A Sociographic Experiment 
on the Effects of Long-term Unemployment)2 described both the practical 
aspects of joblessness such as managing household budgets and the slow tread 
with which the unemployed walked through the village and the shrinking of 
[their] life horizon. While the financial consequences of unemployment were 
great, what was even more striking was the suffering caused by loss of status, 
identity and self-esteem. The study found that people reacted differently to 
unemployment; some descended into a vicious cycle of inactivity and apathy, 
unable to take advantage of the limited opportunities available to them.
A half-century later, Een tijd zonder werk (A Time Without Work)3 – based 
on ethnographic research in the cities of Rotterdam, Amsterdam and 
Enschede – studied long-term unemployment in the Netherlands in the 1980s. 
This study likewise found extended periods of joblessness leading to losses of 
status and identity, an altered sense of time and a contraction of the world. But 
it also identified an alternative culture of unemployment celebrating auton-
omy and individualism. Joblessness did not necessarily undermine status and 
identity; particularly young people made strategic use of welfare benefits as a 
de facto basic income to organize their lives in a way that suited them.4
The slipstream of the 2008 financial crisis has produced relatively few aca-
demic studies of the experience of unemployment. Among the notable studies 
are Washington Post staff writer Amy Goldstein’s account5 of the city of 
Janesville, Wisconsin, where a General Motors factory had closed its doors. 
Janesville: An American Story is as an account of the resilience of a local 
community. Retraining courses, Goldstein found, were no quick fix, as people 
who had undergone retraining found it harder to find new jobs.
1 Jahoda (1982).
2 Jahoda et al. (1975).
3 Kroft et al. (1989).
4 See also Engbersen et al. (1993).
5 Goldstein (2017).
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communal and religious ritual. Alongside the family, work offers a social context 
that allows people to experience, on a daily basis, that they are not islands unto 
themselves. Without work, people feel they have no purpose in life and that they are 
unable to contribute to the collective; they feel excluded from society.
Jahoda’s six functions of work still apply although the meritocratization of soci-
ety – the conferral of status by talent – since the 1930s has added a seventh function: 
work affords self-respect.6 In Respect in a World of Inequality, Richard Sennett7 
writes that people without paid work find it hard to respect themselves – a feeling 
reinforced when people are judged above all by their earnings.8 If people are out of 
work, the general consensus is that they only have themselves to blame; they should 
have stayed longer in school or performed better at the last job interview. A Dutch 
study by Judith Elshout9 found many unemployed people sharing such views: their 
situation was “their own fault” while people without work were “losers”.
American sociologist Michelle Lamont10 reports that there are currently few 
sources of self-esteem outside of paid employment – the centrality of which has 
pushed aside other possible reasons to value oneself. Although many men and 
women in the Netherlands value leisure and family above paid work,11 
(Fig. 2.1) recent research shows that one’s job remains the most important source of 
respect. The unemployed, people with disabilities, pensioners and homemakers 
(both male and female) all struggle more than working people with issues of self- 
esteem. Working people feel more useful and valuable, and are more proud of them-
selves (Fig. 2.1).12
Can volunteer work take over the functions of paid work? Although volunteering 
is generally good for one’s health and well-being, this is less true for unemployed 
people, especially when they are young and have their lives ahead of them.13 The 
Netherlands has a tradition of valuing voluntary work as a symbolic contribution to 
society; within the benefits system, experiments are currently underway to guide 
recipients towards the voluntary sector (see Box 2.2). But however valuable it may 
be and however much it may bolster self-esteem,14 volunteering can never fully take 
over all the functions of a real job with a real payslip.15
6 See also the “homo honoris” in Engbersen et al. (1993). Honneth (2001, 2007) emphasizes the 
importance of recognition, consisting of love, respect and appreciation. For the application of 
Honneth to practices at work, see Sebrechts (2018).
7 Sennett (2003).
8 Swierstra & Tonkens (2008).
9 Elshout (2016).
10 Lamont (2000).
11 Conen (2018, 2020).
12 Wielers et al. (2018).
13 Jahoda (1982), van Willigen (2000), van der Aa et al. (2014), Casiday (2015), Detollenaere et al. 
(2017), Wielers et al. (2018).
14 Wielers et al. (2018).
15 Kampen (2014), Elshout(2016).
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Box 2.2 Experiments with Volunteer Work
Experiments with volunteering have long sought to give those without paid 
work a daily routine and meaning in life. The first experiment we know of 
took place in the uk in 1935 when the Quaker movement set up the Subsistence 
Production Society, a voluntary co-operative for 400 former miners. Rather 
than a wage, participants received a small cash allowance. While the project 
emulated many of the functions of work, it attained better results among older 
men; younger men often failed to show up. For the former, it brought structure 
to the day; for the latter, voluntary work undermined their social status. The 
younger men did not feel they were contributing to a greater goal.16
Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has seen numerous experiments with volun-
teer work for the unemployed, usually targeting long-term benefit claimants.17 A 
study by the City of Rotterdam found that social assistance claimants were gener-
ally positive about the expectation to give back to the community, although a 
minority found it oppressive. Participants in an experimental programme gener-
ally felt more confident and valued, and expanded their social contacts; their 
employment prospects and health, however, did not improve.18 In Amsterdam, the 
comparable programme Meedoen werkt (“Joining in works”) made participants 
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19 ggd Amsterdam & ois (2017). See also the dossier www.socialevraagstukken.nl/
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2.1.1  When People Are Out of Work: Consequences 
for the Individual and Society
Because work has so many functions, it is unsurprising that unemployment has such 
far-reaching consequences. Numerous studies have shown that being out of work 
leads to poorer health, particularly mental health; controlling for socio-economic 
status, employment history and education, we see that joblessness clearly contrib-
utes to mental illnesses such as depression.20 Conversely, unemployed people who 
find jobs experience huge health gains, comparable to the effect of participating in 
programmes designed to promote healthy behaviour.21 Understandably, scientific 
attention over the past decades has shifted away from the pathogenic nature of 
work  – its role in causing illness and disease  – towards its remedial effects. 
Nowadays, a job is more often considered medicine.
The unemployed, as Jahoda already observed, are less embedded in “society” – 
which after all is largely created at work. The wrr pointed to this phenomenon in 
its 1990 report Work in Perspective,22 by which time the erosion of traditional inte-
grative links had made social bonding through work an urgent issue: “Labour-force 
participation  – allowing always for new definitions of what constitutes employ-
ment – has become an increasingly important precondition and manifestation of 
social participation, cohesion and individual citizenship.” People without jobs are 
less anchored in society, have smaller social networks and are more likely to be 
single. Sometimes they are excluded; sometimes they exclude themselves. 
Particularly for married men, losing their job increases the chances that they will 
lose their partner.23
Work in Perspective also found that low labour-force participation rates were 
threatening the solvency of the Dutch welfare state. A healthy ratio between work-
ing and non-working people is needed to maintain solidarity and to finance the 
social-security system. Unemployment and occupational incapacity entail costs that 
go well beyond the sums paid out in benefits, such as those associated with health-
care and social services. For example, people on benefits account for a considerable 
proportion of the spending on mental healthcare.24
The costs of health problems caused by unemployment are at least in part borne 
by society. It is therefore important to help as many people as possible into work, 
not only for their own good but for that of the general public. But it is crucial that 
this work be good work. We now turn to what this actually means.
20 Harbers & Hoeymans (2013), oecd (2014, 2015a).
21 Schuring et al. (2011), Kenniscentrum uwv (2011).
22 wrr (1990): 43.
23 Goñalons-Pons & Gangl (2018); see also de Hek et al. (2018).
24 Einerhand & Ravesteijn (2017).
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2.2  Good Work: Insights from the Social Sciences
Much has been written about what constitutes good work. Although there is no 
single, unambiguous definition, specific elements keep recurring in the academic 
literature and in large-scale international studies by the European Union and the 
oecd. This section describes criteria for good work as proposed by economists, 
sociologists and psychologists, and boils them down to three crucial 
characteristics.
2.2.1  Good Work as Seen by Economists
In economics, the quality of work is generally equated with pay levels.25 High wages 
mean good work; low wages mean bad work. Paul de Beer26 argues that economics 
has narrowed its view of work to income: “Although most economists do underline 
the importance of work for the individual, the dominant approach in economics, the 
neoclassical theory, provides little reason to do so. In most economic views of the 
labour market, work is primarily a way of making money.” Nevertheless, meaning-
ful jobs can be badly paid while well-paid work can also lead to burnout. As impor-
tant as wages are for income and recognition, sociologists and psychologists have 
shown that there are more criteria to good work than pay alone.
Economics has indeed begun to pay more attention to well-being. In The Origins 
of Happiness,27 Layard and colleagues explore how the quality of people’s work 
affects their contentment and distil from contemporary studies three conditions for 
good work: (1) good organization, with sufficient variety in tasks, autonomy, sup-
port, appreciation and so on; (2) good work-life balance (flexible and “civilized” 
hours); and (3) good pay, with income security and opportunities for promotion. In 
sum, work is good if it makes people happy with their lives.
Arne Kalleberg28, a sociologist inspired by economists, identifies five conditions 
for good work. First, the wage must be sufficient to cover basic needs, with the 
chance to earn more over time. It is not only the amount one earns, but the social 
mobility that the income allows. Second, good work provides social benefits such as 
health insurance and post-retirement pensions; Kalleberg emphasizes this as social 
benefits in the United States are generally linked to one’s employment contract and 
not, as in the Netherlands and Europe more broadly, arranged collectively or through 
industry-wide agreements. Third, good work offers “opportunities for autonomy 
and control over work activities”, including having a say over one’s tasks. Fourth, 
“flexibility and control over rosters and working conditions” is increasingly 
25 Kalleberg (2011).
26 de Beer (2001): 119.
27 Clark et al. (2018b).
28 Kalleberg (2011): 9.
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important in light of on-call work in the 24/7 economy. Finally, workers must have 
some control over when their jobs end, as the flexible labour market thrives on 
short-term appointments.
All five conditions do not necessarily have to be met for work to be good; if one 
is missing, this does not automatically make it bad. Here Kalleberg aligns himself 
with neoclassical economic theory, which posits that employers can trade off posi-
tive and negative aspects of work, for example the price in security self-employed 
in the creative industry pay for their independence. Kalleberg nevertheless notes 
that the exchange is often not all that it should be; while employers offering precari-
ous positions should be paying higher wages, this often does not happen. The condi-
tions for good work are also increasingly divorced from one another. We can no 
longer confidently say that individuals earning high incomes will likely score well 
on the other indicators of good work. For example, there is now less job security 
across the board.
2.2.2  Good Work as Seen by Sociologists
According to Duncan Gallie,29 sociologists assess the quality of work through two 
dominant lenses. Building on sociology’s founding fathers (see Box 2.3), the first 
approach seeks to objectively determine the conditions under which workers’ inter-
ests are advanced. Marx, for example, argued that without ownership over their 
work, workers will remain alienated from themselves and from their labour. The 
second approach is based more on what people themselves experience as good 
work. Good jobs are jobs in which people are happy; it is better to let people judge 
for themselves what constitutes good work as their preferences differ.
Gallie further argues that people are remarkably consistent in how they evaluate 
their work, with similar patterns visible in almost all European countries, among 
both men and women. Workers with modest educations, less discretionary space, 
fewer training opportunities, limited job security and greater difficulties combining 
work and care are less satisfied with their jobs. Objectively as well as subjectively, 
the quality of work can be reduced to three central elements: (1) discretionary space 
at work; (2) job security; and (3) work-life balance.30
2.2.3  Good Work as Seen by Psychologists
While sociologists study the quality of work through the lenses of social equality, 
opportunities and workplace performance, psychologists tend to focus on workers’ 
health and well-being. Peter Warr’s “vitamin model”, for example, compares the 
29 See, for example, Gallie (2007a, 2013).
30 Gallie (2007a).
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psychological influence of working conditions to the effects of vitamins on physical 
health.32 According to Warr, people have a natural need for nine “vitamins of work” 
without which good work is impossible. Some have health benefits but can be harm-
ful when overdosed (see Table 2.1). For example, excessive performance require-
ments lead to stress, too much variety in one’s tasks reduces concentration, and not 
everyone thrives with autonomy. The other vitamins – financial rewards, physical 
security, position and status – do not lead to overdose but have no further benefits 
beyond a certain dose.33
Box 2.3 Alienation in the Iron Cage: The Quality of Work According to 
Classical Sociologists
Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber were engaged with the industrial 
relations of their day and the question of how to enforce good work.31 Marx 
(1818–1883) was particularly affected by the kind of industrial labour he saw 
in English factories. The dangers of work lay primarily in various forms of 
alienation: alienation from the product being made, alienation from the work 
process, alienation from one’s fellow workers and alienation from the indi-
vidual creative process. It was vital that people be allowed to be social and 
creative. The answer to alienation lay not in liberation from work but in libera-
tion through work. This was only possible if workers controlled the means of 
production so that they were no longer “wage slaves”.
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is famous for his idea that specialization 
makes people more interdependent, creating an organic form of solidarity. 
But he also warned against the excessive division of labour, where workers 
become automatons and there is little contact between one function and the 
next. People should be able to choose their work freely as this will better 
match their individual abilities. Durkheim saw little point in seeking out con-
flict, preferring a higher level of moral consciousness through professional 
organizations modelled on the guilds of the Middle Ages.
Finally, Max Weber (1864–1920) described how bureaucracies – or other 
forms of far-reaching rationalization – restrict freedom of action, imprisoning 
people in an “iron cage” leading to “depersonalization” and loss of creativity. 
Weber sought a solution in charismatic leaders who could introduce new 
moral values.
Although the proposals advanced by these nineteenth-century sociologists 
to achieve better work ranged from moral appeals to the appropriation of capi-
tal, they were all concerned with scope for individuality and creativity, work-
ing according to one’s abilities, and social relationships at work. It all sounds 
surprisingly modern and to the point.
31 See Hodson (2001), de Beer (2001).
32 Warr (1987, 2007).
33 de Jonge et al. (2013).
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Another strand of psychological research on workplace well-being builds on 
motivation theory. Abraham Maslow’s pyramid of needs, advanced in A Theory of 
Human Motivation (1943), is often used to outline a hierarchy of needs, the fulfil-
ment of which leads to good work. With physiological needs at its base, the pyramid 
progresses through the needs for safety, belonging, love and esteem before reaching 
its apex: self-actualization. Self-determination theory as advanced by Edward Deci 
and Richard Ryan has also found considerable resonance in workplace research.34 
According to this hypothesis, people are driven by three basic psychological needs: 
(1) autonomy, meaning the freedom to design an activity as one sees fit with a 
degree of independence; (2) competence, meaning confidence in one’s own ability 
and the experience of control; and (3) belonging, meaning social interaction and 
trust in others.35 Safeguarding all three in the workplace should result in better per-
formance (quality of work and productivity) and in better health and well-being.36
2.2.4  Good Work as Seen by International Organizations
International organizations such as the oecd and Eurofound have built on the scien-
tific findings outlined above to define and operationalize good work in their research 
on the quality of work. In recent reports such as Divided We Stand37 and In It 
Together,38 the oecd has increasingly focused on pay and income inequality as well 
as the insecurity of workers in flexible labour markets. In its understanding of the 
quality of work, the oecd privileges the socio-economic aspects of employment 
(see Table 2.2). Eurofound in studying the quality of work has identified seven key 
indicators, each with several sub-characteristics (see Table 2.2). Compared to the 
oecd, Eurofound places greater emphasis on physical working conditions, how work 
is organized and social innovation in the workplace.
Table 2.1 Warr’s vitamins of work
Aspects of work with constant effects on 
health and well-being
Aspects of work with sometimes adverse effects on 
health and well-being
Financial rewards Physical comfort and 
security
Position and status
Opportunity to control work autonomously
Clarity of goals and role
Social support and contact
Opportunity to use and develop skills
Variety of tasks
Performance requirements and feedback
Source: De Jonge et al. (2013)
34 Deci & Ryan (1985, 2008), Deci et al. (2017).
35 These characteristics apply to everyone  – including for example people with disabilities 
(Frielink 2017).
36 Deci et al. (2017). See also www.selfdetermination.org
37 oecd (2011).
38 oecd (2015d).
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2.3  Conditions for Good Work
Three core conditions for good work recur in the scientific literature. While their 
importance may fluctuate for individuals over the life course, research shows that 
there are minimum levels for work to be considered good. All three conditions do 
not need to be maximized. Good work can also be good-enough work.
Table 2.2 International job quality indices
Eurofound
1. Physical environment 2. Social environment
  Posture-related (ergonomic)
  Ambient (noise, temperature, vibration)
  Biological and chemical
  Adverse social 
behaviour
  Social support
  Management quality
3. Work intensity 4. Skills and discretion
  Quantitative demands
  Pace determinants and interdependency
  Emotional demands
  Cognitive dimension
  Decision latitude
  Organizational 
participation
  Training
5. Working time quality 6. Prospects
  Duration
  Atypical working hours
  Working time arrangements
  Flexibility
  Employment status
  Career prospects





  Average earnings
  Earnings inequality
2. Labour market security
  Risk of unemployment, linked to level of unemployment insurance
  Risk of extreme low pay
3. Quality of working environment
  Job strain: Demands (time pressure and physical risk factors) in relation to available 
resources (work autonomy and learning opportunities)
Source: Eurofound (2017): 37. and oecd (Cazes et al. 2015)
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2.3.1  Income Security
The first condition for good work is material. People need to be paid enough to live 
on: work that results in poverty cannot be called good. Wages should also be propor-
tionate to the effort involved: is there a balance between what people do and how 
much they are paid? Warr calls this fairness.39 To some extent, fairness is relational; 
people tend to compare what they earn with others. Comparative earnings are there-
fore a key indicator. If a person’s wages are much lower than those of close col-
leagues or people with the same level of education, it is hard to claim their work 
is good.
Security is part and parcel of the material dimension of the quality of work. 
Although people with steady jobs can experience insecurity – “in a reorganization 
you can be out of the door just like that” – temporary contracts are seen as indicators 
of bad work as they bring little financial stability and slim career prospects.
Security is enhanced when workers have opportunities to find other or better- 
paid work through retraining and on-the-job learning and when job loss is accom-
panied by financial compensation, for instance through an adequate redundancy 
package. Redress for loss of income due to termination of contract or incapacity to 
work, as well as guidance into other work where appropriate, are conditions for 
good work.
2.3.2  In the Workplace: Freedom and Belonging
The second condition for good work concerns the workplace itself. A job can be 
secure and well paid but can hardly be called good if one has no space to decide 
when and how tasks are performed, if the workplace atmosphere is toxic, if job 
requirements are so basic that boredom sets in, or if one lacks opportunities for 
development. Although workers don’t need to be in a constant state of bliss, they 
generally want to feel that they are making a contribution.40 Whether one is well or 
poorly educated, highly gifted or cognitively impaired, being able to make the most 
of one’s abilities is a basic human need.41 People like to use and develop their skills. 
Being under-challenged is not only a waste of human talent; it is often demeaning. 
Conversely, people can also be over- challenged: if there are not enough people for 
the task, if the task is too complex, or if it demands the constant managing of one’s 
own and other people’s emotions, the work can no longer be considered good.
While both Kalleberg and Eurofound emphasize the importance of social mobil-
ity through work, we prefer Warr’s vitamin model which recognizes there can be too 
much emphasis on advancement. Mobility in itself is not an end; people can be 
39 Warr (2007).
40 Jahoda (1982).
41 Deci & Ryan (1985).
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satisfied with the work they have. Good work strikes the right balance between 
stress and boredom.42 It concerns appropriate job requirements, not just avoiding 
burnout but also preventing “bore-out”.
To keep alienation  – occupational estrangement from oneself and/or others  – 
from setting in, workers need a degree of control or ownership over their work. As 
Marx wrote, being able to use our creativity makes us human.43 Good work means 
that people can perform their tasks without constant control from managers or tech-
nology – a common problem today, especially for workers in the gig economy who 
must ultimately answer to an algorithm.44 While an appropriate amount of personal 
latitude can shield people from excessive workloads and stress, not all workers need 
the same amount of autonomy, or all of the time; the need for autonomy is stronger 
in some people than in others, and can evolve over the course of a career. Too much 
autonomy can also make workers exhausted and insecure45 – especially when their 
authority does not match their responsibilities. But with the right amount of auton-
omy, psychology’s classic demand-control model46 (see also Sect. 2.4) predicts that 
workers will be more productive. Their input in shopfloor meetings and participa-
tion in decision-making is crucial as it allows workers to shape how tasks are orga-
nized in a way that makes the most of their abilities.47
People want to feel connected to those they work with; this is a basic human 
need.48 Respect and appreciation, courtesy and social support are essential to good 
work.49 People value workplace social relationships, which must be free of discrimi-
nation, aggression and bullying. If workers’ have bad relations with their bosses or 
colleagues, it is not good work.
2.3.3  Work-Life Balance
The third condition for good work is work-life balance. Good work entails working 
hours appropriate for one’s stage in life. Some people want to reduce their working 
hours when raising young children or if elderly parents require their care. Others 
want to work more, which can be facilitated by good public care provision for chil-
dren and the elderly. Yet others wish to continue working after the normal retirement 
age. Not everyone can or wants to follow the standard life-course of “study, work, 
rest”. Good work means fluidity and flexibility so that family life and personal 
42 Warr & Clapperton (2010).
43 Hodson (2001).
44 Bloodworth (2018), O’Connor (2016, September 8).
45 Kubicek et al. (2017).
46 Karasek (1979).
47 Felstead et al. (2016), Gallie & Zhou (2013), etui (2019). Workplace participation or democracy 
is emphasized by the ILO: the right to “decent” work is one thing, but it is even better if workers 
can help shape this right.
48 Deci & Ryan (1985).
49 Warr (1987, 2007).
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development can be combined with a career.50 This includes flexibility in the place 
and timing of work.
The line between work and private life has been blurred in the flexible labour 
market, where working hours and locations are often no longer fixed. While flexibil-
ity is often demanded unilaterally by the employer, good work is about flexibility 
for the employee, not about having to be available for work at all hours.51 It is also 
important that personal problems do not constantly interfere with work, that work-
ers are not repeatedly called away to care for a confused parent or to pick up a sick 
child from school. Employees must be allowed enough rest and time to work well.
Table 2.3 summarizes the three key conditions for good work and links them to 
12 indicators. We will return to them in our analysis of the Netherlands in subse-
quent chapters.
2.3.4  The Three Conditions for Good Work 
Do the above conditions for good work, as distilled from the scientific literature and 
summarized in Table 2.3, align with the wishes of Dutch society? Surveys find that 
people in the Netherlands, more than in any other European country, do not place paid 
work first on their list of priorities52 (see Fig. 2.1). On average, they attach greater 
importance to family, friendships and free time – a privilege of prosperous countries 
where joblessness does not risk basic livelihood.53 Both Dutch men and women wish 
to be able to combine paid work with free time and care responsibilities.54
Table 2.3 Three conditions for good work
Condition Indicators
1. Control over income Reasonable pay
Job security
Security of work
Material dimension of work Social security
2. Control over work Autonomy
Use and develop skills
Social support
Immaterial dimension of work Absence of aggression and discrimination
3. Control in life Part-time work
Paid leave
Influence over working hours
Work-life balance Good childcare and elderly care
50 Epstein & Kalleberg (2004), Schmid (2017).
51 A recruiter for flexible jobs in the uk has set up an innovation unit to create greater flexibility in 
the design of shifts, rosters and jobs for people currently lacking this opportunity: “Shift workers 
in retail and manufacturing, for example, and frontline staff such as nurses are often left out of the 
debate” (Financial Times, 11 October 2018).
52 Conen (2020): figure 1.
53 Wielers & Koster (2011).
54 Portegijs & van den Brakel (2016).
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55 Conen (2020).
56 There are differences between social groups. Men on average attach greater importance to extrin-
sic values than women, who more often privilege intrinsic and social values. Highly educated 
people also score higher on intrinsic values than those with less schooling, for whom extrinsic 
values are more important. See Conen (2020).
57 Freese (2008), Freese et al. (2008).
58 Conen (2020), see also van der Klein (2017).
Table 2.4 Work orientations in the Netherlands, employed labour force (in %), 1990–2018
1990 1999 2008 2018
Extrinsic work values
Good pay/high income 75 76 77 78
Good working hours 45 35▼ 57▲ 68▲
Job security 38 24▼ 42
Good holiday arrangements/extensive leave 36 26▼ 47▲ 45▲
Intrinsic work values
A job in which you can use your abilities 74 75 85▲
An interesting job/position 67 63 77▲
A working environment in which you know you can achieve 
something
44 41 67▲ 63▲
Social values
Pleasant workmates 94 92 96
A job useful to society 44 37 56▲
Note: ▼/▲p < 0.01; compared with 1990
Source: European Values Study, authors’ own calculations, weighted data, Conen (2020)
Table 2.4 shows that Dutch people want work that pays well. But it is even more 
important that their work is interesting and that it makes the most of their talents. A 
good salary is of great importance to more than three-quarters of the population, but 
people also want interesting work “in which you can use your abilities”. All things 
considered, Dutch workers attach more importance to the intrinsic aspects of work 
than do many other Europeans.55 In other words, the value of work lies mainly in the 
work itself. Workers in the Netherlands, more than in the rest of Europe, want their 
work to be “social”; they want pleasant colleagues. A sense of belonging at work is 
an important condition for good work.56
Although the expectations of employees today do not differ markedly from those 
of their 1970s predecessors, women’s growing participation in the labour force has 
generated new expectations regarding work-life balance.57 People attach greater 
value than ever before to reasonable working hours and generous holiday arrange-
ments so they can combine their personal and working lives (see Table 2.4). It is 
also striking how much having an interesting job and the ability to “achieve some-
thing” at work have grown in importance over the past three decades.
It is sometimes claimed that younger people see work very differently, that they 
attach less importance to job security. This is a “millennial myth” – this generation, 
too, wants good work that provides a secure livelihood.58 Everyone, regardless of 
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Fig. 2.2 Consequences of better work for the individual, the economy and society
age, appreciates a steady job, a good employer and a reasonable salary.59 Everyone, 
regardless of age, appreciates  the value of security. In sum, the quality of work, 
according to Dutch workers, concerns pay and security; autonomy and belonging in 
the workplace; and being able to combine work with private life.
2.4  Consequences of Good Work for the Individual, 
the Economy and Society
Good work is not only good for workers; employers and society gain as well. 
Figure 2.2 shows how.
2.4.1  Health and Well-Being
Good work is good for workers’ health and well-being, which means less absentee-
ism, higher productivity and lower costs for the welfare state. Numerous epidemio-
logical studies show a causal relationship between the quality of work and the health 
59 Freese (2008), Freese et al. (2008).
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and well-being of workers.60 Although this applies to physical health as well, it is 
especially – and increasingly – the case for mental health.61
Occupational health is associated primarily with conditions in the workplace and 
the extent to which workers have control over their working lives. There is a direct 
link between high – and above all continuous – work-related stress and medical 
complaints.62 Mental-health issues can arise when employees are insufficiently 
challenged, when they do not feel that their tasks match their abilities, or when they 
lack opportunities for advancement.63 Poor relationships with colleagues and bosses 
increase the risk of illness and can have major implications for a person’s mental 
health and subjective well-being.64
Box 2.4 Burnout: A Product of Changes in Work and Society
The best-known negative effect attributed to bad work is burnout: mental and 
emotional exhaustion often accompanied by physical fatigue, cynicism 
towards work, insufficient sleep and flagging self-confidence. Burnout has 
many causes. Broader social developments play a role; in the performance 
society, work is an indicator of success and having a busy job is a status sym-
bol.65 Meanwhile, we devote our leisure time to even more activity, from 
sports to maintaining a social media presence, leaving us scant time to recover 
from work.66
Other underlying causes of burnout can be traced to the changing nature of 
work, in particular its acceleration. The shift from an industrial to a service 
economy means that people are working less with their hands and more with 
their heads and hearts. Work nowadays is more likely to be mentally than 
physically taxing,67 altering the pattern of occupational illness.
Workers today have fewer opportunities to tune out. More likely to be 
working with others, they are expected to keep their interactions civil, even 
under trying circumstances.68 Many workers are increasingly engaged in emo-
tional labour, tasks that require them to suppress their own feelings or to 
express emotions they are not experiencing. This can lead to all kinds of 
exhaustion from burnout to compassion fatigue, the diminished ability to feel 
empathy.
60 Eurofound (2017): 36.
61 van Echtelt (2020).
62 Bierings (2017), Gallie & Zhou (2013), Smulders & van den Bossche (2006), Béjean & Sultan-
Taïeb (2005), Shvartsman & Beckmann (2015).
63 Hupkens (2005), Smulders et al. (2013).
64 Schaufeli et al. (2009).
65 Pfauth et al. (2016, April 12).
66 van Echtelt (2014).
67 Houtman et al. (2008).
68 van Bergen (2016).
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A great deal of research has been done on occupational factors that affect health. 
Of the frameworks seeking to predict which employees are at increased risk of ill-
ness, the demand-control model,69 the effort-reward imbalance model70 and the job 
demands-resources model are probably the best known.71 All recognize that certain 
negative factors (job requirements) increase the incidence of medical complaints 
and that certain positive factors (resources) reduce it.72
Excessive workload is undeniably a negative factor: employees under great pres-
sure are more likely to suffer symptoms of burnout.73 While such pressure is usually 
manageable for short periods, prolonged exposure to stress puts the body in a con-
stant state of maximum preparedness, which renders relaxation difficult.74 Working 
to tight deadlines is fine so long as workers are allowed enough rest between them. 
Interruptions such as phone alerts are also not a problem unless they occur continu-
ously and undermine concentration, which increases the chances of burnout.75
To deal with the causes of workplace stress, employees need resources and con-
trol options at their disposal. With support from managers and colleagues, they are 
less likely to suffer from health issues.76 Being able to talk freely about difficulties 
helps, which can also make it easier to hand work over to colleagues.77 But col-
leagues can also be part of the problem when relationships are strained or when 
there is bullying in the workplace.78 Autonomy at work can provide protection 
against illness and burnout. Heavy workloads can be better managed when workers 
are able to decide when and how they perform their tasks; workers entrusted with 
responsibility also feel more appreciated.79 This is probably why people who are 
their own boss are less likely to burn out.80
69 Karasek (1979).
70 Siegrist (1996).
71 Demerouti et al. (2001), Schaufeli & Taris (2013).
72 van Echtelt (2014).
73 Bierings & Mol (2012), Schaufeli & Bakker (2013b), Smulders et al. (2013).
74 van den Broeck et al. (2010).
75 Newport (2016), tno (2017), van Bergen (2016).
76 Bierings & Mol (2012), Crawford et al. (2010), Demerouti et al. (2001).
77 Halbesleben (2006).
78 Houtman et al. (2008).
79 Muller et al. (2015), Bierings & Mol (2012), Smulders & van den Bossche (2017).
80 tno (2016).
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The material aspects of work influence psychological well-being. Low earnings 
can lead to poverty while the poor are more likely to suffer poor health.83 Job inse-
curity, especially flexible contracts, can negatively affect mental health.84 
International research consistently finds a link between long-term temporary work-
ing and the greater risk of health problems. Studies in the Netherlands are less clear- 
cut on this point, perhaps because people with chronic medical conditions are less 
likely to be working due to the country’s robust social-security system. Temporary 
agency work appears to have negative health effects while self-employed profes-
sionals report better health.85
Work-life imbalance has psychological consequences. People who work long 
days are more likely to burn out,86 while disrupting an existing equilibrium between 
care-giving and work often undermines health, well-being and workplace function-
ing.87 Having to be continuously available for work can generate considerable stress 
for “task combiners”. While combining work with care-giving does not necessarily 
Box 2.5 Emotional Labour in the Service Economy
“Emotional labour” is increasingly widespread in the service economy, where 
more and more workers are expected to manage their feelings to present a 
particular image to clients and customers. In The Managed Heart, sociologist 
Arlie Hochschild81 shows how flight attendants are trained and controlled to 
be pleasant (smile!) at all times. Emotional labour, she warns, can lead to 
alienation, especially if one’s feelings do not match how one is expected to 
behave. This effect increases when a worker is being watched by a boss or 
colleagues. Since Hochschild coined the term, emotional labour has been 
studied in workplaces ranging from call centres to schools and hospitals. As 
the service economy expands, aspects of emotional labour are encroaching 
onto less obvious professions, for example movers and plumbers who must 
deal with customers of all kinds.
Although emotional labour can make work meaningful – it may add an 
extra or deeper dimension to the job – it can also lead to stress and burnout. 
This is especially the case when there is “emotional dissonance”  – when 
workers, like actors, must feign emotions they are not actually feeling. People 
who work closely with others are more likely to take sick leave and suffer 
burnout. This is why emotional capital – the ability to feel and manage emo-
tions – has become an increasingly important asset in the workplace.82
81 Hochschild (1983).
82 For more on this, see Heuven (2013), Cottingham (2016).
83 de Hek et al. (2018), Broeders et al. (2018).
84 Gallie (2013), Kalleberg (2018), see also Kremer et al. (2017a).
85 Chkalova & van Gaalen (2019).
86 Eurofound (2018).
87 Henkens & van Sollinge (2017).
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lead to stress or mental health problems, those who feel their work and care respon-
sibilities are out of balance are more likely to experience symptoms of burnout.88
Much also depends on the worker’s network of social support. Do they have 
people they can turn to at home for help with work-related stress, and people at 
work who can assist when they have domestic troubles? Tellingly, burnout is less 
common among task combiners, perhaps because their families offer more sup-
port.89 But if there are problems at home – for example with the children or finances – 
the risk of burnout increases.90 The incidence of sick leave is also higher among 
working care-givers; the longer they combine care duties and work, the longer they 
are off sick.91 Conversely, good work can have a protective effect, for example by 
keeping working care-givers from being overburdened by their care responsibilities. 
In short, the right combination of personal and work activities can energize employ-
ees and improve their productivity, motivation and engagement.
What are the consequences for society if work is not good? The resulting health 
problems increase absenteeism. Alongside workplace conflict, health problems – 
especially psychological ones  – are the main reason people take time off from 
work.92 A significant proportion of absenteeism is due to problems with the work 
itself93: overwork and stress are increasingly cited as reasons for reporting sick.94 
The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment estimates that 
unfavourable working conditions cause 4.6% of the total burden of disease in the 
country, the same order of magnitude as environmental factors (5.7%), physical 
inactivity (3.5%) and obesity (5.2%).95
Absenteeism is detrimental not only for workers but for employers and society. 
The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research calculates that an 
employee idle for a year due to burnout costs at least €60,00096 and that all work- 
related absenteeism costs an estimated €5 billion annually. Of this, €2.7 billion can 
be attributed to “psychosocial workload”. In addition, healthcare costs for people 
with occupational disorders amount to €1.6 billion, and for occupational disabili-
ties, €2.1 billion. In total, work-related health conditions cost the Netherlands €8.7 
billion in 2018.97
Good work can contribute to keeping people at work and keeping them in work 
longer, as well as enabling those with health problems to return to the workforce.98 
88 Pot & Smulders (2019); see Chap. 3.
89 Bierings & Mol(2012).
90 Chandola (2010), Meijman & Zijlstra (2006).
91 de Klerk et al. (2015).
92 Gallie (2007a), Eurofound (2017).
93 Johnson et al. (2018); see also Chap. 6.
94 Pressure or stress at work was cited as the cause of absenteeism in 42.5% of cases in 2017; in 
2015 it was 37% (tno 2019).
95 rivm (2019).
96 See Wester (2017, June 19).
97 tno (2019).
98 oecd (2018a).
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In addition to absenteeism, work-related psychological complaints can lead to “pre-
senteeism” – the employee turning up to work but doing little once there, for exam-
ple due to chronic fatigue. Improving the quality of work, the oecd concludes, 
reduces absenteeism and losses in productivity99 as workers become more physi-
cally and mentally present. In short, investing in good work benefits employees, 
employers and society alike. Good work is good for everyone.
2.4.2  Engagement
One consequence of good work is engagement,100 deftly described in workplaces 
past and present by the sociologist Richard Sennett101 in The Craftsman. Employee 
engagement affects how organizations function.102 Engaged employees work harder 
and deliver better results.103 Effectory – a firm that has surveyed employees across 
Dutch companies and institutions, including the entire central government – no lon-
ger only asks about job satisfaction, which it deems a too-passive concept. 
Nowadays, Effectory asks about enthusiasm at work and commitment to the organi-
zation.104 Alongside the formal contract, every employment relationship contains a 
reciprocal “psychological contract”, “a perception of promises made between 
employer and employee, expressed or implied, about their exchange 
relationship.”105
Employers able to engage their employees, typically through non-hierarchical 
relationships, consultation and worker participation, promote “organizational citi-
zenship behaviour”. Staff are then more inclined to take on work left by absent col-
leagues, to not cause problems for others and to commit themselves to the 
company.106 When people feel safe, secure, supported and appreciated at work, they 
often do more for the organization than is required by their formal contract.107 Such 
engagement is good not only for the functioning of the company, but benefits its 
clients.108
99 See also eu-osha (2014).
100 Bakker & Schaufeli (2015); see also www.arnoldbakker.com
101 Sennett (2008).




106 See also Felstead et al. (2016).
107 Dekker & Freese (2018); see also research by economists such as Stiglitz on the “efficiency 
wage”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficiency_wage
108 See also Schaufeli & Bakker (2013a) and www.arnoldbakker.com
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Good work contributes to innovation and economic growth by encouraging 
workers to think about how products, services and work processes can be 
improved.109 Eurofound finds that “job quality contributes to developing organisa-
tional commitment and motivation among workers, as well as shaping a climate that 
is supportive of creativity and innovation”.110 Social innovation – structuring work 
organizations in ways that bring out the best in people (see Box 2.6) – is crucial for 
our knowledge and service economy, which primarily depends on human capital.111 
Innovations often happen when employees have ideas about how work processes 
can be improved. But this only happens when workers enjoy real autonomy. Offices 
are cleaned better and faster when cleaners can suggest improvements.112 Starbucks’ 
Frappuccino was the brainchild of an employee given room to experiment after 
returning from a holiday in Greece.
Insecurity at work inhibits innovative behaviour. Companies that depend on flex-
ible workers tend to focus on bureaucracy and controlling their staff.113 Temporary 
contracts also undermine innovative behaviour.114 Staff who do not know whether 
they will be employed in a few months have few incentives to brainstorm improve-
ments or to provide feedback on how things could be done better. Lack of autonomy 
interacts with job insecurity to adversely affect innovation and economic growth.
Box 2.6 Social Innovation in the Netherlands: Past, Present and 
Future115
At the beginning of this century, Dutch employers’ organizations and trade 
unions agreed to promote “social innovation”.116 They joined the Smarter 
Work Platform, and later, the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation, in 
which academic institutions also participated. In a 2005 report, the Social 
Innovation Task Force described social innovation as “renewing the work 
organization and maximizing its use of skills with the aim of improving busi-
ness performance and talent development.”117 The Netherlands Centre for 
Social Innovation received government support; one of the national employ-
ers’ association (awvn) played a major role in the initiative, focusing on 
co-creation.
109 Pot et al. (2009).
110 Eurofound (2017): 36.
111 van Hoorn (2015), wrr (2013a).
112 Gallie & Zhou (in press).
113 Kleinknecht (2014).
114 de Spiegelaere (2017).
115 With thanks to Frank Pot.
116 “Exercising control over labour and technology occurs under a variety of headings: different 
organization, smarter organization, working differently, smarter working, social innovation, inno-
vative work organization, empowering people, high-involvement organization, and so on” 
(Pot 2019b).
117 Taskforce Sociale Innovatie (2005).
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2.4.3  Sense of Community
Finally, good work is good for the individual’s sense of belonging to the community 
and for social cohesion. Insufficient income and insecure work limit opportunities 
in the housing market and, especially for men, in the life-partner market. People 
with permanent positions are more likely to have children.121 For young flexible 
workers, putting off starting a family is almost the norm; as a German Minister of 
Family Affairs once said, temporary contracts are “the best contraceptive”.122 The 
same applies to possibilities for combining work and care; countries with paid 
parental leave have higher birth rates.123 Workers with both uncertain and irregular 
hours can never be sure if and when they will be called into work and so experience 
particular difficulties combining work and care.124 The consequences of good work 
thus extend to social and family life.
Box 2.6 (continued)
As a concept, social innovation is meant to offset the general bias towards 
technological innovation. It is about “the participative and interrelated renewal 
of work, organizations and personnel policy in order to improve human func-
tioning and so take organizational performance, the quality of work and 
labour relations to a higher level. Obviously, this will almost always be done 
in conjunction with technological innovation.”118 “Organizational perfor-
mance” here primarily refers to labour productivity and innovative ability; 
“quality of work” to enriching tasks, developing skills and mitigating stress- 
related risks. An evaluation of 10 years of social innovation in the Netherlands 
found that organizations committed to the concept had gone some way to 
achieve these goals.119
The number of socially innovative companies nevertheless remains lim-
ited. In 2019, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment announced that 
he would turn to the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands – an 
advisory body of employers, employees and independent experts – for advice 
on the “broader and better application of social innovation”, meaning smarter 
working, flexible organization, co-creation and dynamic management.120
118 Pot (2012).
119 Xavier & Pot (2012).
120 See www.ser.nl/-/media/ser/downloads/werkprogramma/ser-adviesaanvragen-2019.pdf?la=nl&
hash=6B5619DD5614B3E30413DAE37B8E746B
121 Verweij & Stulp (2019, August 29); ser (2016b).
122 van der Klein (2017).
123 Rovny (2011), Olivetti & Petrongolo (2017).
124 Kremer (2017), Ballafkih et al. (2017).
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Lack of good work can fuel social discontent. More and more workers in jobs 
with low wages, little security, scant autonomy and few or no control options are 
turning their backs on society and growing pessimistic about the future.125 Why is 
this happening? First of all, bad work is widely experienced as demeaning. People 
in such jobs feel little respect and appreciation, and often sense that they are inter-
changeable: “If you go, there are ten more waiting to take your place”.126 Negative 
workplace experiences – tasks one is overqualified for, discrimination or “flexism” 
(the unequal treatment of people with temporary positions) – are easily projected 
onto society as a whole. Second, social unease grows when people do not experi-
ence control over their own lives, their futures and that of their children.127 This 
leaves them unable to look ahead, consigned to be “prisoners of the present”.128 As 
work is central to everyone’s existence, job insecurity easily engenders insecurity in 
all aspects of life.129 Finally, bad work can induce feelings of marginalization, espe-
cially when others are perceived to have better work. If their work seems peripheral, 
people have no incentive to engage. Better work can draw people towards the heart 
of society.
Sharp distinctions between good and bad jobs can put social cohesion under 
particular pressure. Indeed, qualitative job polarization may trigger all kinds of new 
social problems from the increased mistrust of institutions and incidence of mental 
ill-health130 to the creation or deepening of social divisions along education, 
gender and ethnic lines. Good work for all is crucial for society.
2.5  Conclusion: Good Work Means Control
People in the Netherlands do not want work to dominate their lives, crowding out 
family and leisure time. But paid work continues to have important social functions. 
Work provides status and gives people the feeling that they are contributing to 
something larger than themselves. Work is a major source of self-esteem, satisfac-
tion and a sense of belonging – but only if it fulfils certain requirements.
The scientific literature reveals three key conditions for good work, all of which 
align with the expressed wishes of Dutch workers and the needs of the country’s 
economy.
 1. Control over income. Good work provides financial security, also in the long
term, and a fair wage.
125 See Engbersen et al. (2017).
126 Hodson (2001).
127 See also Vrooman (2016).
128 Silva (2013).
129 van Dijk et al. (2018).
130 Wilkinson & Pickett (2009), Pickett & Wilkinson (2018), Therborn (2013), see also Kremer 
et al. (2014).
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 2. Control over work. Good work allows for appropriate workplace autonomy and 
supportive social relationships.
 3. Control in life. Good work allows sufficient time and space to combine work 
with care responsibilities and a private life.
For work to qualify as good, all three conditions must be met; they cannot be 
traded off against one another. While one condition might (temporarily) trump 
another in individual cases, proportionality is crucial. While autonomy is a hallmark 
of good work, workers can also suffer from too much latitude. Although good work 
allows workers to have private lives away from the workplace, it also allows reason-
able demands to be placed upon workers.
People without (good) work suffer psychological and social consequences. Good 
work increases workers’ well-being and makes them feel visible, recognized and 
part of society. Work that is not good is problematic not only for the individual 
worker but for society. The economy benefits from productive workers, not from 
those who are made ill or exhausted (which ultimately undermines the finances of 
the welfare state). Engaged workers benefit the economy by contributing to well- 
functioning companies and workplace innovation. Good work benefits social cohe-
sion by enabling workers to build social relationships, feel recognized and look 
ahead rather than living on society’s margins. To maximize social cohesion, every-
one must have good work.
The following three chapters focus on the quality of work in the Netherlands. Where 
does the country have the most to improve? How are new technologies, flexible 
contracts and new workplace pressures affecting Dutch workers? We focus in turn 
on control over income (Chap. 3), control over work (Chap. 4) and control in life 
(Chap. 5).
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(continued)
 A Day at Work: The Primary-School Teacher
Marijke, a self-proclaimed teacher in heart and soul, has been in the class-
room for more than 25 years. She is at school by 7.30 am each day, where she 
teaches a third- grade class. Today she has the help of a trainee teaching assis-
tant who comes in once a week. Marijke prepares the lessons while the teach-
ing assistant sets up the classroom. The 29 miniature desks are arranged in six 
groups, crammed into the available space.
The children start trickling in at 8.20 with their parents. Within minutes the 
place is bustling. Some parents read or play with their children; others need to 
see “Miss” about something or ask her “a quick question”. Then Marijke 
claps her hands and shouts, “Let’s start!”
The first lesson today is reading. The assistant takes a handful of pupils 
who are behind in their reading out of the classroom to teach them separately. 
Those left behind read independently in groups. Marijke calls those children 
whom she suspects have dyslexia up to her desk, one by one. Half an hour 
later the class is reunited. The reading books are put away and language text-
books come out. After some commotion and instruction, the children again 
work on their own. This gives Marijke and the assistant space to help those 
who get stuck one-to-one. Hands are going up all the time. The maths lesson 
after the break is similar: a short introduction followed by independent work. 
Marijke walks around the classroom, at times giving pupils individual atten-
tion, but “always less than you would like”. The children are allowed to ask 
each other for help “but kids just tend to give the right answer rather than 
explaining how it works”.
Children differ not only in achievement, but in learning skills, working pace 
and behaviour. Identifying and responding effectively to such differences is the 
big challenge facing teachers, says Marijke. The magic words are differentiation 
and customization. With 29 faces looking at her, that is a task and a half. “On the 
days without an assistant, I can’t give the kids all the guidance they need.”
The children are tested regularly to monitor their development. While their 
scores reveal deviations from average performance, Marijke says they do not 
take into account the child’s individual circumstances. While she takes the 
results with a pinch of salt, Marijke realizes her attitude is a luxury she can 
afford due to her experience; things are harder for her younger colleagues. The 
tests take up a lot of teaching time – three to four times a year for 29 children in 
Dutch language, reading and maths – and generate a lot of administrative work. 
Each pupil’s results and how they affect the way he or she is taught must be 
recorded in a digital tracking system. Marijke does some of this work at home.
“Appropriate education” – recently added to Marijke’s job description – 
aims to keep children with learning difficulties, from Down’s syndrome to 
autism, in mainstream education as much as possible. It requires additional 
expertise. The teaching profession is changing, says Marijke. Co-ordination is 
essential for pupils across the spectrum of abilities to flourish throughout their 
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school careers. Teaching is increasingly becoming a team effort, at the expense 
of the individual teacher’s autonomy.
The relationship with parents is also more intensive than when Marijke 
entered the profession, with both under-involved and over-involved parents 
creating further stress. But Marijke is no shrinking violet and knows how to 
manage both. “Parents demand attention – and rightly so, as long as it’s about 
their child, not themselves – but they also need to realize that there are 20 to 
30 other children who also deserve attention.”
This afternoon, one parent arrives too late to pick up his child. Marijke 
must thus play babysitter. She then has a meeting with another parent about 
examining her child for suspected autism. While Marijke knows how to keep 
the meeting to the agreed 20 minutes, not all of her colleagues are so adept at 
time management. She then sits down with the trainee teaching assistant to 
discuss her progress. They then tidy the classroom together and prepare for 
the next day. As they are doing so, another teacher enters, in need of a shoul-
der to cry on. After she has left, Marijke expresses her own concerns: 
“Teachers want the best for the kids, so it can be hard to draw boundaries. 
Especially for the younger ones. They experience real emotional distress.”
At 5.15 pm Marijke shuts down her computer and checks her to-do list for 
the day. Only half of the items can be crossed off. Later tonight, at home, she 
will go through her e-mails, including some from parents. It is 5.30 pm when 
she finally leaves the school, 10 h after arriving.
The Netherlands has 155,000 primary-school teachers, more than 80 per cent 
of them women. Most have vocational degrees; two-thirds work part-time. 
Teaching leads all professions in work-related stress. The rate of sick leave is 50 
per cent higher than the average for all occupations. A full-time primary teacher 
earns between €2600 and €4200 gross per month. The average (modal) income 
in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 euros per month, excluding 
holiday pay. Since 2017, primary-school teachers have been campaigning to 
reduce their workload and for pay rises to bring their salaries in line with those 
of secondary-school teachers, who also typically have vocational degrees.
2 The Importance of Better Work
Part I
Good Work: Development and Current 
Status
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The Netherlands does not top international tables when it comes to the quality of 
work.1 Compared to many other countries, the Netherlands has low unemployment, 
which remained the case in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis  and the recent 
Covid-19 crisis. Security of employment  – a person’s general employability or 
chance of having a job – is relatively high. Statistics Netherlands reports that many 
jobs have been created in recent decades, and that the Dutch have never worked so 
much as now.2 The quantity of work does not seem to be a problem.
The Netherlands’ middling position with regard to the quality of work is mainly 
due to the flexibility of its labour market. While jobs exist, they are increasingly 
insecure. This chapter delves into the workings of the Dutch flexible labour market, 
including security of employment, opportunities for training and professional devel-
opment, social security and wages. What has changed in recent decades? How have 
new technologies and flexible contracts affected income security? Have identifiable 
groups of workers been affected differently?
3.1  Insecure Work
Just under two-thirds (64%) of all Dutch workers have permanent contracts; just 
over a third (36%) have some form of flexible work. The pre-pandemic economy 
was generating both permanent and temporary jobs, most notably on-call and casual 
work. The number of self- employed persons (those without employees of their own) 
was also rising, albeit at a slower pace than a few years ago. In 2018 there were 1.1 
1 oecd (2016a), Eurofound (2017).
2 cbs (2019a).
50
million self-employed persons in the Netherlands.3 About half of them also had 
income from a pension, benefits or a job with an employer (Fig. 3.1).4
While more and more people across the board find themselves in the flexible 
labour market, temporary contracts – especially agency and on-call work – tend to 
be concentrated in specific groups: the young, the less skilled, women and people 
with migration backgrounds.5 Insecure work is thus distributed unevenly; the higher 
one’s level of education, the more likely one will have a permanent contract 
(Fig. 3.2). The gaps are also widening: while a quarter of high school graduates had 
flexible contracts 10 years ago, by 2018 it was more than one-third (35%). For those 
with higher education, the corresponding figures were 11% and 15%. The recent 
rise in permanent employment has mainly benefited the highly educated.6
A higher proportion of high-school graduates are employed in the Netherlands 
than in Germany or France.7 Nevertheless, this group remains on the margins of the 














Fig. 3.1 Working people by type of contract, 2010–2018
Source: cbs StatLine
3 These are people whose primary occupation is classified as “self-employment without staff”. 
When those who undertake freelance or similar work for extra income are included, the number is 
1.5 million.
4 cbs StatLine; Kremer et al. (2017c).
5 Kremer et al. (2017c), van Echtelt et al. (2016), Euwals et al. (2016), Wennekers et al. (2019). 
Men, people with migrant backgrounds and the lower skilled are also more likely to remain on 
temporary contracts for extended periods (Bolhaar et al. 2016).
6 cbs (2019c, May 29).
7 https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rates-by-education-level.htm
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especially those employed through agencies, are less happy with their work and 
lives than the workforce as a whole; the vast majority would prefer a permanent 
contract.8
In contrast, the self-employed tend to be content with their work. Although it was 
not always their choice to start out on their own, over time most are happy to be their 
own boss.9 They particularly value the freedom and autonomy that accompanies 
self-employment, working in a way and at a place and time of their own choosing 
(see sect. 3.2). Self-employment is also democratizing, with people from all walks 
of life setting up on their own. Nevertheless, the typical self-employed person 
remains highly educated, male and aged over 45.10 There are considerable differ-
ences within this group. The IT consultant who goes freelance at the age of 55 with 
a substantial pension pot and home equity, a working partner and his previous 
employer as customer cannot be compared to a self-employed builder or an up-and- 
coming freelance talent in music or journalism. The differences in income and asset 
base between self-employed individuals are huge – far larger than those between 
employees.11 While no category of worker is as diverse, the self-employed, 
Fixed employment relationship














Fig. 3.2 Form of employment by level of education, 2018 versus 2003 (x 1000)
Source: Commissie regulering van werk 2019
8 van Echtelt et al. (2016), cbs (2017b, October 24).
9 According to the tno Self-Employment Survey (Van der Torre et al. 2019), one in ten of these 
people would prefer conventional employment.
10 cbs (2018g).
11 Rijksoverheid (2015), Kremer et al. (2017c), cbs (n.d.). According to Statistics Netherlands, the 
incomes of the self-employed in 2019 were “clearly more skewed” in their distribution than those 
of working people (https://longreads.cbs.nl/welvaartinnederland-2019/welvaart-van-werkenden/)
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compared to their employed counterparts, all share one thing: less income security. 
The market in which they specialize may collapse, think about the effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, or they may be struck down by illness or their partner might 
leave them.
3.1.1  Insecurity
Insecurity is the price many flexible workers pay. Research by one of the authors of 
this book (Kremer) amongst self-employed individuals and employees on tempo-
rary contracts shows that this phenomenon means different things to different flex-
ible workers. It sometimes has a positive ring to it.12 High-earning professionals 
who turn freelance towards the end of their careers and recent university graduates 
who have landed their first temporary contract may well experience insecurity as 
expectant tension. Not knowing what is coming is preferable to stone-cold certainty 
12 Kremer (2017).
13 Gray & Suri (2019).
14 See, for example, Arets & Frenken (2019).
Box 3.1 Insecure Work with Online Platforms
Online platforms such as the taxi-hailing app Uber and Werkspot, an app for 
jobs about the house, claim that workers are free to use them or not. While the 
idea is that people can work on their own terms, when and where they want, 
in practice this is not always the case. People are often judged by their avail-
ability, the ability to refuse work can be limited, and reviews by sometimes 
fickle customers can result in jobs no longer being offered. The fear of losing 
work is stress-inducing and leads to exceedingly long working days. There is 
never a guarantee of work, never mind how much – less of a problem for 
people who do platform work on the side than for those trying to live on it.13
For people struggling to start out, platforms can be a relatively easy way to 
access work. But there is considerable controversy over the quality of much 
of this work. Legal proceedings about the rights of platform workers are 
underway in many countries, with local and national governments occasion-
ally stepping in to regulate services. Some platform workers have begun orga-
nizing themselves14 to fight for more rights and greater security. These groups 
also give platform workers a venue to share their experiences and to support 
each other. When your boss is an algorithm, there are no opportunities to meet 
colleagues around the coffee machine or water cooler.
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about what they will be doing a year from now – “my worst nightmare” according 
to one young woman. Uncertainty for these people means “change”, which gives 
them the feeling of personal growth.
But insecurity certainly has its downsides, too. Insecurity for many people means 
financial stress. Will there be food on the table tomorrow or in 6 months’ time? 
Such uncertainty can affect sleep and mental health, but can have broader economic 
impact by for instance postponing consumer spending.15 If one is unsure about one’s 
income 6 months from now, buying a new TV or booking a holiday is no easy 
decision.
Work-related insecurity also leads to life-course insecurity. People want to look 
ahead and make plans for the future, but this can be difficult for freelances and tem-
porary workers. People in the Netherlands typically think about starting a family 
from about age 25, but this is usually beyond the means of young self-employed or 
temporary workers.16 A German government minister once described flexible work 
as the best form of contraception, and this also applies to the Netherlands. Particularly 
women in temporary employment tend to postpone having children.17
Finally, uncertainty often means lack of recognition and appreciation. Colleagues 
and especially employers often treat flexible workers differently than permanent 
employees, a phenomenon known as flexism. Examples include being denied train-
ing or access to important workplace meetings. In the Dutch political debate, 
employability has long been seen as more important than job security.18 But for 
many workers, a permanent contract has not only practical value – it allows one to 
rent or buy a home – but symbolic significance. When it means moving from one 
temporary job to the next, flexible contracts give people the feeling that they are 
expendable: “If you go, there are ten people waiting to take your place.” In the 
words of a temporary healthcare worker: “I’m a puppet and if I’m sick or can’t come 
into work, someone else will. That has opened my eyes.”19
Most people value security – a crucial feature of good work. But there is a sig-
nificant gap between most people’s wishes and reality.20 While the flexible labour 
market may help more people find work, especially temporary and on-call work 
clearly have adverse social and economic consequences (see Chap. 2). These range 
from discouraging innovation in the workplace because people have scant incentive 
to take initiative, to putting off starting a family and general societal 
dissatisfaction.
15 Dekker and Vergeer (2007) show that greater job insecurity leads to lower or postponed con-
sumer spending as well as slower economic recovery after a recession.
16 van der Klein (2017).
17 Chkalova & van Gaalen (2017).
18 wrr (2017).




3.2  Social Security and Insecurity
The safety net provided by the Dutch social-security system has been steadily with-
drawing its protections against personal financial insecurity. Although the self- 
employed can claim basic subsistence benefits, these are much lower than the 
work-related benefits employees contribute to. They can only be accessed after 3 
months without work, and only when the applicant has neither assets nor an earning 
partner. Self-employed individuals are also entitled to a basic state pension, but not 
to disability benefits or a state earnings-indexed pension.21 While many European 
countries wholly or partly exclude the self-employed from such schemes, the 
Netherlands is among the countries with the fewest statutory provisions for this 
group. In Belgium the self-employed must join a social insurance fund of their 
choice; in Germany they can join sector-specific disability insurance schemes.22
Self-employed persons in the Netherlands have generous tax allowances, 
designed to stimulate entrepreneurship and to allow them to individually cover 
themselves against occupational risks.23 In practice, few take out private disability 
insurance. This is not because the self-employed are foolhardy24 – many are deeply 
worried about incapacity to work – but because they are deterred by high premiums 
(due to negative selection), strict acceptance criteria and the small print in available 
policies: “Will I actually be paid if I become unable to work?”25 There are few alter-
natives to the commercial insurance market. A tiny proportion contribute to “mutual 
aid funds” (see Box 3.2); others are saving towards a private pension. Few make use 
of opportunities to join existing pension initiatives.26
Self-employed individuals without their own insurance cover and savings thus 
rely on the public purse when they are no longer able to work. Once they reach 
retirement age, they can draw a basic state pension although this on its own is barely 
enough to keep them out of poverty. In the event of unemployment or disability, 
they can only apply for a basic subsistence benefit if they have no earning partner to 
support them.27
21 Goudswaard & Caminada (2017).
22 See also European Commission (2017).
23 Rijksoverheid (2015).
24 Conen & Debets (2019); see also Kremer (2017).
25 According to the tno Self-Employment Survey (Van der Torre et al. 2019), four in ten have no 
unemployment or disability risk cover of any kind: they are not insured, do not deposit money in a 
mutual aid fund and have no investments or savings. The great majority cite high costs. Sufficient 
assets or the ability to fall back on a partner’s income are rarely mentioned (Rijksoverheid 2015).
26 Berkhout & Euwals (2016), Goudswaard & Caminada (2017).
27 Self-employed persons with assets can claim basic welfare benefits more easily than employees; 
there are special arrangements for this group (Self-Employed Workers Benefit Decree).
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The Dutch interdepartmental policy study Self-Employed Persons without Staff 
concluded in 2015 that this group’s distinctive tax arrangements and exemption 
from social insurance premiums sets them apart from regular employees. This 
applies at all income levels. A self-employed person with gross earnings equivalent 
to the national minimum wage will retain 87% of this income after statutory deduc-
tions, an employee just 72%. At twice the national average (modal) income, the 
self-employed retain 55% and employees, 46%. This does not take into account 
amounts reserved for private pension contributions and sickness or disability insur-
ance, which are voluntary for the self-employed. But even when these are included, 
a self-employed person with a modal income retains approximately €11,000 a year 
more than an employee. On the other hand, the self-employed must offset potential 
loss of income during periods when they have no assignments. For their clients, 
using freelances can have significant cost benefits; calculations by the oecd29 show 
that doing so can reduce labour costs by up to 37% – although the actual amount 
depends on the individual entrepreneur’s bargaining position and can thus vary con-
siderably. For those at the bottom of the market, it is the employer who most likely 
benefits. At the top of the market, the advantage lies with the supplier.30
According to the interdepartmental policy study, the rapid growth of Dutch self- 
employment may well have been fuelled by these tax and social insurance differen-
tials. Depending on who is best able to take advantage of the arrangement, issuing 
and taking on assignments on a self-employed basis can be financially attractive for 
clients, workers, or both. The study concludes: “On balance, the effect upon the 
government finances of the growth in the number of self-employed persons without 
Box 3.2 Mutual Aid Funds: Insurance for the Self-Employed
Local mutual aid funds have recently emerged to provide independent entre-
preneurs with an alternative to expensive private insurance against disability. 
Membership is limited to a maximum of 50 people, each contributing a small 
sum each month (between €34 and €112). The idea is that this keeps the 
arrangement transparent because everyone knows each other. In case of a 
member falling ill, the fund usually pays a modest amount (between €750 and 
€2500) per month for a maximum of 2 years. The first mutual aid fund was set 
up in 2006; there are now about 500 across the Netherlands, with a total of 
more than 22,000 members.28
28 ten Houte de Lange (2018, July 3); van der Meer (2017); www.broodfonds.nl
29 oecd (2019a).
30 The oecd calculates in its report for the Netherlands Independent Commission on the Regulation 
of Work: “Considering an unmarried individual without children and earning the gross average 
wage for employees, the firm could pay a total employment cost of eur 40,911 (with a payment 
wedge of 22%) for an unincorporated self-employed contractor instead of eur 64,960 for a stan-
dard employee (with a payment wedge of 51%). This represents a total labour cost saving for the 
firm of 37%” (oecd 2019a: 21).
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staff is very likely to be negative.”31 Although this group currently makes scant use 
of the benefits system, this could change in the future. As this would undermine 
public support for the system, there is no justification for retaining differential treat-
ment. As the same study points out, “From the protection point of view, in many 
cases there is little reason to treat self-employed workers and employees differently. 
The self-employed, like employees, run health risks at work and experience similar 
problems in assessing their sickness, disability and longevity risks.”32 The exclusion 
of the self-employed from the Dutch social-security system – that is, up until the 
Covid-19 pandemic – not only affects them as individuals; it may prove detrimental 
to the system’s long-term solidarity and financial sustainability.
3.2.1  Workers on Temporary Contracts
Are workers on temporary contracts better covered by the Dutch social-security 
system? While they have proportional access to its provisions, the rules around ben-
efits and incapacity insurance are insufficiently geared to today’s fluid and hybrid 
labour market.33 If on-call workers have monthly fluctuations in their earnings – 
sometimes placing them above subsistence level and sometimes well below it – they 
face bureaucratic hurdles when applying for benefits to supplement their income. 
Similarly, those who go from one temporary job to the next and claim benefits 
between contracts must face labyrinthine rules that generate a great deal of uncer-
tainty. The social-security system seems incapable of providing the level of flexibil-
ity needed to cope with the fickleness of temporary work.
While temporary workers have a full package of rights on paper, things are not 
always so clear-cut in practice. Take expectant parents: they have a legal right to 
parental leave but their temporary contracts are not automatically extended for the 
period of leave.34 Employees on extended sick leave are entitled to assistance rein-
tegrating into the workplace, but only for the duration of their contracts. What is the 
chance that their employer will keep them on once the contract has expired? In 
practice, formal legal equivalence is often not what it seems.
The social-security rules are often cited as a reason for the burgeoning flexible 
labour market in the Netherlands.35 The prevalence of temporary work, for example, 
31 “The emergence of individual self-employment has, to a limited extent, been accompanied by 
positive external effects. On the other side of the coin, however, are lower tax and national insur-
ance yields and higher expenditure on tax allowances. On balance, the effect on the public finances 
of the growth in the number of self-employed individuals is very likely to be negative” 
(Rijksoverheid 2015: xiii).
32 Rijksoverheid (2015): xiii.
33 See, for example, Bannink (2018).
34 Plantenga (2017).
35 The prospect of entitlement to a state pension or benefits can make individual self-employment 
an attractive option. See Kremer (2017), Conen & Debets (2019).
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is often attributed to the country’s stringent rules surrounding sickness and incapac-
ity.36 When workers with permanent contracts fall ill, employers must continue pay-
ing their salaries for 2 years and help them to reintegrate into work. While this 
arrangement has cut the incidence of long-term sick leave, it also makes especially 
small and medium-sized enterprises hesitant about hiring people on a permanent 
basis. While research commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs shows that 
75% of employers are insured against long-term sick leave, 45% still see it as an 
obstacle to recruitment37 – the financial obligations less than the labyrinthine paper-
work and the reintegration requirement. This then begs the question why it is mainly 
larger companies that make use of flexible contracts.38 Having studied all the pos-
sible explanations for the Netherlands’ leading position in flexible work, Paul de 
Beer concludes that it is mainly because companies copy each other.39
For all workers in the Netherlands, the social-security system itself has become 
a source of insecurity.40 Compared to other countries, the Netherlands has sound 
arrangements for unemployment – albeit primarily for the first years of joblessness; 
the longer-term unemployed are better off in Belgium, Germany and Sweden.41 But 
in recent decades, every change to the Dutch social-security system has reined in its 
provisions.42 The changes have also been continuous: the rules around occupational 
disability benefits alone underwent 16 major revisions between 1995 and 2010.43 
However justified some of these amendments may be, for ordinary citizens they 
reduce the continuity and predictability of their social rights. Each incoming gov-
ernment has announced the further retrenchment of social-security along with 
stricter rules.
3.3  Repair or Revise
The flexibilization of work, in particular the rise of individual self-employment, has 
brought renewed urgency to the long-standing debate over the need for a social- 
security system better suited to the modern labour market. There are essentially two 
options: repair the current system or completely revise it. Which is preferrable 
largely depends on how one sees the growth in the number of the self-employed. 
Are these 1.1 million largely uninsured independent workers an unintended conse-
quence of recent laws and regulations, so that it should be possible through legal 
36 oecd (2018a).
37 Brummelkamp et al.(2014).
38 See Koster (2020).
39 de Beer (2018b); see also Dekker (2017) and Chap. 7.
40 van Lieshout (2016).
41 oecd (2015c).
42 See also ter Haar (2017, February 2).
43 Vrooman (2010).
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restrictions, stricter enforcement and the elimination of tax advantages to reduce 
their numbers? If so, the favoured option might be to repair the system, for instance 
by requiring the self-employed to insure themselves against incapacity. Here the 
Netherlands could follow the Belgian example. There was such a requirement for a 
brief period around the turn of the millennium,44 abolished as the costs were per-
ceived to be too high. It could perhaps be reinstated in some form.
If such a system is introduced, all self-employed individuals would have to pay 
into it and fulfil its other obligations. Social insurance of this kind only works with 
a viable level of participation and a fair spread of good versus bad risks; even those 
with a relatively low chance of becoming incapacitated would have to contribute, 
precluding any kind of voluntary opt-out arrangement – which would also be unwise 
for psychological reasons. In Why Knowing What to Do is Not Enough,45 the wrr 
outlined human limitations such as foresight, assessing risks and converting knowl-
edge into action – limitations that also apply to the self-employed. Solidarity among 
the self-employed would also be undermined if participation in a national disability 
insurance scheme were voluntary.
This combination of financial, psychological and social factors lend support to 
the second option: revising the social-security system to make it universal, covering 
all workers and citizens regardless of employment status so that the self-employed 
participate as a matter of course.46 This is the alternative most likely to be favoured 
by those who consider the 1.1 million self-employed as a more or less inevitable 
(and irreversible) product of the contemporary labour market. As more and more 
people alternate between or concurrently juggle temporary contracts, self- 
employment, part-time work and care responsibilities, a social-security system 
geared solely to contracted employment is even less appropriate; the system needs 
to be realigned to accommodate all working and life situations (see Chap. 5). 
Changes to the location, organization and meaning of work all call for a form of 
social security no longer determined by one’s source of income or contractual 
arrangements. The diversity of work in today’s world requires a universal base of 
certainties.
“Contract-neutral” social security could be achieved through a system in which 
everyone participates in the most basic forms of social provision. It would involve a 
minimum level of government-organized insurance and investment applying to all 
citizens – not just the active workforce – to protect them financially against illness, 
disability and unemployment, to provide them with a pension, to enable them to 
44 The 1997 Self-Employed Persons’ Disability Insurance Act applied to everyone in this category, 
whether or not they employed staff of their own. The statute was repealed in 2004.
45 Keizer et al. (2019).
46 This is the option preferred by the membership of zzp Nederland, an association representing the 
individual self-employed. More than 82% of its membership is against compulsory occupational 
disability insurance; 90% would rather see basic provision for all workers so that the self-employed 
can take out optional supplementary insurance if they wish. See www.zzp-nederland.nl/nieuws/
achterban-zzp-nederland-geen-aov-plicht-maar-positief-over-basisvoorziening- arbeidsonges-
chiktheid-voor-werkenden.
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organize their care responsibilities and to allow them to pursue training to strengthen 
their position in the labour market. On top of these standard statutory arrangements, 
people could take out supplementary insurance according to their own wishes and 
possibilities. Self-employed workers who cherish their autonomy would retain the 
freedom to make their own choices, as would all other workers. As it consists of a 
basic product with additional options and toppings, this variant of social security is 
also known as the “cappuccino model”.47
Any future reset of the social-security system would require further elaboration 
of its financing and of the roles played by employers’ organizations and trade 
unions, which could focus more on personal development, learning on the job and 
better reintegration following long-term sick leave. A further advantage of a reset is 
that it could address other urgent issues in the labour market, such as intergenera-
tional solidarity, migration and the burden of social premiums.
3.4  Security of Employment and Professional Development
Learning on the job is necessary to improve both security of income and employ-
ment. In workplace training and professional development, the Netherlands com-
pares reasonably well to other European countries; only the Scandinavian countries 
tend to score better.48 Workers undergo training and attend courses fairly frequently, 
often paid for by the employer: four in ten have done so recently.49 Informal learning 
is often more important than formal instruction; professional development is not 
just about returning to school or following compulsory courses, but about develop-
ing one’s abilities in the workplace: learning by doing, through peer advice and 
feedback from managers and colleagues.50 Such informal learning, however, seems 
to have declined slightly between 2004 and 2017.51 According to the oecd, it is 
doubtful whether Dutch workers’ professional development is sufficient for an 
advanced knowledge economy.52
While lifelong learning has been on the Dutch agenda for five decades, participa-
tion in courses and training has levelled off since the beginning of the century. At 
present, there are some 140 training and development funds in more than 100 
47 The “cappuccino model” and its variants have been debated for some time. For their advantages 
and disadvantages, see Geleijnse et al. (1993), cpb (2005). For a discussion of its underlying prin-
ciples, see Van der Veen (2016). The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis has 
described several variants from a flexible labour-market perspective (Euwals et al. 2016). The IBO 
report (Rijksoverheid 2015) also describes several variants, including a system that begins with the 
worker’s degree of self-reliance.
48 Eurofound (2017).
49 van Echtelt et al. (2016).
50 de Grip (2015, June).
51 de Grip et al. (2018).
52 oecd (2017).
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sectors, contributing financially to the professional training of workers and some-
times also offering courses and training projects themselves. Take-up on the good 
schemes is about 45%; on the bad ones, it is virtually zero, with very few people 
even being aware of their existence.53 In the context of lifelong learning, it is crucial 
that training can facilitate movement between sectors. In 2019, the Dutch govern-
ment allocated more than €200 million to provide everyone in the country with a 
personal development budget.
One problem is that those who are most in need of training are the least likely to 
receive it. Highly educated workers continue to have more opportunities for both 
formal and informal learning; people with the least schooling, on temporary con-
tracts, ethnic minorities and those suffering health problems have fewer chances to 
develop professionally.54 Particularly agency temps and on-call workers have virtu-
ally no chance to learn on the job. Flexible contracts have affected employers’ will-
ingness to invest in staff, especially for formal learning.55 Employers may also be 
hiring workers on a temporary basis so they don’t have to invest in them.56
Future-oriented learning is not about teaching everyone hard technological skills, 
but the human competencies needed to thrive in the service economy: how to solve 
problems, negotiate, persuade, deal with others, and to cope with one’s own and 
other people’s emotions. Although not everyone needs to learn to code, people need 
to know something about robots and artificial intelligence: what they can do, what 
they cannot do, and how people can work with technology. As tasks and duties will 
inevitably evolve, everyone needs to be able to learn on the job. Above all, people 
must learn how to learn (see Chap. 6).
It is a myth that the formally less educated are less able to develop in the work-
place. Learning often occurs naturally as tasks and duties evolve. High-school grad-
uates are often consigned to jobs with scant learning potential. But when managers 
believe they can do more and better, and support them in this, their performance 
improves and they are often just as satisfied with their work as their more highly 
educated peers.57 Research has consistently shown that people, regardless of previ-
ous educational attainment, learn and develop more when the workplace is orga-
nized to support professional development.58
Learning on the job and professional development require good colleagues and 
supportive bosses as well as a sense that there is something to learn. Professional 
development should be seen as a means to gain and retain control over one’s work-
ing life and as a way to bring out the best in people within the organizational setting 
rather than an obligation to bolster one’s employability (see Chap. 4).
53 According to the Grip, “good” funds also “draw attention to the availability of that money and 
the possibilities”. See Bouter (2019).
54 van Echtelt et al. (2016).
55 Boermans et al. (2017).
56 See also Dekker (2017).
57 Boermans et al. (2017).
58 Gallie & Zhou (2013), Felstead et al. (2016).
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3.5  Wage Development
Wages in the Netherlands up until the Covid-19 pandemic were rising after years of 
stagnation. Wage development depends on many factors, among them the relative 
strength of workers, employers and their representative organizations. International 
comparison reveals that strong trade unions bring higher wages and greater pay 
equality.59 In many countries, however, organized labour has long been in decline 
and unions are struggling to attract young workers in particular. Union membership 
in the Netherlands has plummeted, from 37% of the workforce in the late 1970s to 
the current 18%.60 According to Paul de Beer: “To attract more members, they have 
to show that they can do more for their members. But to be able to do that, they need 
more members. It is difficult for unions to work their way out of this situation… 
Recruitment is usually indirect: people join a union because they are asked by col-
leagues who are already members. As unions shrink, their presence in the work-
place declines and that reduces their ability to recruit.”61
The weakening of the trade-union movement is a concern for employers’ organi-
zations which see staff involvement and support as indispensable. The Dutch 
employers’ association awvn is thus seeking to help unions recruit new members. 
In 2018, a think-tank organized by the awvn, consisting of about 60 people from 
academia, politics, the trade-union movement and business, advanced ten proposals 
including “when signing their contract, new employees are offered trial member-
ship of a union of their choice for a period of one year. Employers would encourage 
this by providing extensive information when hiring people.”62
Until the Covid-19 crisis, wages in the Netherlands were rising moderately, 
although not equally for all. According to Statistics Netherlands, the average dis-
posable income of households with a high-school graduate primary breadwinner 
was recovering more slowly than in other households: “In 2016 they had average 
income 4.6% higher than in 2013. For households whose main breadwinner had 
post-secondary or higher education, those figures were 5.3% and 5.7%, respectively. 
More and more people have found or returned to work since the crisis. For those 
with post-secondary or higher education, that usually means a greater rise in income 
than for the less well-educated”63.
Wage inequality is not a matter of education alone. Wage differentials between 
professions are widening,64 as was highlighted by primary-school teachers 
59 Kalleberg (2018).
60 de Beer & Berntsen (2019).
61 van Agteren (2017, October 26).
62 awvn (2018).




demanding salaries more in line with their secondary-school colleagues in their 
recent wave of industrial action. Wages particularly lag behind in jobs involving a 
lot of repetitive or closely supervised work.
3.5.1  A Living Income
According to a survey by the professional association v&vn,65 more than two-thirds 
of nurses and social care workers in the Netherlands believe they earn too little. 
Many can only make ends meet with the premium they receive for working evening, 
night and weekend shifts.66 Their work requires commitment and dedication, is 
essential for society, and is difficult or impossible to automate.67 Feeling insuffi-
ciently valued and rewarded, some look for other jobs; important services and facili-
ties are thus unable to find enough staff.
The Dutch statutory minimum wage has been falling further behind average 
(modal) income for decades.68 But compared to many other European countries, few 
workers in the Netherlands live in poverty: about 5.3% of the working population, 
or 320,000 in all.69 Although this proportion has been growing steadily since 1990, 
it remains lower than in Germany (9.4%) or the United Kingdom (12.4%). But it is 
higher than in Denmark (3.5%) or Belgium (4.3%).70 The working poor in the 
Netherlands are often poorly skilled and/or have migration backgrounds, and work 
mostly in catering, retail and transport, and sometimes in the public sector.71 While 
their growing numbers can in part be attributed to their wages not rising as fast as 
the wages of other groups, the flexible labour market and the gig economy has cre-
ated new groups of the working poor. More than one in nine self-employed persons 
are at risk of poverty.72
65 v&vn (2017).
66 More and more people must work at night, which can be detrimental to their health and social 
life. The Netherlands Health Council observed in an advisory report (Gezondheidsraad 2017) that 
“Nearly 1.3 million people sometimes or regularly work at night. Night work disrupts the body’s 
circadian rhythm, which can lead to adverse health effects.”
67 Graeber (2018) refers to the “caring classes”.
68 oecd (2015b) and data from Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. 
php?title=Minimum_wage_statistics/nl#Algemeen_overzicht)
69 Poverty is defined using the “modest but adequate” criterion formulated by the Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research. This is based on a “basic needs” budget to cover expenditures on 
essentials such as food, clothing, housing and insurance, plus a minimal amount for leisure and 
social participation. In 2014 the norm for a single person was €1,063 per month. The “working 
poor” are people in paid work living in a household classified as “in poverty”, excluding school-
children and students with a part-time job. See scp (3 October 2018): www.scp.nl/Nieuws/
Aandeel_werkende_armen_in_Nederland_gegroeid_en_overtreft_dat_van_Denemarken_
en_Belgi
70 Vrooman et al. (2018).
71 Snel (2017).
72 cbs (2019e, March 5).
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3.5.2  How New Technologies and Flexible Contracts 
Affect Income
Technological developments affect distinct groups in the labour market in different 
ways. Wages for jobs largely involving routine tasks are falling behind those that 
require problem-solving skills.73 Wiljan van den Berge and Bas ter Weel74 of the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis predict that some tasks now per-
formed by the better-educated will also be replaced by new technology.
Job polarization can be exacerbated by the greater use of robots and artificial 
intelligence.75 As some workers with post-secondary education face shrinking 
opportunities in the labour market, this puts pressure on workers with lesser qualifi-
cations – and their incomes. At the same time, new services and products are also 
increasing demand for less educated personnel.76 Much also depends on the choices 
made by companies, institutions and governments about how technology is used: to 
complement or substitute human labour (see Chaps. 6 and 7).77
The flexibilization of labour puts pressure on wages. While economists often 
assume that employers pay higher wages for insecure work, this is rarely the case.78 
Not all self-employed individuals have the bargaining power to enforce fair fees for 
their labour, especially in times of high unemployment. This group also lacks col-
lective means to enforce better pay. This is also true for temporary workers, for 
whom a succession of temporary contracts does not automatically lead to incremen-
tally higher pay, as is generally the case in collective agreements covering perma-
nent staff. The Dutch central bank, among many others, has concluded that the 
flexibilization of labour exerts downwards pressure on wages.79
73 Fouarge (2017).
74 van den Berge & ter Weel (2015a).
75 van den Berge & ter Weel (2015b).
76 van den Berge & ter Weel (2015a: 107).
77 “Unlike replacing technologies, which take over the tasks previously done by labor, augmenting 
technologies increase the units of a worker’s output without any displacement occurring, unless 
demand for a given product or service becomes saturated” (Frey 2019: 13).
78 Kalleberg (2011).
79 dnb (2018) writes on its website: “An analysis of data from eight Dutch industrial sectors over 
the period 1996–2015 shows that the fall in the wage share is linked to increased labour-market 
flexibility. One possible explanation for this is the weaker bargaining position of workers in the 
flexible shell, compared with employees on permanent contracts.”
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3.6  Conclusion: Control over Income Requires More 
Security and Less Inequality







Income security is a crucial condition for good work. While work in the Netherlands 
is generally rewarded fairly, there are big differences in the financial value placed on 
various tasks and professions. These differences may be exacerbated by the automa-
tion and flexibilization of work; wage inequality may thus grow in the future. 
Although learning on the job and professional development are necessary for all 
workers to maintain their employability, they are still not the norm, most glaringly 
for workers who are already vulnerable. Despite the Netherlands’ relatively low 
unemployment rate – which stood at 3% until the Covid-19 crisis – there remain 
concerns about income security, mostly centring on the rise of precarious work. 
Although employability in the Netherlands remains high compared to many other 
countries, job security is low – a product of the growing number of self-employed 
individuals and the expansion of temporary work and the gig economy.
The uncertainties associated with the flexible labour market are unevenly dis-
tributed: there are sharp divisions by education, age and sex. While almost every-
one wants job security, the availability of secure positions has plummeted, 
especially for the less educated. Nor is the current social-security system equipped 
to deal with the uncertainties. The Netherlands needs a modern system incorporat-
ing risk-sharing and protection for all categories of workers; this means revisiting 
the responsibilities of employers, workers and the state (see the recommendations 
in Chap. 8).
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 A Day at Work: The Order Picker
Consumers no longer need to leave the comfort of their homes to make purchases. 
Supermarkets and department stores have their empty shelves restocked automat-
ically. Distribution centres – the large square sheds that have sprouted across the 
countryside – are the hubs in the enormous logistics operations that make this 
happen. Behind their anonymous façades, distribution centres are a hive of activ-
ity, with truck drivers delivering goods, unloaders taking them inside, stackers 
shelving the products and order pickers collecting items to be sent to customers.
Anke and Jos are order pickers at a distribution centre for a department 
store chain. Some 350 people are employed here, spread across two huge 
warehouses: one for large items, with electric pallet trucks whizzing around, 
and the other for smaller products.
Much has changed over the 20  years Anke and Jos have been picking 
orders here. At first they walked around with pen and paper; then came hand-
held scanners. Now almost everything is automated. Each picker works in his 
or her allocated section of the aisle between the shelving racks. An automated 
system sends them crates. On their computer screen they see which articles to 
place in each crate, and in what quantity. Flashing red and green lights indi-
cate where these products are located in the racks. At the touch of a button, the 
packed crate moves on and the next one appears.
“We don’t have to walk as much and this system is less prone to errors”, 
says Jos. “But it’s not as enjoyable. Having a quick chat or a joke with your 
workmates is almost impossible now.” This is tough for Jos because what he 
likes about work is the social contact. Now it is limited to three breaks per 
shift and further hindered by language barriers. As the centre increasingly 
employs people of different nationalities, speaking Dutch is no longer a 
requirement to work here. The products are all numbered and the headsets can 
be tuned to three languages: Dutch, English and Polish.
With all the changes, the workload has increased. There is a personal produc-
tivity target – 650 crates a day – and the computer can track everyone minute by 
minute. “Whenever there’s a mistake”, Anke says, “they can look back and see 
who made it.” The central display in the warehouse is showing that one employee 
has done nothing for 8 min. “Maybe he’s gone to the toilet”, comments Anke.
Prompters come around several times a day to tell workers how they are 
performing. While Jos can feel them watching, he claims it does not make him 
work faster. “Although of course I’d rather hear that I’m doing well than that 
I haven’t done enough.” Some companies pay a performance bonus, but not 
this one. The pickers earn the minimum wage, or not much more. Jos would 
not recommend this job to others. “You work yourself to death for a pittance. 
It’s hard to support a family on these wages.”
Anke and Jos both have permanent contracts, but these are now few and far 
between. All new staff are agency temps and are out if they do not meet their tar-
gets. If they perform well for some time, they can apply for permanent positions.
(continued)
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The order pickers work morning and evening shifts, currently only on nor-
mal working days although there are plans to introduce night and Saturday 
shifts. There are no specific educational requirements. It is not a difficult job, 
says Anke, “but you do need a feel for it”. The work, however, is physically 
demanding. The pickers must still walk many kilometres a day and lift a lot – “it 
makes a difference whether you have to pick up tights or plates” – and the pace 
set by the red and green lights requires their full focus through each shift. At the 
end of the day they return home completely worn out. Many of their colleagues 
are seeing physiotherapists because of back, shoulder or wrist complaints.
Anke and Jos wonder whether they will make it to retirement age in this 
job. But even after all these years, Anke retains her enthusiasm. But she adds, 
“If I found something else less physically demanding tomorrow, I’d take it.” 
This is not a job you get better at the longer you do it, she explains. You learn 
it in your training period and it remains pretty much the same thereafter until 
at some point, as you get older, you start “sagging”. The system registers that 
you have slowed down. If you have been there for a long time and have a good 
reason to take it a little easier, the firm takes this into account. You can be put 
“on cardboard” (clearing away empty boxes) or the pallet trucks. But if your 
productivity decreases long-term, you must leave.
In the summer, temperatures in the warehouses can reach tropical levels. 
People sometimes pass out. With all her experience, Anke keeps an eye on the new 
workers. “They forget to drink because they’re so focused on hitting their target.”
Order pickers are typically paid €1600-€2000 gross per month. The average 
(modal) income in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, 
excluding holiday pay. Most order pickers only have secondary education. 
There is a shortage of workers in this sector, attributable primarily to the physi-
cal demands and monotony of the work. The introduction of electronic monitor-
ing systems has increased the workload. While automation is a long-term trend 
in the industry, the number of jobs is not declining proportionally. A large Dutch 
supermarket chain reopened one of its distribution centres at the end of 2018 as 
an almost fully-automated operation. Where once it had employed 450 people, 
there are now just a handful. But shortly afterwards, the same firm announced 
plans to build an entirely new distribution centre where, from 2020, 1000 order 
pickers will be needed to meet the growing demand for home deliveries.
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“Busy, busy, busy.” Ask people about their working lives and they will often respond 
with this staccato summary. With titles such as Busy: How to Thrive in a World of 
Too Much, One Second Ahead, Mindfulness at Work and Crazy Busy, self- help books 
promise to make our lives less stressful. More and more workplaces are offering 
courses in yoga and mindfulness or stress tests to help people stay on top of the pressure.
Compared to their counterparts in most European countries, Dutch workers are 
doing quite well. Their workloads are average, many enjoy a relatively high degree 
of autonomy, their tasks are varied, and most receive support from colleagues and 
managers. Only in the Scandinavian countries, especially in Finland, do people 
enjoy more control over their work.1 Yet burnout is on the rise. Moreover, if almost 
half of all workers report that they lack sufficient autonomy, is their work really 
good enough? Are more people losing control over their work, or does this problem 
only affect specific groups concealed below the surface of the overall averages? 
This chapter explores these questions and examines how the automation, flexibiliza-
tion and intensification of labour may affect people’s control over work.
4.1  Busier than Ever? The Intensification of Work
The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research2 finds the “burden of 
work” among Dutch workers to be high and continuous (Fig. 4.1). Almost four in 
ten claim they frequently have to work hard and rapidly, for example to meet suc-
cessive deadlines. This is the narrow, quantitative definition of the intensification of 
work. If we include a qualitative definition of intensification, almost eight out of ten 
1 Houtman et al. (2017); see also Eurofound (2017).
2 Houtman et al. (2020).
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workers find their work intellectually taxing, while one in ten consider their work 
emotionally challenging, placing them in tough situations that demand a high level 
of engagement.
Working people have not suddenly become busier. Their working lives were already 
demanding but have become more so over the past decade. In 2008, 34.5% of working 
people reported that they had to work fast; by 2018, this figure was 38.6%. The preva-
lence of mentally taxing work declined slightly in the same period, from 81.8% to 
76.6%. The opposite applies to emotionally demanding work; its prevalence rose from 
9.4% to 10.7%, particularly affecting workers in service and caring professions.
People who have emotionally demanding jobs also often consider their work 
rewarding and valuable. At the same time, they are far more likely to experience 
symptoms of burnout.3 Fig. 4.2 shows aspects of the quality of work associated with 
burnout. Although the term “hard work” is still largely used to refer to physically 
demanding activity, the hard work in today’s service economy is found primarily in 
intellectually and emotionally strenuous jobs.
These statistical time series apply to the entire workforce and are based on what 
people report. But work often changes of its own accord, unnoticed. These figures 
may thus also reflect human adaptability, of becoming accustomed to our tasks. 
Drawing on specialist expertise,4 Van den Groenendaal et al. has mapped out the 
changes over recent decades in six common occupations: homecare worker, 
Frequent or permanent heavy workload
and time pressure














Fig. 4.1 The intensification of work, 2007–2018 
Source: Houtman et al., 2020
3 Pot and Smulders (2019).
4 Conversations with labour experts and information from the Claim Assessment and Assurance 
System (cbbs) operated by t e Employee Insurance Agency (uwv).
4 Control Over Work
69
primary- school teacher, IT systems administrator, mobile security patrol officer, 
domestic truck driver and order picker.5 In all six occupations, workers now face 
stricter quality requirements, greater time pressure and more emotionally demand-
ing tasks; they all need better communication skills, greater stress-resistance and 
keener judgement of human nature. The only burden to have decreased is the physi-
cal workload. Although observed across the board, these trends differentially affect 
the surveyed occupations (see Box 4.1 and the professional portraits between the 
chapters in this book).
Emotionally demanding work
Heavy workload or time pressure
Hours spent in front of a screen for work2
Lack of job security
Duration of work in hours per week2
Physically demanding work
Work-life and / or life-work imbalance
Employment relationship (permanent / flexible)1
Promoted within the company in the past two years1
Opportunity to learn
Good salary









Fig. 4.2 Relationship between quality of work and burnout complaints
Note: All variables are measured on a three or four-point scale, unless otherwise indicated with 
“binary scale” or “ratio scale”
Source: Pot & Smulders, 2019
5 These professions were chosen as they vary in educational and gender profile.
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4.2  Autonomy as Achilles’ Heel
Whether people can cope with the quantitative and qualitative intensification of 
their work depends, among other things, on whether they feel they receive enough 
in return. The “burden of work” is not simply a synonym for workload but refers to 
the strain caused by the mismatch between task requirements (a lot of work and dif-
ficult work) and opportunities for control (the extent to which the worker has a say 
over how they do their work).7 While workers may be as busy as ever, this need not 
be a problem so long as they feel in charge, that they have a certain degree of free-
dom in their activities. As Ulbo de Sitter wrote in his 1981 book Op weg naar 
nieuwe fabrieken en kantoren (Towards New Factories and Offices): “Simply put, it 
is not the problems which cause the stress but the obstacles to solving them.”8 We 
thus refer to an appropriate degree of freedom; not everyone thrives by being part of 
a self-managing team, while too much autonomy can itself cause stress.9
Compared to other European countries, Dutch workplaces offer a high degree of 
autonomy; only Finland scores higher.10 Nevertheless, almost half of all workers in the 
Box 4.1 Changing Requirements in Four Professions
The mobile security patrol officer must monitor a greater area and more prem-
ises than ever before. They now do this alone, carrying hand-held computers 
to remain in direct communication with the control room. They also need to 
be able to de-escalate confrontations with members of the public, who have 
become increasingly aggressive towards them.
The homecare worker must deal more frequently with illness and death 
due to their ageing client base. This makes the job emotionally tougher. At the 
same time, their schedules have become tighter – to the extent that these often 
part-time employees are inclined to help clients on their own time.
The primary-school teacher spends as many hours in the classroom as in 
the past, but now with much more diverse pupils: children from different 
countries and with a wide range of special needs. They have been required to 
take on a lot of additional work including extracurricular activities and updat-
ing the electronic student monitoring system.
The IT systems administrator has become busier because technology is 
increasingly central to organizations. Under greater pressure from bosses, cli-
ents and colleagues, they must deal promptly with incidents and consult more 
widely with a variety of people.6
6 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
7 Wiezer et al. (2012).
8 Quoted in Pot (2019a).
9 Kubicek et al. (2017).
10 Houtman et al. (2017); Eurofound (2017).
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Netherlands still say that they lack sufficient autonomy. This figure has grown in 
recent years, from 38.3% in 2007 to 44.3% in 2018.11 Declining autonomy is most 
pronounced among high-school graduates, who were already more likely (59.2%) to 
report being too strictly regulated and having too little space and freedom in their work 
(Fig. 4.3). The same applies to 47.7% of Dutch workers with post-secondary voca-
tional education. A striking 31.1% of university graduates also say they lack autonomy 
at work – a percentage that has also been rising. Women on average have less auton-
omy in their work than men (Fig. 4.4), largely due to the professions and sectors in 
which they work. Along with hospitality and transport, work in female- dominated 
areas of the public sector – healthcare and education – provide the least occupational 
freedom.12 These fields also have a relatively high percentage of personnel – almost a 
quarter – whose work combines limited autonomy with demanding requirements: a 
toxic combination that leads to high levels of stress and absenteeism.13
Declining autonomy can hinder workers as they try to manage the intensification 
of their working lives. Seth van den Bossche and colleagues warn of its economic 
consequences: “Since autonomous personnel are often more innovative and produc-
tive, it is important to ensure that employees retain sufficient autonomy, especially 
in times of crisis.”14 Work only brings out the best in people when they have control 
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Fig. 4.3 Lack of autonomy by level of education, 2007–2018
Source: Houtman et al., 2020
11 Houtman et al. (2020).
12 tno (2018).
13 tno (2016).
14 van den Bossche et al. (2015: 350).
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4.2.1  Declining Autonomy at Work: Explanations
How can it be that worker autonomy in the Netherlands is falling across the board? 
One possible explanation is the flexibilization of the labour market, in particular the 
growth of temporary and agency jobs.15 Temporary staff generally have less control 
over how they do their work; when people are insecure in their positions, employers 
can exert greater pressure.16 In this light, growing self-employment can be seen as a 
strategy by workers to maintain their freedom. Across Europe, “wanting autonomy” 
is the leading reason why people go freelance.17 Self-employed individuals often 
find work organizations too restrictive, bureaucratic or hierarchical, and prefer the 
freedom that comes with “being their own boss”.18 The greater job satisfaction they 
experience, and the fact that they less frequently suffer health problems and burn-
out, is mainly due to the control they exercise over their work.
The self-employed are the canaries in the coal mine of work organizations - to 
bring up another “bird metaphor” (see Chap. 1). When former employees strike out 
on their own, it may signal insufficient workplace autonomy. Research suggests that 














Fig. 4.4 Lack of autonomy by gender, 2007–2018
Source: Houtman et al., 2020
15 van den Bossche et al. (2015).
16 Gallie (2017).
17 Josten and Vlasblom (2017); Benz and Frey (2008).
18 Kremer et al. (2017c).
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freelances, they would be just as satisfied with their work.19 Not only would employ-
ees feel less incentive to leave; the organization would benefit from giving staff 
greater initiative. Werner Liebregts and Erik Stam refer to “intrapreneurs” – enter-
prising employees within organizations who “can impel the growth of (new or 
established) companies” – who “may go on to become independent entrepreneurs 
later in their career. Whatever their position, working people must remain creative 
to generate new value. They are increasingly responsible for the investments made 
in their own careers. In addition to investing in expertise for specific tasks, this also 
means investing in entrepreneurship as well as collaborating in new contexts so as 
to create new tasks.”20
Another explanation for declining workplace autonomy lies in New Public 
Management – the infiltration of management techniques and models from the pri-
vate sector into the public and semi-public sectors.21 Although meant to improve 
services, control costs and provide greater transparency for taxpayers, the introduc-
tion of accountability systems, protocols and performance measurements adversely 
affect the quality of work.22 The “organized mistrust” they reflect results in balloon-
ing administrative workloads for public-sector professionals, combined with shrink-
age of their discretionary space. The control the government seeks to exert over 
them comes at the cost of the control they want over their own work.
The Professional Ethics Foundation (Stichting Beroepseer) believes that the 
practices of New Public Management have led to “professional distress”, with 
experts in areas such as mental healthcare, education, youth services and science 
witnessing the “de-souling” of their professions.23 This has repercussions not only 
for professionals personally, but for the public at large. As the Council for Health 
and Society reiterates, the erosion of the quality of professionals’ work will ulti-
mately have adverse consequences for the quality of public healthcare and other 
services.24
The autonomy of many workers in the private sector has declined as well, most 
notably affecting workers in logistics, business services and retail. Global competi-
tion encourages revenue models and work processes that privilege short-term think-
ing and accountability to “impatient capital”.25 This means that employers embrace 
19 Parent-Thirion et al. (2020).
20 Liebregts and Stam (2017).
21 Osborne (2010); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004).
22 wrr (2004); Tummers et al. (2009); Noordegraaf and Steijn (2013); Bredewold et al. (2018); 
Tjeenk Willink (2018).
23 The foundation’s first publication, Beroepszeer: Waarom Nederland niet goed werkt (Professional 
Distress: Why The Netherlands Is Not Working Well; Van den Brink et al. 2005), marked the begin-
ning of a long series of important studies. For more titles, see www.beroepseer.nl.
24 rvs (2019).
25 Kalleberg (2011).
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temporary work and assume greater, more structured control over work processes. 
Especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, many firms sought to “tighten the 
reins”26 – visible in the above-mentioned changing protocols governing the work of 
security guards and truck drivers.27
Finally, the use of new technologies can result in declining autonomy, particu-
larly at the bottom end of the labour market. Firms today often use technology to 
monitor their employees, reducing their control and freedom at work.28 Truck driv-
ers are required by law to have a tachograph in the vehicle – a device that allows the 
employer to keep track of their driving behaviour, location and efficiency. Order 
pickers at distribution centres are monitored so the firm can see how many items 
they pick per hour; those who fail to meet productivity targets rarely have their con-
tracts extended.29 These are examples of the Taylorization of work, in which people 
increasingly function as “robots made of flesh”. Technology can increase the pace 
of work and constrain workers’ room for manoeuvre while making it easier for 
management to penalize them if they perform below set standards.30
But technology can also help increase workers’ autonomy and scope for control. 
In the chemical industry, Eurofound31 research across five countries found that digi-
tization gives employees greater latitude in the conduct, documentation and moni-
toring of processes. The use of cobots  – collaborative robots that work with 
people – can make human tasks less routine and physically demanding as well as 
more challenging and interesting, pushing workers to draw on their teamworking, 
analytical, creative and problem-solving skills. Technology can thus take work in 
either direction: more or less interesting, augmenting or undermining workers’ 
autonomy (Box 4.2).32
26 van den Bossche et al. (2015).
27 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
28 van den Bossche et al. (2015).
29 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
30 Gallie (2017).
31 Eurofound (2018).
32 Went et al. (2015); see Chap. 7.
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4.3  Camaraderie at Work
Compared to workers in other countries, Dutch workers experience a high degree of 
social support at work, both vertically from managers and horizontally from col-
leagues. The figures are higher in Ireland and Norway, but lower in Germany.39 
Box 4.2 Bringing out the Best in People? Not for Everyone
Good work means enabling people to use their abilities to the fullest extent 
possible. One indicator is the degree of autonomy people are allowed in their 
work. Another is the extent to which people are working below their abilities, 
with a third of Dutch workers claiming they do not use all their professional 
talents and skills at work.33 Some also work at a level below that implied by 
their educational attainment, although this percentage is comparatively low.34
Women’s capacities are under-utilized at work. From the age of 35, women 
in the Netherlands are more likely than men to work at a level lower than is 
appropriate for their education.35 This is sometimes their own choice as they 
wish to devote more time to their children and so “choose” a less demanding 
job. But all too often, women encounter the glass ceiling which prevents them 
from rising to the top of an organization, or a “sticky floor” which keeps them 
bogged down in its lower regions.36
People with migration backgrounds often have jobs requiring a standard of 
education inferior to their actual qualifications. Statistics Netherlands con-
cludes that the Dutch labour market has an inherent “ethnic sanction”: after 
adjusting for their course of study and the grades they obtained, a person with 
a migration background needs a higher level of educational attainment than 
someone of Dutch origin to secure the same job.37
Finally, people with occupational disabilities are less likely than their able- 
bodied peers to be working at a level below that implied by their educational 
attainment. In many cases, this is probably because their health problems or 
disability prevented them from obtaining qualifications matching their intel-
lectual ability. This group reports more frequently than their able-bodied 
peers that insufficient use is being made of their skills and know-how. This is 
in part due to the lack of workplace adjustments and adaptations, and in part 
due to prejudice and discrimination.38
33 Poulissen et al. (2017).
34 oecd (2017).
35 cbs (2016, January 19).
36 Portegijs et al. (2016).
37 Falcke et al. (2017).
38 Poulissen et al. (2017).
39 Eurofound (2017). In 2018, some 96.6% of Dutch workers enjoyed substantial social support 
from colleagues; 85.6% enjoyed support from managers Houtman et al., 2020.
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Social support is not only a buffer against the intensification of work; it can reduce 
symptoms of burnout (see Fig. 4.2), improve occupational well-being, and is neces-
sary for co-operation within the work organization. People who work well with 
others are the building blocks of social innovation, and the Netherlands values good 
workplace relationships like no other nation.40 Although this desire for camaraderie 
is frequently fulfilled, the country also has one of the highest scores in Europe for 
aggressive workplace behaviour.41 We explore this apparent contradiction in more 
detail below.
4.3.1  Aggression at Work
Workers in the Netherlands are more likely to encounter aggressive workplace 
behaviour, mostly in verbal form, than their peers in Germany, Belgium and France. 
It is difficult to explain. One probable factor is the size of the Dutch service sector, 
which is particularly prone to aggressive conduct. Across different service subsec-
tors, the rate of violence is higher in the Netherlands than in other countries. The 
Dutch “direct culture” may also play a role.42
To some extent, it is colleagues and managers who make work a battleground. 
16% of Dutch employees experience inappropriate behaviour at work from col-
leagues and managers, including harassment, bullying, unwanted sexual advances 
and physical violence.43 People with migration backgrounds, especially the first 
generation, who are affected most (one-fifth), also report more discrimination by 
people they work with or report to.44
Clients, in the broadest sense of the term, are the principal source of workplace 
aggression: a quarter of employees experience harassment, bullying or unwanted 
sexual advances from clients.45 The problem is the most severe in the health and 
social care sector. In the past 3 years, Algemeen Dagblad, one of the largest news-
papers in the Netherlands by circulation, has reported cases of aggressive behaviour 
against disability care workers, prison guards, psychiatric care workers, paramed-
ics, pharmacists and medical receptionists. While working with people is intrinsic 
to the service economy, it demands resilience and strength of character.
In the public sector, the aggression is largely due to increasingly vocal clients. 
Parents for example expect a great deal of say in their children’s schooling; public 
policy encourages this empowerment. Combined with cuts to services that leave 
public-sector workers less time and space to do their jobs well, this can lead to 
40 Conen (2018); see also Conen (2020).
41 Houtman et al. (2020).
42 Eurofound (2017); see also Houtman et al. (2017).
43 Houtman et al. (2017); see also Houtman et al. (2020).
44 Hooftman and Houtman (2017).
45 Houtman et al. (2017).
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problems escalating more quickly and more often.46 The flexibilization of the labour 
market also fuels aggressive behaviour as clients find themselves dealing with a 
different employee each time they interact with the organization. The resulting frus-
tration is one reason why nine out of ten employees in disability care face aggres-
sion – not just from clients, but also from their relatives and friends.47 Research by 
the Dutch teaching union aob states that “parents are a factor in the workload that 
should not be underestimated” and that conflicts with assertive parents are one of 
the major causes of teacher burnout.48
Private-sector workers are also experiencing increased pressure and aggression 
from customers. Again, this is because many occupations have taken on a service 
dimension.49 Security guards may be confronted by violent criminals, but more 
often by irritated drivers delayed at checkpoints. Truck drivers can experience road 
rage and then angry customers when they arrive late at their destination. Broader 
social changes are penetrating the workplace. When citizens become assertive con-
sumers, in some cases encouraged by government policy, this can suppress human 
empathy for the person standing in front of them. We are treated everywhere as 
buyers of products and services, as consumers with a right to be demanding – “the 
customer is king (or queen)”. But this is only possible because there are people 
working to provide these goods and services. In our current consumer society, we 
sometimes forget that we are not only consumers but working people.
The pressure empowered citizens and consumers place on workers in healthcare 
and the service economy can be further increased by digitization and social media. 
People working via online platforms in the gig economy are subject to the “reputa-
tion mechanism”: the systemic use of customer reviews to encourage them to per-
form well. But other organizations, including governments, have begun using such 
mechanisms for direct review as well. Consumers and patients are often more moti-
vated to write negative reviews than positive ones. The digital culture of constant 
evaluation can thus reinforce feelings among workers that they are always walking 
on eggshells and that their colleagues have become competitors. It was largely for 
this reason that staff at the Dutch department store De Bijenkorf, led by their trade 
union, resisted the introduction of a rating system for sales personnel.50
4.3.2  Camaraderie in the Age of Flexible Work
Platform-based work can undermine workplace camaraderie. When one’s boss is an 
algorithm and one’s colleague a competitor, it is difficult to build or experience any 
sense of fellowship. New technologies can also lead to more solo work, for example 
46 See also Tummers et al. (2016).
47 See cnv Zorg and Welzijn (2018).
48 Algemene Onderwijsbond (2017).
49 van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
50 rtl Nieuws (2018, May 23).
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security guards who now patrol with handheld computers rather than partners, and 
order pickers who receive their instructions from portable devices which direct 
them along the most efficient walking route, leaving them few opportunities to chat 
with colleagues.51
Temporary work can also hinder bonding in the workplace. The sociologist 
Richard Sennett in The Corrosion of Character52 paints a portrait of a “short-term 
society” in which contacts are always temporary and fleeting. But although it is true 
that temporary workers, especially agency and on-call personnel,53 receive less sup-
port from colleagues and managers than permanent staff, collegial atmospheres can 
be maintained when everyone is in the same boat, as is often the case in hospitality 
or cleaning.54 Contact with managers, however, remains problematic; in much pre-
carious work, the actual employer is nowhere to be seen.55 In flexible work, the 
problem lies primarily in vertical relationships at the workplace (see Chap. 6).
Labour market flexibility has ushered in counter-movements. As noted in the 
wrr publication For the Sake of Security, many self-employed individuals partici-
pate in various forms of “work community-light”.56 Wanting to be one’s own boss is 
not the same thing as wanting to be alone in the world of work. Freelances meet in 
coffee bars and shared offices, join mutual aid funds and form groups to help mem-
bers with work and facilities.57 Sometimes these contacts evolve into a kind of 
“work organization 3.0” that allows members both independence and basic ties to 
collectively cover risks.
4.4  Differences in Control over Work: Education 
and Occupation
When people have little control over their work, this constitutes bad work. Are bad 
jobs growing in the Netherlands, as Arne Kalleberg observed for the United States?58 
We observed earlier that work has been intensifying, especially in terms of time 
pressure and emotional labour, while workplace autonomy is declining. While 
everyone seems to have a little less control over work, there are important differ-
ences between workers, particularly according to their educational attainment and 
occupation.
51 See the professional portraits in van den Groenendaal et al. (2020).
52 Sennett (1986).
53 Houtman et al. (2020).
54 Camaraderie can also emerge in response to unfair treatment by the employer (Kremer, 2017).
55 van der Gaag (2018).
56 van der Meer (2017).
57 One example is Zorg&Co. See van der Meer (2017).
58 Kalleberg (2011).
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At the bottom end of the labour market, work is generally unchallenging and 
workplace autonomy is in short supply. Especially young people, people with non- 
western migration backgrounds and people with less formal education are more 
likely now than in the past to have routine, boring jobs with little autonomy.59 
Figs. 4.1 and 4.3 show the decline in intellectually challenging work. Autonomy at 
work is lowest among high school graduates and has also declined the most for this 
group, although it has declined for workers with post-secondary education as well. 
While jobs have been created at the lower end of the market, these are mainly bad 
jobs offering little in the way of challenge.
There are also specific occupations in which control over work has eroded. 
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Fig. 4.5 Burden of work and resources in various occupations, 2014–2018 (ages 15–74)
Source: Houtman et al., 2020
59 Smulders and van den Bossche (2017).
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intensification of work) on the x-axis and the resources available to deal with this 
burden (social support, autonomy) on the y-axis. The professions under greatest 
pressure are in the bottom-right corner: primary and secondary-school teachers, 
nurses and truck drivers. While care workers for the elderly, printers, loaders/
unloaders, and bus and train drivers are not far behind, they enjoy somewhat more 
social support and/or autonomy. These are precisely the occupations that have been 
demanding better conditions in recent years, sometimes through industrial action. In 
the top-right corner are professionals such as architects and managers who also 
work intensively, facing tight deadlines and complex situations. But they generally 
have more resources at their disposal, which allow them to better cope with the 
increasing demands.
Strikingly, the occupations in which workers have the least control are mainly in 
the public and semi-public sectors. The 2018 annual review of working conditions 
by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research found healthcare 
and education (alongside hospitality) to be the sectors where workers most often 
face heightened demands alongside limited autonomy. Conditions have also been 
deteriorating over the previous decade.60
4.5  Who Is Responsible for Control over Work?
However helpful training courses, stress tests and self-help books may be – and 
however much we may ultimately be racing against ourselves – control over work is 
not an individual problem but one that suffuses the modern work organization. We 
should be focusing not only on how workers handle stress, but on how to minimize 
risks in the first place. First and foremost, it is up to companies and institutions to 
create healthier work organizations. But to date, improvements have been lacklus-
tre. Who or what is holding back progress?
The Netherlands, like other corporatist European countries, has a highly devel-
oped system of social dialogue that makes extensive use of legally binding collec-
tive labour agreements that cover about 80% of all employees. Many actors 
participate in this system, including the government; employers’ organizations and 
trade unions (the government’s “social partners”); and working people alongside 
their professional associations. We discuss each in turn below.
4.5.1  Government
The government’s first pillar, the Working Conditions Act, has since 1989 covered 
the quality of work (Section 3, Well-Being at Work). Initially focused on extending 
learning opportunities and reducing stress-related risks, measures were added in 
60 tno (2019).
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1999 to prevent workplace bullying and discrimination. These are just a few of the 
provisions in the Act’s 44 sections, most of which cover the physical aspects of 
work (hazardous substances, heavy lifting and so on).61 The Working Conditions 
Act holds employers responsible for the quality of work and obliges them to con-
duct risk assessments. The question is whether legislation is paying adequate atten-
tion to the non-physical aspects of work that also undermine workplace 
well-being.62
While the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate is responsible for ensur-
ing compliance with working conditions legislation, it lacks the human and finan-
cial resources needed for comprehensive enforcement. Its inspections reveal that 
many firms do not even undertake the mandatory risk assessments. Overall, the 
inspectorate concludes, the business community is falling short of its legal obliga-
tions.63 Although the inspectorate’s remit includes workloads, workplace aggression 
and discrimination, it rarely checks – certainly not in actual workplaces. Inspections 
still tend to focus on the physical aspects of work.64 While work today is more likely 
to entail psychosocial risks, the law and what enforcement there is focus on their 
detection rather than on how the work organization can be improved to bring out the 
best in people.65
The government’s second pillar consists of legislation governing sick leave and 
reintegration in the workplace. Employers are obliged under the threat of fines to 
take care of staff on sick leave. This system, unique to the Netherlands, has success-
fully reduced absenteeism. The guidance provided by occupational physicians, 
however, is directed mainly at individuals, not the work organization, and it remains 
questionable whether the medicalizing of individual employees is the right approach. 
Improving the design of companies and institutions cannot be left to doctors alone; 
it sometimes requires more structural changes for which labour or organizational 
experts are needed.
The government’s third pillar is the law on staff councils. These bodies are highly 
developed in the Netherlands and allow employees to influence the quality of their 
work through legally binding rights of advice and consent. Not all work 
61 Regarding “psychosocial” and other forms of mental or emotional pressure, Section 3.2 of the 
1999 Working Conditions Act states: “The employer shall operate a policy aimed at preventing 
employment-related psychosocial pressure, or limiting it if prevention is not possible, as part of the 
general working conditions policy.”
62 Frank Pot argues that more effort should be made to publicize Section 3 of the Working 
Conditions Act, where it “calls for work to be adapted to the employees’ individual characteristics 
and for monotonous work and activities that need to be carried out at a particular speed to be 
avoided or limited” (Pot, 2019b).
63 Inspectie szw (2019).
64 As an exception, 81 organizations were inspected between 1 November 2015 and 1 March 2016 
to see whether employers had developed policies to manage work pressure; 80% were found not to 
have done this systematically enough (Inspectorate szw, 2016).
65 The oecd cites the Working Environment Act in Denmark as an example of good practice (oecd, 
2018a: 182).
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organizations are required by law to implement this form of employee participation; 
many small firms are exempt, while workers in the platform economy, self-employed 
individuals and flexible temporary staff generally fall outside of its remit.66 Workers 
with insecure flexible jobs rarely take part in decision-making, are less familiar with 
this form of participation and are not strong enough to enforce changes.67 The larger 
the proportion of temporary personnel on a company’s books, the less likely it is to 
have a staff council.68
4.5.2  Social Partners and Professional Associations
Employees can exert influence to improve their control over work.69 After all, who 
is better placed to do so? The question is whether employees are sufficiently power-
ful and whether existing forms of staff representation focus enough on the quality of 
work. Compared to especially the Scandinavian countries and France, the 
Netherlands has low trade-union membership; unions generally lack meaningful 
presence in individual workplaces. At the national level, trade-unions advise the 
Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (ser) and campaign to shape 
Dutch and European regulations. The ser70 is an advisory body comprising repre-
sentatives of trade unions and employers’ organizations as well as independent 
experts, one of the main platforms for social dialogue in the Dutch system of broad 
consultation known as the “polder model”. In its 2016 report People and Technology, 
the ser advocated combining technological and social innovation.71
Collective labour agreements provide further opportunities for improving the 
quality of work. Although discussion about implementation has yet to begin, two 
agreements recently concluded in the metals sector contain provisions to promote 
workplace “social innovation”. Many industries publish working conditions cata-
logues specifying occupational health, safety and well-being requirements tailored 
to their particular contexts, along with recommendations and examples of best prac-
tice.72 Renewing their traditional interest in their members’ professional 
66 Heidsma and Zaal (2019).
67 van der Gaag (2018).
68 Tros et al. (2019).
69 “Workers’ participation is all the more necessary as the advent of artificial intelligence is 




72 Working conditions catalogues are available in the meat, poultry, fish processing, agricultural, 
parks and gardens, cleaning, window-cleaning, construction and infrastructure sectors, among oth-
ers. They advocate alternating or rotating tasks and ergonomic improvements. The catalogues do 
not question the nature of the work itself, although they do occasionally refer to the Working 
Conditions Act – specifically Section 3.1d, which calls for the avoidance of monotonous work 
(Pot, 2018a).
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development would allow unions to more effectively participate in the debate on 
how technology can improve the quality of work and workplace well-being.73
While professional associations – for example v&vn, representing nurses and 
social care workers in the Netherlands – often emphasize professional development 
and workplace autonomy, they are not always large enough or sufficiently resourced 
to press their demands home within individual companies and institutions.74
4.5.3  Workers
Effective staff representation improves the quality of work and protects workers 
from occupational stress.75 There are three levels at which workers can strengthen 
their positions within organizations: on the shopfloor, in the staff council and in the 
boardroom. Particularly the system of staff councils could be better exploited to 
improve the quality of work. Companies with staff councils generally have working 
climates where employees can take initiative.76 Staff councils can facilitate consul-
tation and teamwork on the shopfloor; the more influence employees have over the 
organization of their own work, the more effectively their representative bodies 
operate.77 But it remains unclear to what extent staff councils are able to influence 
decision-making. While they already have a broad statutory remit, they may – judg-
ing by their past track record78 – be hard pressed to tackle broader issues such as 
emotional stress or how technology is used in the workplace.
Employees do not always feel represented by existing structures. Organizations 
have thus begun experimenting with more pro-active forms of participation along-
side, instead of, or within staff councils.79 Examples include the banking group abn 
amro’s participant pool and Haarlem City Council’s theme groups that draw many 
more employees than only staff council members into work-related discussions.
How far can workers influence corporate governance? From his research on how 
employee participation has affected the market value of 700 European companies in 
the period 2006–2008, Robert Kleinknecht80 concludes that employee participation 
73 Crouch (2018).
74 v&vn, the Dutch professional association for nurses and social care workers, is very active and 
has more than 100,000 members. It addresses workload, education, autonomy and profes-
sional pride.
75 etui (2019); Eurofound (2013).
76 Smulders and Pot (2016).
77 Tros et al. (2019); Smulders and Pot (2016).
78 Pot (2019b).
79 Tros et al. (2019).
80 Kleinknecht (2018).
4.5  Who Is Responsible for Control over Work?
84
heightens managers’ awareness of long-term goals. In the Netherlands, the debate 
thus far has focused mainly on gender balance in governance (see the ser advisory 
report Diversity in the Boardroom: Time to Accelerate).81 Elsewhere, French 
President Emanuel Macron, former uk Prime Minister Theresa May and former us 
presidential candidate Elisabeth Warren have advanced proposals to reserve more 
places on company boards for staff or trade union representatives.82 In the 
Netherlands, one suggestion is for a nurse to sit on the board of every healthcare 
institution83 – an idea that has long been on the agenda in the us.84
Finally, it is possible to create work organizations in which the personnel take 
charge from the outset. Although workers’ co-operatives are not as common in the 
Netherlands as they are in Italy or Spain, interest is growing: groups of the self- 
employed have begun pooling their resources while new initiatives are emerging in 
the platform economy (see Box 4.3). Some companies have introduced initiatives 
combining profit-sharing and representation.85 More recently, social enterprises 
with a different approach to doing business than traditional firms are emerging,86 
although they may encounter legal and regulatory obstacles from the requirement to 
establish staff councils87 to the ban on employees who are also claiming benefits 
from sharing in the profits. To strengthen control over work, initiatives to democra-
tize work must be supported.
The three structural developments at the heart of this report – the automation, 
flexibilization and intensification of labour – can all undermine control over work. 
To ensure that this does not happen, different actors need to play their part.
81 ser (2019a).
82 Kowalsky (2019).
83 In 2018, mps Corinne Ellemeet and Sophie Hermans tabled a parliamentary motion calling for all 
healthcare institutions to appoint a “chief nursing officer” to the board. They believe that nurses, 
with their wealth of knowledge and experience, should be listened to.
84 Graystone (2019).
85 See, for example, Kremer, M. (Kremer, 2015, February 2).
86 See also the wrr exploratory study of philanthropy (de Goede et  al., 2019) which proposes 
studying the desirability of a new statute for social enterprises.
87 The ser can grant exemptions from this requirement, but rarely does (Tros et al., 2019).
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Box 4.3 Workers’ Co-Operatives
Co-operatives enable self-employed individuals and platform workers to enter 
into collective agreements about rates and other matters. A platform co- 
operative is owned and managed by the platform’s users. Examples include 
Stocksy, a website operated by a group of photographers, and Green Taxi, 
formed by 800 taxi drivers in Denver, Colorado. Smart, originally founded in 
Belgium, claims to represent 85,000 freelances, many of them artists and per-
formers. Co-operatives have effectively functioned as trade unions when new 
platforms appear on the market, forcing for instance food-delivery services 
Deliveroo and Take Eat Easy to accept collective agreements covering their 
members.88
There are businesses where the staff are in charge in other industries as 
well. Schoongewoon, founded in 2012, is a group of ten local workers’ co- 
operatives in the cleaning sector. Everyone participates in the firm’s decision- 
making and shares in its profits; all say they prefer this work to their previous 
job – not because their wages are higher (they are not) but because they feel 
that they are their own boss, that there is mutual trust and everyone helps each 
other.89 In the home care sector, the Helpgewoon co-operative is organized 
along similar lines.
4.6  Conclusion: Control Over Work Requires More 
Autonomy and Camaraderie
Control over work The Netherlands in Europe The Netherlands over time
Autonomy
Use and develop skills
Social support
No aggression/discrimination
Neutral Positive Negative  
Dutch workers are constantly trying to adapt to the changing and growing demands 
of their jobs, which are leaving them with more to do and less time to do it. Although 
the Netherlands, on aggregate, scores well in “control over work”, it does not do so 
88 Arets (2019, February 25).
89 Stavenuiter and Oostrik (2017).
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consistently. Aggression in workplaces is increasing while almost half of all work-
ers experience limited and declining autonomy. While new technologies and flexi-
ble contracts are part of the story, the government itself is part of the problem when 
public-sector professionals are suffering the brunt of New Public Management and 
the organized mistrust it entails. With little autonomy at work, people are less able 
to cope with its intensification. All in all, it is a recipe for burnout and absenteeism.
Lack of control over work is not an individual problem that can be solved through 
stress tests and self-help books. It concerns work organizations and, more broadly, 
society. How can we ensure that companies and institutions take responsibility for 
the quality of work they provide as they make strategic decisions about the automa-
tion, flexibilization and intensification of labour? After all, the prime responsibility 
for the quality of jobs and workers’ ability to exercise meaningful control over their 
work rests with management. Much remains to be done, not least by employers’ 
organizations and trade unions; workers also need greater influence over their orga-
nizations (see recommendations in Chap. 8).
It is crucial that people have control over their work – for their own health and 
well-being as well as for the functioning of the work organization. For the same 
reasons, workers need to be able to put boundaries around their work so that they 
may exercise control over the rest of their lives. That is the subject of the next 
chapter.
 A Day at Work: The IT Worker
“Data is the new gold”, says IT worker Gerco, “and I help mine that gold.” 
Gerco was hired on a freelance basis by the German energy company Innogy, 
the parent company of Essent – a leading supplier of gas and electricity to the 
Dutch market. Innogy wants to make the most of its data on its 2.5 million 
customers in the Netherlands, such as their energy consumption and their 
responses to special offers. Gerco is part of a “Big Data Team” of 20 special-
ists organizing and analysing this material, converting it into behavioural 
predictions.
Aged 48, Gerco is self-employed and currently engaged by several clients, 
mostly on long-term projects. He works for Innogy about three days a week, 
partly at home and partly at its offices in Den Bosch. Today there is a short 
sub-team meeting at 9:30  am to identify problems and define new tasks. 
Because of its international composition, the team works in English. After the 
meeting, Gerco takes a seat at one of the workstations in the “flexible space” 
where the Big Data Team has gathered. He is working on a program for an 
improved data library. “Programming is not so creative”, he explains. “It’s 
mainly making use of solutions other people have already come up with. 
Programmers are constantly googling.” He types in a question, goes through 
the search results and finds a possible answer. Then he cuts and pastes, pol-
ishes, does a test and finds that it works. A big laugh: “We are very pleased 
with Google.”
(continued)
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The self-managing team works in “three-week sprints”, each with new 
goals. From these are derived specific tasks, which are delineated and allo-
cated through mutual agreement. At 11 am there is a stand-up meeting in a 
cramped, glass-walled conference room to mark the end of the current sprint. 
Against the back wall is a 3×2-metre board with the project timetable, covered 
with stickers and Post-It notes. The team members report briefly on their 
progress and discuss successes, problems, solutions and new estimates. Post-
Its are moved and new ones added. The conclusion: they are still on schedule. 
Everyone returns to their own computer.
Shortly after noon, someone calls out something about lunchtime. Gerco 
drags himself away from his screen. It is rare for anybody to work through 
lunch with just a sandwich at their computer. In the canteen, six members of 
his team sit together at a table. 45 min later, everyone is back in the office. 
Gerco continues to work on his program. Now that he has found the right 
route, he can set about perfecting it.
Information technology is developing rapidly. Gerco keeps up to date by 
reading and talking with colleagues, but above all by doing. He had to learn 
the trade largely on the job – his degree is in Mechanical Engineering, not 
IT.  His criticism of many training courses and companies is that they tie 
employees down to a specialist domain, say Java, when broad knowledge is 
essential to keep up. “As a freelance, I’m in on a wide range of projects. You 
learn from that.”
Becoming self-employed was a deliberate choice for Gerco. He has joined 
4Synergy, a group of 45 freelance IT specialists who work together to acquire 
and share knowledge. He is saving for a rainy day and is insured against ill-
ness through a mutual aid fund. His rate varies between €700 and €1200 gross 
per day, depending on the type of assignment.
At about 2 pm, Gerco has an appointment with a colleague from Innogy. 
The Big Data Team needs permission to link its cloud platform to the firm’s 
data files. This is a major information security issue. The two men sit together 
in a small interview room, each behind his own laptop. The jargon flies: “gate-
way”, “aws management console”, “user landing”. The perfect solution can-
not be achieved at the moment, but Gerco says that the alternative they have 
found is more than adequate: it sounds an alarm if anyone tries to break in. 
But his colleague doubts this will satisfy his superiors. Gerco is not happy. 
Co-ordination with the company often leads to delays, he sighs.
He returns to his computer. Stress is not a problem for Gerco. Nor does he 
have the idea that companies are racking up their demands or expecting orders 
to be completed faster. It is rare for him to work in the evening or on weekends.
Gerco notes that technology is taking over more and more work, including 
that of people in IT. “The hardware specialists, especially in non-graduate 
positions, are losing their jobs. For example, because servers are being 
replaced by the cloud.” Which does not mean that he, as a cloud specialist, is 
(continued)
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sitting pretty. “In ten years’ time that could be replaced by artificial intelli-
gence.” So? “So I have to make sure I stay up to date and in demand. How? 
By continuing to work. Beyond that, you can’t plan things.”
It is 5 pm. Gerco finishes his program and then goes home.
The number of IT workers in the Netherlands continues to grow; at the begin-
ning of 2019 there were 395,000 of them, 85% of them men. They are rela-
tively highly educated: 62% have a university degree, 22% a post-secondary 
vocational qualification. The number with permanent contracts is declining. 
In 2017, they accounted for 73% of the profession, while 15% were on flexible 
contracts and 16% were self- employed. According to a 2014 survey of IT pro-
fessionals by the technology website Tweakers, almost 60% have a gross 
income of between €2000 and €4000 per month. The average (modal) income 
in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, excluding holi-
day pay. Freelance IT workers are more likely than employees to earn less 
than €2000, but also more likely to earn more than €4000.
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The Dutch value clear boundaries around their work. However much they may be 
committed to their professions and occupations, they want to live a life and to be 
able to look after young children and elderly parents. It is thus hardly surprising that 
control over one’s working hours has become a key policy issue in recent decades.1 
This has largely been driven by women moving en masse into the paid labour mar-
ket, although working men certainly want more control over their lives as well. One 
in ten workers in the Netherlands now say that their working and private lives are 
out of balance.2 As deadlines pile up at work, so too does the washing up at home; 
as a result, people sometimes feel inadequate on both fronts.3 Some people – espe-
cially the highly educated, women and parents – feel perpetually rushed.4
Eurofound5 observes that it is relatively easy for people in the Netherlands to set 
limits on their work and to combine work with private life. This is largely due to the 
country’ s part-time work culture. Dutch women entered the workforce en masse 
only in the late 1990s, at about the same time as women in Spain and Ireland. The 
inroads women have made since then are largely due to the part-time economy, with 
shorter hours widely accepted even in the middle and upper segments of the labour 
market.6 But it is not only women who find it easier to enter paid work; the part-time 
culture also benefits other groups such as people with occupational disabilities 
(Box 5.2).
1 The clearest changes concern the importance of good working hours (45% in 1990, 60% in 2018) 
and good holiday arrangements (36% in 1990, 45% in 2018) (Conen, 2020).
2 Houtman et al. (2020).
3 Houtman et al. (2017).
4 Overall, 36% of workers sometimes feel rushed, 54% that they are sometimes too busy, and 39% 
that they are failing to some extent. Highly educated persons, women and parents more often 




The question remains whether this has not created what economist Janneke 
Plantenga calls the “part-time trap”.7 Public provisions in the Netherlands, from 
school hours to pre-school childcare, tend to be geared to part-time work which has 
become the norm, in policy as well as in practice. As a result, many workers do not 
truly choose the hours they work. The part-time culture has also impeded progress 
in areas such as comprehensive childcare and paid leave.
This chapter focuses on part-time work as well as the other ingredients necessary 
to improve control in life including paid leave, good childcare, care for the elderly 
and workers’ ability to determine their own working hours. How are new technolo-
gies, flexible contracts and the intensification of work affecting people’s control 
in life?
5.1  Part-Time Work, or Looking After Number One
The work-life balance enjoyed by most people in the Netherlands can be attributed 
to the part-time economy, more specifically to the part-time economy for women. 
Three-quarters of working women are employed part-time (Fig. 5.1); their average 
working week has now risen to 28 h, which is no longer low by European standards. 
Twenty-two percent of working men also work part-time, a level unique in Europe. 
Overall, men work an average of 39 h a week (Fig. 5.2).8
The Care and Work Act, introduced in 2006, allows people to adjust their own 
working hours, providing what is effectively a right to work part-time. The possi-
bilities were further expanded by the Flexible Working Act in 2016. This means that 
the Netherlands, together with the uk, now has the most comprehensive legislation 
for part-time work.9 By law, workers enjoy substantial autonomy to determine for 
themselves where and what hours they work. Combined with the Dutch part-time 
economy, the law ensures that people have more time for their families, voluntary 
work and other activities.
Does the lack of affordable childcare force especially women to work part-time? 
The answer, largely, is “no”: part-time work is what most women prefer. It is their 
wish, primarily because it allows them to spend more time with their children. 
Despite this, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research has calculated that the 
average female working week would be 2.3 h longer if all women were able to work 
the amount they preferred.10 Moreover, 13% of women – and 7% of men – explicitly 
state that they want to work more hours.11 Whereas public policy in recent decades 
7 Dohmen (2017, October 20).
8 Portegijs and van den Brakel (2018).
9 oecd (2019b).
10 Portegijs et al. (2016).
11 Portegijs and van den Brakel (2018). According to Statistics Netherlands, 662,000 people want 
to work fewer hours, notable among them the self-employed. In the first quarter of 2019, 766,000 




















































































































































































































































































Fig. 5.2 Proportion of men in part-time work in the Netherlands and the rest of the European 
Union, 2017
Source: scp
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has focused on opportunities to work less, perhaps more attention is now warranted 
for possibilities to work more. While part-time work as a choice is a hallmark of 
good work, this choice is inevitably shaped by prevailing social, economic and insti-
tutional conditions. We examine the most important of these below.
5.1.1  Childcare
Would people in the Netherlands work longer hours if childcare was less expensive 
and of better quality? The provision of public care for young children – professional 
childminding, crèches, kindergartens, nursery schools – is seen primarily as a sur-
rogate for parental care (the term kinderopvang implies a “relief” or “stand-by” 
service). The main aim of childcare in the Netherlands has always been to support 
women’s participation in the workforce – unlike in Scandinavia, where the child’s 
social, emotional and cognitive development is paramount.12 The quality of Dutch 
childcare has long worried pedagogues.13 Most workers in the sector only have 
modest qualifications,14 and it is only quite recently that Dutch public childcare has 
been assessed as “satisfactory” to “good”.15 Pedagogues claim that compared to 
other countries, the quality of Dutch childcare is only “average”.16
Dutch parents often find the costs of childcare prohibitive, and they are right: 
only in the uk do parents spend more of their income on childcare. A couple with 
one full-time and one part-time earner can easily find themselves spending a fifth of 
their earnings on childcare, even if it is only for a few days a week.17 While parents 
generally consider the quality of the care good, they are critical of the high staff 
turnover – a product, in part, of labour market flexibilization.18 Dutch parents have 
low expectations.19 Because of the part-time economy, children only attend nursery 
a few days a week; “safe” and “fun” are thus good enough. If childcare focused 
more on the child’s educational development, parents might make more use of it, 
allowing them more time to work.
12 See also wrr (2013a).
13 Vermeer and Groeneveld (2017).
14 The National Childcare Quality Monitor concludes: “The provision of professionalization activi-
ties is middling on average, with little frequent substantive educational consultation with col-
leagues or fellow childcare workers and managers” (Slot et al., 2017: 12).
15 Slot et al. (2017).
16 Fukkink (ed.). (2017).
17 oecd (2016b); see also oecd (2019b). Dutch government spending is also relatively low; see also 
McKinsey Global Institute (2018).
18 Roeters and Bucx (2018).
19 Dohmen (2017, October 20).
5 Control in Life
93
5.1.2  Care for the Elderly
Would people in the Netherlands work longer hours if care for the elderly were bet-
ter organized? In previous generations, women were stay-at-home mothers and 
available to look after elderly relatives if need be. Now that most members of both 
sexes are working outside the home, more and more people are combining paid 
work and informal care-giving – one in three women and one in five men, 2 million 
people in all. This number will only continue to rise with the aging of the population 
and people staying in work for longer.21 So long as their care-giving only consists of 
basic tasks and errands that are not too time-consuming, most working informal 
care-givers manage to cope. But the heavier the burden becomes – 8 h or more a 
week – the more likely some will stop working altogether and many more will work 
fewer hours or take sick leave.22 Workers with heavy informal care responsibilities 
experience a great deal of time pressure and are less satisfied with their lives.23
Compared to most other European countries, the Netherlands spends large sums 
on long-term care for the elderly. A significant percentage of those aged 75 and over 
live in residential nursing facilities or receive professional care in their own homes.24 
While the policy aim is for people to continue living independently for as long as 
possible, the Dutch social care system is not organized to support informal care- 
givers; it focuses on the elderly themselves, not on their working sons or daughters. 
What assistance informal care-givers receive comes from local government in the 
form of information, emotional support and at times short-term respite care – none 
of which does much to keep the informal care-giver in work.
20 Kremer (2007); Rostgaard (2014).
21 de Boer et al. (2019).
22 Among those combining work with intensive informal care-giving, 17% started working less and 
7% gave up work altogether (Josten & de Boer, 2015).
23 de Boer et al. (2019).
24 Spasova et al. (2018).
Box 5.1 Childcare in Northern Europe
Pre-school in Scandinavia has historically focused on children’s social and 
cognitive development, and Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark consis-
tently top international tables for the quality of childcare. The idea is that – 
certainly from the age of two – children are better off attending nursery than 
staying at home. In Denmark, all children older than 6 months are entitled to 
at least 20 h of public childcare a week, even if their parents do not go out to 
work.20 In line with this thinking, higher professional demands are placed on 
staff in the sector, who usually have vocational degrees. In contrast, their 
Dutch counterparts are more likely to have post-secondary qualifications at 
best, while many are on temporary contracts.
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Structural facilities to help working informal care-givers such as day-care cen-
tres and hospital-based services have been phased out. Referring to what they call 
the “participation society”, recent Dutch governments have called on people to take 
greater responsibility for care and to make less use of facilities provided by the 
welfare state. For the foreseeable future, the care demands placed on families are 
more likely to increase than decrease.25
5.1.3  Fair Sharing
Do people work more if their partner does more at home? The policy ideal in the 
Netherlands has long been the “fair sharing” of both paid and unpaid work. But 
although the Dutch have been European leaders in talking about men’s responsibili-
ties26 and shared caring is the stated ideal of much of the population,27 things differ in 
practice. Women usually reduce their working hours once children are born while 
men work more. In only 18% of households with children do both partners work 
equal hours. While Dutch men have begun caring more for their children than men in 
most other European countries except in Scandinavia, Dutch women more frequently 
remain responsible for household tasks and especially family organization. The dif-
ferences are most apparent in informal care-giving, where 17% of working women 
and 10% of working men look after sick or needy elderly relatives, partners or 
children.28
5.1.4  Good Work
If one chooses for it, working part-time can protect workers from the intensification 
of work.29 But would part-time employees work longer hours if they had better 
jobs? Women tend to have less autonomy at work and are more likely to be working 
on a temporary or on-call basis and in sectors with high workloads such as primary 
education and healthcare. Some jobs are so emotionally stressful that people eschew 
full-time positions. In primary education, a leading reason to prefer part-time 
appointments is that teaching is “too demanding for a full-time job”.30
Sometimes only part-time work is available, for instance in home care, after- 
school childcare and cleaning. Entry-level jobs for young women leaving school or 
college are often part-time,31 while cleaning often also employs men and ethnic 
25 Bredewold et al. (2018).
26 See, for example, Commissie Toekomstscenario’s Herverdeling Onbetaalde Arbeid (1995).
27 Portegijs et al. (2016).
28 Portegijs et al. (2016).
29 Piasna (2018).
30 Arbeidsmarktplatform PO (2019).
31 Merens and Bucx (2018).
5 Control in Life
95
minorities who must hold several part-time jobs to make ends meet. Part-time work 
has become the norm in some occupations and sectors, not because it helps workers 
gain control in life but because it is cheaper for employers.
While the Flexible Working Act sets the standard and encourages the practice of 
part-time employment,32 it is less well-known that this statute provides opportuni-
ties for both reducing and increasing working hours, for example by working from 
home. Legal proceedings to enforce this right are less common than cases seeking 
fewer hours and are also less likely to succeed as employers can give many reasons 
for opposing such requests.33 Employees are often unaware that they can demand 
more official hours as an alternative to structural overtime. From the perspective of 
good work, being able to work more, if one wishes, is as important as the right to 
work less.
The quality of work can be a significant factor encouraging people to work fewer 
hours. It is striking that 70% of the lower skilled labour force in the Netherlands, 
male and female, have part-time jobs – a rate unsurpassed anywhere else in Europe.34 
Women in this group are less likely than other women to be working at all. When 
they do, they have on average the shortest working weeks: 22 h, compared with 25 h 
for women with post-secondary qualifications and 28 h for university graduates.35 
One reason, it seems, is that many women with lower educational attainment have 
“traditional” views of family life, preferring to spend a lot of time with their chil-
dren; their husbands are less active in the household than other men. But there is 
also the fact that the work they do, or could do, is not very attractive. With better 
jobs, they might want to work longer hours.
In short, part-time work can help people gain control in life – but only if it is a 
genuine choice, not something forced on people because childcare is too expensive 
or poor in quality, because their jobs are too draining to do all day, every day, or 
because there are no full-time positions on offer.36
Although part-time employment allows people to more easily draw boundaries 
around their working lives, it comes at a price. Ultimately there is a price for society 
as well. The Dutch part-time economy is among the main reasons why women are 
less likely to be in good jobs and senior positions, and more likely to be paid less, to 
have lower pensions, to receive less compensation when they become incapacitated 
32 Kamerstukken ii, 2010/2011, 32 889, No. 3.
33 Burri (2020).
34 oecd (2019b).
35 Portegijs et al. (2016).
36 The Emancipation Monitor (Portegijs & van den Brakel, 2018) maintained by the Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research reports that nearly eight out of ten women working part-time would, 
subject to certain conditions, like to work more hours. One in three cite inadequate household 
income as their motivation. Similar numbers would work more hours if they could better combine 
it with their personal lives, for example through more suitable hours, working from home and/or 
shorter commutes. Affordable quality childcare would make a difference for one in six mothers; 
one in five informal care-givers say they will work more once their help is no longer needed.
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or unemployed, and to be, overall, less financially independent.39 Only 60% of 
women (compared to 79% of men) have incomes that are at least 70% of the net 
full-time minimum wage.40 This means that they have less financial bargaining 
power and run greater risks if their home situation changes due to separation or 
divorce. The Dutch solution to provide work-life balance thus has a price for both 
individuals and society.
5.2  Paid Leave
Workers in the Netherlands do not receive financial compensation for providing 
informal care. If parents choose to work part-time to look after the children, they 
bear the costs in lost income. Things are different in Scandinavia and Germany, 
where the dilemma of combining care with work has been solved through paid care 
leave, which can sometimes be taken on a part-time basis. The right to paid leave 
applies to both parents; sometimes it is subject to a “use it or lose it” clause to 
ensure that fathers take advantage of the provision to strengthen their bonds with 
their children and so that women do not fall further behind in the labour market.41 In 
contrast, the Netherlands only has parental leave for new mothers and, as of 1 July 
2020, 5 days of paid partner leave, plus the option of taking up to 26 weeks of paren-
tal leave unpaid.
Box 5.2 Part-Time Employment as an Opportunity to Work
Part-time employment provides opportunities for people with difficulties 
adapting to the demands and rhythms of paid work, or who need a stepping 
stone to full-time employment. They include people who wish to start work-
ing again after serious illness, the long-term unemployed and people with 
occupational disabilities. According to the oecd, it is because of the part-time 
economy that people with serious mental health issues in the Netherlands are 
more likely to be working than in other countries.37 But in most cases, these 
people would like to be working longer hours to be able to make a decent 
living.38
37 oecd (2015a).
38 Schaafsma et al. (2015).
39 Burri (2020).
40 Portegijs and van den Brakel (2018). Persons in the Netherlands are considered economically 
independent if their individual net income from employment and/or self-employment equals or 
exceeds the threshold for individual minimum income. The threshold is currently set at 70% of the 





Figure 5.3 shows that the Netherlands lags behind much of Europe in its parental 
leave arrangements. Germany, for instance, provides a total of 14 months of paren-
tal leave on a state-funded benefit,42 which parents can divide between themselves. 
In Sweden the combined paid leave period for both parents is 16 months; the gov-
ernment pays a basic allowance, supplemented by employers. To comply with eu 
policy, the Netherlands is now revisiting its policies on parental leave. From 2022, 
all parents will continue to receive half their wages for the first nine weeks they take 
off (out of a total leave entitlement of 26 weeks) during the child’s first year of life – 
a still limited arrangement compared to many other European countries.43
The idea behind paid parental leave is that by giving both parents time and money 
to look after their new child, they divide care duties equally and both remain active 
in the labour market. The structure of the arrangement is crucial; it needs to include 
clauses ensuring that both partners actually take time off and that they are ade-
quately compensated when they do so. As for its duration, the leave should be nei-
ther too short nor too long, so parents do not lose touch with the world of work. 
Eight to twelve months per person is probably a sensible period.44
Leave arrangements for informal care-giving are even less developed than for 
new parents. Here the Netherlands is more in line with the rest of Europe. The 


































































































































High salary Low salary No salary
Months
Fig. 5.3 Overall parental leave entitlement in months, eu countries, 2017
Source: Blum et al., 2018
42 This is about €1800 per month.
43 See also oecd (2019b).
44 Akgunduz and Plantenga (2013).
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salary) and long-term unpaid leave (approximately 6 weeks a year). But only one in 
ten informal care-givers make use of the paid leave they are entitled to, while many 
more use their vacation days or report sick in order to fulfil their care responsibili-
ties.45 Apparently, the almost unpaid arrangements available to them do not meet 
their needs. Few collective labour agreements include provisions for informal care, 
although there has been slightly more recognition in recent years of the “combined 
pressure” of work and care.46
The growing group of flexible workers rarely claim paid leave. A self-employed 
person has no employer and is not covered by a collective labour agreement. A tem-
porary employee has only limited rights, while having intensive care duties at home 
would seem unlikely to help them secure a permanent contract.47 Plantenga con-
cludes: “A self-employed worker with a sick partner or a single parent with a tem-
porary contract and an unwell child see the hard face of the current social-care 
infrastructure.”48 In the flexible, part-time Dutch economy, parents and informal 
care-givers bear the costs of lost income.
It is not inconceivable that looking after young children, elderly parents and sick 
partners will eventually become the privilege of the happy few. But for single par-
ents with limited skills or low-earning or sick partners, choosing to work fewer 
hours is not always a viable option. The National Institute for Family Finance 
Information calculates that a person with an average income who works one day 
less a week to care for a sick father living elsewhere in the country will easily be 
€245 out of pocket each month. Particularly if workers must reduce their hours to 
care for a sick partner who depends on benefits, there is a genuine risk that they will 
descend into poverty.49 While people with good jobs may have enough of a financial 
cushion to move into part-time work, especially if it is only temporary, what about 
the shop assistant with a sick father or partner? Such people often lack control or 
even influence over their working hours.50 More than a third of working informal 
care-givers have no say at all over their working hours; more than one in five are 
rarely or never able to take time off.51 Having the time and money needed to provide 
care could well become a new issue of distributive justice.
Unpaid care is already apportioned unevenly. More and more women are fulfill-
ing informal care responsibilities in their “spare” time. Much of this labour – as well 
as voluntary care work in home care and hospitals – falls on people already working 
in the social and healthcare sector, one in four of whom provide some form of 
45 de Boer et al. (2019).
46 Heeger and Koopmans (2018).
47 The self-employed in the Netherlands are entitled to 16 weeks of maternity leave, during which 
they receive the Maternity Benefit for the Self-Employed.
48 Plantenga (2017): 271.
49 Heeger and Koopmans (2018). The National Institute for Family Finance Information has calcu-
lated that informal care-givers can lose €1100 per month (Nibud, 2014).
50 See also de Klerk et al. (2017).
51 de Boer et al. (2019).
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unpaid care on top of their paid work.52 The burden of care, both paid and unpaid, 
thus disproportionately falls on a specific group of workers.
Box 5.3 Do the Dutch Really Work So Little?
It is often claimed that the Dutch work less than anyone else in Europe. While 
this is true, the differences are not as great as many people think. The average 
Dutch person now works 29 h a week, the same as the average Belgian and 
only an hour less than the average Dane.53 While the average Dutch worker in 
the 1960s logged about 1800 h per year, by 1990 this had declined to around 
1400 h per year, a number which has since remained relatively stable. But col-
lectively, the Dutch are working more than ever before (Fig.  5.4). This is 
because participation in the labour market, especially by women, has risen 
since the 1990s to a level comparable to that in the Scandinavian countries54. 
Many working people thus also run households, take care of children and help 
out when loved ones are ill.
52 de Klerk et al. (2017).
53 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/9699107/weekly+paid+hours+2016. The 
European average is 33. In Denmark it is 30. The gap between the Netherlands and other European 
countries is narrowing.
54 In 2017, some 72.9% of women aged 15-64 who were not studying were working. The figure for 
men was 84.8% (Portegijs & van den Brakel, 2018).
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Paid work need not double the load for people with care responsibilities at home. 
Workplace flexibility and support from colleagues and managers may shield them 
from the strain. Those who have a good day at work can return home ready to take 
on the challenges of looking after a sick partner or a disabled child. Good jobs that 
give workers space for care-giving make unpaid care work possible.
5.3  Control Over Working Hours
While part-time work, paid leave, childcare and home care services all have the 
potential to give working people greater control in life, people also need some con-
trol over where and when they work.55 Above all, this means flexibility for the 
worker, not by the worker. About half of all working people in the Netherlands say 
they can largely determine their own hours; only workers in Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway fare better.56 The other half, however, have no control over their hours. For 
them, requesting time off to look after a sick child or an evening shift to take an 
elderly parent to the hospital during the day can be problematic. Control over one’s 
working hours is also unevenly distributed, primarily along the axis of educational 
attainment.57
Especially insecure temporary workers lack control over their working hours, a 
real problem for the 550,000 casual and on-call workers (see Chaps. 1 and 3) over- 
represented in the hospitality, cleaning, supermarket and healthcare sectors.58 In 
theory, these workers can refuse shifts; in practice, they fear that they are replace-
able and will no longer be called.59 Especially in the above-mentioned sectors, 
employers roster their staff to eliminate “inactive” time at work. The work itself is 
also often intensive, leaving workers too exhausted to maintain a private life.60
The combination of insecure contracts with uncertain hours – “double flexibil-
ity” – makes things even worse. In the words of a flexible home-care worker with a 
school-aged daughter: “You don’t know what your week will look like. You can’t 
make arrangements for your daughter. Everything is subject to change.”61 Research 
in the United States underlines the importance of regular, predictable working 
hours, with workers, on average, willing to surrender 20% of their pay in return for 
greater control over their hours.62
55 Some 45% of respondents in 1990 considered good working hours important; in 2018 it was 68% 
(Conen, 2020).
56 Eurofound (2017).
57 Houtman et al. (2020).
58 On-call workers also include many school, college and university students; 70% are under the 
age of 25. We are not talking about them here, but about adults working to build independent lives.
59 Kremer (2017); van der Gaag (2018).
60 Piasna (2018).
61 Kremer et al. (2017c): 104.
62 Mas and Pallais (2017). See also Datta (2019), who concluded from research in the us and the 
uk that although atypical workers may like flexibility, they still prefer permanent jobs and that 
many would settle for less pay if it means greater job security.
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Another form of labour flexibilization, self-employment, can be considered more 
accommodating for the working person. People who became their own boss often 
report they did so to combine work and care; better able to balance their personal 
and professional lives, they tend to be more satisfied with their situations, especially 
if they chose it themselves.63 Among informal care-givers, the self-employed out-
number those with salaried positions.64 It suggests that employers still do not take 
work-life balance seriously enough, although research shows that companies and 
institutions that allow personnel to tailor their work to their home situations have 
lower staff turnover, more enthusiastic employees and less absenteeism.65
5.4  Blurring Boundaries
The self-employed sometimes have difficulties demarcating their working and pri-
vate lives. This became apparent in the interviews conducted for our previous pub-
lication, For the Sake of Security.66 In their free time, freelancers often feel they 
should be generating turnover: “The work goes on all the time”. This feeling of 
working all the time is the flip side of working from home.
Almost one-third of employees in the Netherlands regularly work overtime  – 
most notably managers, teachers and university graduates aged 25–35.67 Many must 
bring work home to finish their allotted tasks.68 But it is not always clear anymore 
what people see as overtime. In one study, highly educated professionals did not 
consider reading and replying to e-mails as work.69 They did this in front of the 
television in the evening and on Sundays, to be ready for work the next day – a clear 
case of blurring boundaries. While many professionals feel perpetually on call,70 
they need time to recover and would benefit from clear dividing lines between their 
work and personal lives.
The internet and portable devices are further blurring the boundaries of work. 
Digital technology is a double-edged sword; in a joint report, Eurofound and the 
ilo71 found smartphones, tablets, laptops and the like affecting the quality of work 
in both positive and negative ways. On the one hand, these technologies can improve 
63 Annink (2017).
64 Josten and Vlasblom (2017).
65 Kamerstukken ii, 2010/2011, 32 889, No. 3.
66 Kremer (2017): 116.
67 cbs (2018h, July 24).
68 van Echtelt et al. (2016).
69 Gregg (2011).
70 Duxbury and Smart (2011).
71 Eurofound & International Labour Organization (2017).
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work-life balance, reduce commuting time and stimulate productivity.72 Tele- 
working makes it easier for parents of young children to remain working full-time.73 
On the other hand, these technologies can lengthen working days, increase work-
loads and fuel work-life conflicts.74 Many countries have thus begun imposing lim-
its on how far workers can be contacted outside of their official hours. Since 1 
January 2017, employees in France have the legal right to switch off their phones 
outside of working hours; several companies in Germany including bmw and 
Volkswagen entitle their employees to be “unreachable”. In the Netherlands, a 2019 
parliamentary bill introduced the “right to inaccessibility” – a prerogative already 
included in some collective labour agreements.
5.5  Conclusion: Control in Life Requires More than Just 
Part-Time Work






Good care for the elderly
Neutral Positive Negative  
It is easier to balance work and private life in the Netherlands than in many other 
countries. This is largely due to how public policy supports working part-time – 
meaning people are not forced to devote themselves entirely to work during life’s 
busy periods. The question nevertheless remains whether certain groups  – espe-
cially moderately and less educated women – would not work longer hours if there 
72 Cal Newport (2016) argues that the omnipresence of the internet and portable devices means we 
are no longer in the phase of “deep work”. Work has become fragmented; our brains must con-
stantly process information, which takes time and energy.
73 Chung and van der Horst (2017).
74 Houtman et al. (2017).
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was better public care for the young and the elderly. This would not only enable 
these groups to work more; it would encourage them to find better work. People 
without good work are more prepared to work less.
Care responsibilities generally remain unremunerated in the Netherlands; despite 
the high levels of workforce participation, opportunities for paid leave are limited. 
This means that especially female part-time workers pay a personal price for their 
commitment to care-giving. There is a social price as well, and the future may well 
see greater inequality between those who can negotiate (and afford) work arrange-
ments that allow them to care for family and those who cannot. Control over work-
ing hours is crucial to control in life but is often limited or non-existent for 
low-skilled, temporary and on-call workers. While control in life is a cherished goal 
for most working people, it is certainly not something they all have.
5.6  Part 1 – Conclusion: Work Could Be better
People in the Netherlands are generally quite satisfied with their work. Nevertheless, 
there is substantial room for improvement across the three conditions necessary for 
work to be considered good: security of income, control over work and work-life 
balance. Based on Statistics Netherlands’ Monitor of Well-Being, Fig. 5.5 places the 
quality of work in the Netherlands in European perspective (the slices) and in light 
of recent developments (the inner ring). As we see, the Netherlands does not consis-
tently rank well (green) across the twelve indicators of good work. In some areas, 
the country lags behind other European nations or the quality of work has been 
deteriorating (red). In other areas, the Netherlands is mid-range or there have been 
few positive developments (grey).
5.6.1  Good Work in the Netherlands?
With the flexibilization of the labour market, more and more workers in the 
Netherlands have lost income security. If people have not experienced this uncer-
tainty themselves, their partner, child or neighbour has. While the Dutch economy – 
even during the Covid-19 crisis – was generating a lot of jobs, many of these come 
with low (and further declining) job security. The social-security system itself has 
become a source of insecurity for many working people, especially the self- 
employed who are largely excluded from work-related social benefits.
While the Netherlands still scores better than many other European countries, 
workplace autonomy – necessary for shielding workers from excessive demands, 
for organizations to function effectively and for innovation  – is declining. And 
although many Dutch workplaces offer social support, they can also be settings for 
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aggressive behaviour; companies and institutions do not always bring out the best in 
people, especially for ethnic minorities and people with occupational disabilities. 
Nor has the kind of learning and professional development that would contribute to 
security of employment been widely embraced.
With widespread opportunities to work part-time, work and private life are easy 
to combine in the Netherlands. But the costs are borne by individuals, especially 
women. The country has limited paid leave arrangements to care for young children 
and the elderly although working people are increasingly likely to be assuming 
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Fig. 5.5 Quality of work in the Netherlands, in Europe and over time: twelve indicators
Source: WRR, inspired by the Monitor of Well-Being (cbs)
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Publicly-funded child and elderly care make work possible. While quality child-
care enables parents to work (more) – and encourages them to do so – the Netherlands 
does not excel in this area. Although care for the elderly is highly developed, there 
is scant emphasis on supporting working people who provide care outside of their 
working hours. The ability to determine when work starts and stops is important for 
work-life balance but not everyone has sufficient control over their working hours 
to allow taking on informal care responsibilities as well. In short, control in life is 
unevenly distributed.
5.6.2  Dividing Lines
The quality of work is under pressure for all working people in the Netherlands. 
Insecurity is increasing across the board and burnout is widespread. In this sense, 
there is no clear polarization between good and bad jobs, between “MacJobs” and 
“McJobs”. There is no guarantee of good work, even for university graduates. That 
said, some people clearly have better work than others. People with modest educa-
tional qualifications on aggregate have less control over the three dimensions of 
good work. Women, too, generally earn less, are more insecure and enjoy less con-
trol over their work. The same applies to people with migration backgrounds.
New divisions are emerging in how much control people enjoy over their work-
ing lives. There are significant differences by level of education as well as between 
occupations, with public-sector professionals in healthcare and education as well as 
the police having the least control over their work. Alongside the classic gender 
divide, new divisions are emerging between workers who are able to combine their 
careers with informal care-giving and those who cannot because they have no say 
over the time and place of their shifts.
5.6.3  Three Core Developments
The three developments at the heart of this book – the automation, flexibilization 
and intensification of labour – may well have negative consequences for the quality 
of work in the coming years. One danger is that the wider use of robots and artificial 
intelligence will further limit workers’ autonomy, reduce their wages and increase 
the flexibility expected of working people. But this need not happen;  technology can 
also contribute towards good work.
While the intensification of work can exacerbate burnout and absenteeism, this 
need not happen if people retain sufficient control over their working lives. While 
the flexible labour market reduces people’s control over their earnings, the risks are 
diminished if there is adequate social-security provision and if all workers enjoy 
greater opportunities for professional development.
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5.6.4  Policy Choices
Whether or not work improves will depend primarily on decisions made by employ-
ers, who can support workplace learning and professional development and ensure 
that workers have adequate control over the organization of their tasks and the space 
they need to harmonize their lives at work and at home. This is also a matter for the 
government. Good work is supported by public policies for training and social secu-
rity (Chap. 3), by legislation governing working conditions and its enforcement, and 
by protecting and promoting the rights of workers.
 A Day at Work: The Retail Floor Manager
Although the shop does not open until 10 am, Cathelijn is there at 9. There is 
plenty to do, including cleaning up and checking the till. But first a cup of 
coffee. De Prael is a small brewery with a pub and shop in the heart of old 
Amsterdam. In addition to the 17 varieties of De Prael beer, the store also sells 
local or sustainable delicacies such as wine, liqueurs, cheese, nuts, chocolate 
and coffee to take away. Cathelijn, 49, works here as “floor manager” four 
days a week, between 9 am and 2 pm.
In the meantime, Atone (pronounced Ah-ton) has arrived as well, a cheer-
ful 65-year-old man of Senegalese descent with a history of drug addiction. 
He works here one or two days a week on a voluntary basis. De Prael is a 
social enterprise employing dozens of people “distanced” from the labour 
market, either unpaid but with benefits or on subsidized wages. Some are 
making real progress. Cathelijn began here 5 years ago as a volunteer; for the 
past 2 years, she has been earning a regular salary through a sheltered employ-
ment scheme. For others, like Atone, it is enough that they have somewhere 
they are expected to be.
Cathelijn vacuums the store and Atone follows her with a mop. Sales were 
good yesterday, meaning there are empty spaces on the shelves to be replen-
ished. At 10 am Cathelijn opens the door and Atone inserts the company ban-
ners into their holders outside. He used to attend an addiction clinic, he says, 
and was not the easiest of clients. “I didn’t listen”, he laughs out loud. “But 
now I do.” He is full of praise for Cathelijn: “She has motivated me.”
Cathelijn has a university degree and used to work as a researcher, but 
10 years ago suffered a nervous breakdown. “For years I spent my days in 
bed.” She finally realized she had to do something and ended up at De Prael 
after being referred there by the mental health service. First in administration, 
later in the shop. “The depression slowly subsided, and the work helped. 
Structure. Cycling to work in the morning, along with all the other people 
doing the same. Keeping busy, but at your own pace. You can do that here.” 
Cathelijn no longer needs much supervision, although she did at the begin-




Two Asian tourists enter the store, look around and leave. A young woman 
comes in for a cappuccino. A couple, clearly in love, pick out a selection of 
beers. Cathelijn takes their money. Atone jumps in to help, wrapping each 
bottle in a sheet of newspaper. Otherwise they will clink in the bag, he 
explains.
Two years ago, Cathelijn’s case manager asked if she would like to convert 
her volunteer position into a paid job under the sheltered work scheme. She 
jumped at the chance. Before she could make the move, the Employee 
Insurance Agency had to assess her fitness for work. That was “very confron-
tational”. De Prael now pays her in line with the results of the assessment, 
with the city council topping it up so that she is earning the statutory mini-
mum wage. She loves not being on benefits anymore. “They’re just hassle and 
stress. They can try to make you work somewhere, and maybe I wouldn’t be 
able to handle that.”
The pressure at De Prael is lower than elsewhere but the laws of economics 
still apply. The shop is not bringing in enough money. Because its future is 
uncertain, Cathelijn has been looking around for other work. She has made 
three applications, for both regular and sheltered jobs, and two have been 
accepted. But she is not sure what to do. “Change is hard. I know what I have 
here, and I don’t know what I might get.”
Cathelijn has lunch at 12:30 pm. What she calls “the canteen” is a good-
sized kitchen with dining tables laid with bread, milk, boxes of chocolate 
sprinkles and family jars of peanut butter. Two quiet older ladies keep them 
topped up, clear away the used dishes and wash up. A dozen or so workers 
from the brewery are eating. Cathelijn does not know them all, or how they 
came to work here. “That’s not important.” She thinks everyone deserves a 
paid job. “Not everyone is productive enough, but it’s important that you have 
opportunities to grow. There has to be hope that you can make progress.”
Atone leaves just before 2 pm. He gives Cathelijn a hug. A little later she 
puts on her coat as well. Five years ago, she would come home exhausted after 
half a day at work. Now she has energy to spare.
Sheltered employment is meant for people who need extra guidance and a 
suitable workplace due to an occupational disability. They have a contract 
and are paid at least the statutory minimum wage. There were approximately 
3000 sheltered positions in the Netherlands as of mid-2019, a number which 
should eventually increase to 30,000 under agreements between the central 
government and local authorities who are responsible for managing the 
schemes. Sheltered employment is one of many participation-enhancing inter-
ventions consistently shown by research to strengthen self-reliance and 
enhance social participation. But very few sheltered employees move into 
regular work.
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Despite successive Dutch governments emphasizing “jobs, jobs, jobs”, thousands of 
people who want to work have no jobs at all, never mind good jobs. More than 1.6 
million people in the Netherlands live entirely on benefits. In 2017, some 810,000 
were claiming benefits for disability and another 378,000 for unemployment, while 
442,000 were receiving a basic subsistence benefit. One million individuals in 2018 
possessed “unused labour potential”, including approximately 600,000 unemployed 
who would like to work and 400,000 underemployed eager to work more. These 
numbers will only increase with the Covid-19 crisis.
Are the automation, flexibilization and intensification of work leading to more or 
fewer people finding and retaining jobs? Who is benefiting or suffering the most 
from these developments? According to the oecd,1 the Achilles’ heel of the Dutch 
labour market is its lack of inclusiveness; although the vast majority of the popula-
tion is working, specific groups are marginalized in the labour market. Are new 
technologies, flexible contracts and the intensification of work helping or hindering 
vulnerable groups to stay in work – in good work in particular? Is the changing 
labour market opening new opportunities? What are the prospects for the future? 
Are new vulnerable groups emerging?
This chapter seeks to answer these questions while analysing what is already 
being done to provide good work for all. We address, in turn, the automation (Sect. 
6.1), flexibilization (Sect. 6.2) and intensification of work (Sect. 6.3) before discuss-




6.1  Technological Developments
The end of paid work and the working class has been a recurring prophecy in mod-
ern western history.2 But despite the introduction of the factory assembly line in the 
nineteenth century, the personal computer and the global internet in the twentieth 
century, and mobile phones, robots and artificial intelligence in our own era, both 
dreams and nightmares about the coming end of human labour have come to naught.
Although a much-discussed 2013 study by Frey and Osborne3 provoked fears 
that robots would eliminate 47% of jobs in the United States over the next two 
decades, little remains of the doom and gloom just a few years later. Some studies 
even warn that there will be too few people for all the new jobs created by AI, robots 
and cobots.4 But these latter studies, too, remain speculation; many are based on the 
subjective expectations of ceos and technical experts, which we need to take with a 
grain of salt.
Box 6.1 Robots Sacked
We have all heard predictions of the impending robot apocalypse which could 
cost up to half of all workers their jobs in the near future.5 But the revolution 
is not proceeding as quickly as some expected. A hotel in Japan put hundreds 
of robots to work in 2015; half of them, due to malfunctions, were “sacked” 
in 2019.6
Treatises on machines replacing people have recently become more 
nuanced and realistic. Approaching jobs as bundles of tasks, they focus on 
which sub-tasks are amenable to automation. This does not mean that the 
machines are taking over as all kinds of other considerations, power relation-
ships and preferences remain.7 Human beings do not only work to make 
money but to structure their days, gain self-esteem, enhance their identities 
and feel a part of society.8
Although technology can take over specific tasks, this is less the case for 
entire jobs; no profession can be reduced to a set of tasks that can be done by 
machines alone. Much depends on the specific applications of the technology 
and the choices made about their implementation.
2 Keynes (1932), Gorz (1994), Rifkin (1995).
3 Frey & Osborne (2013).
4 See, for example, Nakamura & Zeira (2018).
5 See also Smulders & Oeij (2019).
6 Tates (2019, January 17).
7 Hueck (2018, April 3).
8 See also Valenduc & Vendramin (2019).
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Few people perform only a single task at work.9 Although it may be possible to 
automate certain subtasks, whether this actually happens depends not only on the 
(often overestimated) capabilities of the new technology but on the structure of 
specific firms and sectors, and on the economic, social and political stakes involved. 
Studies by the Dutch government’s three largest employment-related executive 
agencies for the National Labour Market Analysis 2018–202510 show that the time 
freed by partial task automation can be used to increase production, ease workloads, 
improve production quality, undertake other activities or use fewer people to pro-
duce the same amount – or some combination of the above.
As many firms have discovered, not all work can be done by computers and 
robots. Hal Varian, chief economist at Google, notes that many jobs are more com-
plicated and much harder to automate than is often believed.11 Although many driv-
ing jobs may seem obvious candidates for automation, anyone who regularly rides 
a bus or talks to a trucker knows better.12 It is also doubtful whether we want to rid 
ourselves of the humans in our midst; bus drivers, tram conductors and train guards 
also attend to passenger safety.
Governments, employers and trade unions all have influence over how new tech-
nologies are implemented in the workplace.13 While millions of workers have indeed 
seen their tasks change under the influence of new technology – a trend that will 
continue into the future – we need to focus on human-machine complementarity 
within specific applications of technology and on restructuring the labour market, 
both to increase productivity and to improve the quality of work.
Box 6.2 Robots in Cleaning?
The 2017 collective agreement for the Dutch cleaning sector included provi-
sions for a pilot project in which employers and trade unions study the pos-
sibilities of developing robot technology which is good for both cleaners and 
companies. Although we do not yet know what will come of it, this initiative – 
based on the principles of complementarity, co-creation and co-ownership – 
suggests a way forward for other sectors wishing to take full advantage of the 
possibilities offered by robots, cobots and artificial intelligence.
9 Nedelkosta & Quintini (2018).
10 Brennenraedts et al. (2019).
11 Snyder (2019, March 11).
12 Broussard (2019, April 3).
13 ter Weel (2018); Went et al. (2015).
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6.1.1  Job Polarization
Which jobs are particularly vulnerable to automation? Although unemployment is 
highest among people who only have high-school diplomas, their prospects have 
not declined. Fig. 6.1 shows that unemployment among this group declined from 
7.3% in 2003 to 6.6% in 2018.14
Scholars have predicted that automation will lead to “job polarization”  – the 
disappearance of jobs such as routine administration in the middle segment of the 
labour market.15 The phenomenon has affected the Netherlands less than many other 
countries (Fig. 6.2).16 The proportion of Dutch jobs requiring only low skills – or 
conversely, high skills – has risen by about 5 percentage points over the past two 
decades, whereas jobs requiring post-secondary vocational education has declined 













Fig. 6.1 Unemployment rate by level of education, 2003–2018
Source: cbs StatLine. (https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/cbs/nl/dataset/82922NED/table?from 
statweb)
14 See also de Beer (2018a).
15 Goos et al. (2009), Graetz & Michaels (2015).
16 Smits & de Vries (2015).
6 Everyone into Work
115
Policy Analysis, this is creating a new divide among workers with post-secondary 
vocational qualifications17: some have moved down in the labour market, working 
jobs below their nominal skill levels, while others have moved up into jobs for 
which they are not formally qualified. The biggest changes are taking place within 
sectors and professions. Secretaries who previously used to type and distribute faxes 
are now involved in planning and project management.
It is not a foregone conclusion that technological changes will hollow out the 
middle class. Many routine white-collar tasks have already been automated, while 
it is conceivable – and at times already apparent – that tasks traditionally performed 
by university graduates can be done more effectively by, or together with, smart 
machines; consider how radiologists, accountants and lawyers are aided by algo-
rithms in their work.18 What this means for existing professions – and what new jobs 
may appear in the manufacture and maintenance of new machines or due to entirely 
new possibilities – is impossible to predict in advance (see also sect. 6.2).


















































































































Fig. 6.2 Employment shares by skill content of occupations (percentage points), 1995–2015, 
oecd countries
Source: oecd (2018a)




6.1.2  Switching Between Jobs
Good work allows people to adjust to advances in technology. Everyone needs to be 
able to learn on the job as emergent technologies may alter or eliminate their current 
tasks or create new ones. Having the space and support to cope with these changes – 
“learn while you earn” as The Economist calls it – is crucial for preserving work or, 
if necessary, for switching careers. The independent think tank DenkWerk estimates 
that Dutch employers will have to invest €4–7 billion a year in on-the-job retraining 
and refresher courses if the country is to make the most of the opportunities offered 
by new technology.19
Technological change within companies does not take place overnight. 
Supporting people into new lines of work cannot wait until they are declared redun-
dant; the Employee Insurance Agency and its partners must get involved before 
lay-offs occur.20 Workers need to be protected during such transitions, not least by 
the social-security system.21
6.1.3  Technology for Inclusivity
New technologies can aid current workers to learn new tasks, help people with 
occupational disabilities to find work, and to make the labour market more inclu-
sive.22 Technologies such as virtual reality can help workers learn new tasks in fields 
such as manufacturing, maintenance and medicine (e.g. wound care), while several 
organizations in the Netherlands are dedicated to using technology to help people 
with occupational disabilities find and retain work. Higher wages for low-paid 
workers in the United States has led some companies to automate their jobs out of 
existence, while other firms have turned to new technologies to make their workers 
more productive, thus justifying higher pay.23
New technologies will change the demand for labour and the nature of work. But 
how their application will affect the quality of work is neither a foregone conclusion 
nor a process we can leave to the market alone. As firms, institutions and govern-
ments often make decisions that undermine good work, these choices must be moni-
tored. Machines can be deployed to replace people but also to help them work better, 
collaborate more effectively and to be more productive. New technologies can be 
19 Think tank Denkwerk (2019) calculates that 3 million people need their digital skills upgraded, 
at an estimated cost of €4–4.5 billion. Moreover, 400,000 specialists in the front line of digital 
innovation are seeing their skills rendered obsolete due to technological advances. Bringing their 
knowledge up to date will cost an estimated €2–2.5 billion.
20 One example is the Mobility Centre launched in 2019 by trade-union federation fnv and the 
Employee Insurance Agency to guide redundant workers into new jobs following the announced 
closure of the coal-fired Hemweg Power Station in Amsterdam.
21 Borghouts-van de Pas et al. (2019).
22 oecd (2018b).
23 Kopf (2019, January 18).
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used to offer people currently marginalized in the labour market new prospects as 
well as to give lower skilled workers new tasks and opportunities.
6.2  Flexible Labour Market
It is often claimed that the flexibilization of the Dutch labour market has created 
jobs and allowed more people to keep working. It enables employers to remain 
agile, to lay off staff when necessary and recruit more readily in good times. But it 
could also be argued that flexible work undermines workers’ incentives to inno-
vate,24 creates costs for companies through staff turnover, and exerts downwards 
pressure on wages, consumer spending and thus economic growth.25 According to 
the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), the question of 
whether flexible work creates jobs or simply replaces permanent jobs with more 
insecure ones cannot be answered with certainty: “From an economic perspective, 
it cannot be said which type of employment relationship is preferable or what pro-
portion of flexible relationships within the working population is ideal.”26 In other 
words, this is a decision society has to make. How much do we value everyone hav-
ing access to good work? As the CPB points out, the flexible labour market differ-
entially affects segments of the workforce. Fully 45% of people with a low level of 
education had flexible jobs in 2018 (Fig. 6.3).
6.2.1  Permanently Temporary
At first sight, flexible labour markets may seem to favour people with occupational 
disabilities and outsiders such as migrants. Employers are disinclined to take risks 
and temporary contracts entail few obligations – certainly in the Netherlands. The 
oecd27 credits temporary contracts and the flexible labour market for the compara-
tively high proportion of individuals with severe mental disorders working in the 
Netherlands. Others argue that employers will be more inclined to give refugees a 
chance if they can do so without longer term obligations.
Finding work is not the same as keeping it, as more and more people find them-
selves trapped in the labour market’s ever-expanding “flexible shell”. High-school 
graduates, ethnic minorities, migrant workers from Eastern Europe and people with 
chronic medical problems are more likely than others to have temporary jobs, which 
24 de Spiegelaere (2017).
25 oecd (2018a).
26 Euwals et al. (2016: 13).
27 oecd (2015a).
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are now spreading among other segments of the population, most notably the over 
25s and people with post-secondary qualifications.28
A temporary contract is now rarely a stepping stone to a permanent position, 
especially for on-call and casual staff.29 Very few people hired on a temporary basis 
in the period 2010–2019 had a permanent position 1 year later; despite economic 
growth, this percentage has been falling since 2010, down to 14% in 2019.30 It is 
common for temporary contracts to be strung together so that a worker is effectively 
employed on a “permanently temporary” basis.
6.2.2  A Revolving Door in Social Security
Labour market flexibility has opened a revolving door in the social-security system 
as people alternate between temporary work and unemployment. The proportion of 
flexible workers still working after 2 years is 10% lower than for employees with 
permanent contracts.31 As shown in Fig. 6.4, temporary workers are far more likely 
to claim unemployment or subsistence benefits. Due to the high rate of economic 


































Fig. 6.3 Working people by type of contract and level of education, 2008 and 2018
Source: Statistics Netherlands
28 van Echtelt et al. (2016).
29 Euwals et al. (2016).
30 cbs (2019f, 2019g, October 24).
31 van Echtelt et al. (2016).
6 Everyone into Work
119
heavy burden on the social-security system. Most jobs found by benefit claimants 
are temporary,32 meaning their reintegration into the labour force is also only tem-
porary.33 Finding a job rarely means a job one can keep.
While even temporary work is generally better than no work at all, repeated 
bouts of short-term employment interspersed by applications to the benefits office 
mean a succession of demotivating disappointments, attacks on one’s self-esteem, 
stress and financial uncertainty (“If my contract expires this month, will I receive 
money from the benefits agency next month?”). Research from the uk shows that 
people who can only find a succession of insecure jobs suffer deteriorating health.34 
The flexible labour market questions the very concept of “reintegration”.
6.2.3  Less Training
Employers invest less in workers with temporary contracts.35 This applies especially 
to formal training courses, from which temporary personnel are generally excluded. 
The difference is most marked for workers with post-secondary qualifications or 
university degrees, while high-school graduates have fewer learning opportunities, 







Claiming subsistence benetsIncapacity for workUnemployment
Fig. 6.4 Benefit claims by type of contract previously held, 2014
Source: Van der Werff et al. (2016)
32 uwv (2015).
33 Bannink (2018), Ruitenbeek et al. (2019).
34 Chandola & Zhang (2017).
35 Dekker (2017).
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formal or informal, across the board.36 Although training is crucial for people to be 
able to stay in work and to change jobs when necessary, the weaker responsibility 
relationships between employers and employees in the flexible economy renders it 
unusual.
Our era demands that everyone – regardless of their form of employment – has 
access to additional training or retraining to stay in work. Flexible workers should 
be able to make use of the sectoral training and development funds and the personal 
learning budgets from which they are now largely excluded. While individual learn-
ing accounts can increase participation in training, their use needs to be encouraged 
among groups that currently make scant use of such opportunities.37 Such individual 
funds should be part of a contract-neutral social-security system (see sect. 3.1 and 
Chap. 8).
6.2.4  Protection
The flexible labour market poses additional problems for people with chronic health 
problems. The “flexicurity model” of the Netherlands and Denmark, which com-
bines flexibility with good social-security provision, offers them few job opportuni-
ties.38 Since the mid-1980s, the gap between less skilled workers with and without 
health problems has grown enormously in both the Netherlands and Denmark; 
Sweden has performed better, especially when protections against dismissal were 
more robust. A European comparative study likewise concludes that stronger con-
tract protection leads to more people with occupational disabilities working.39 
Permanent contracts protect vulnerable workers more effectively as employers are 
legally obliged to take responsibility for them. The flexibilization of employment 
relationships thus contributes to the long-term marginalization of the “least produc-
tive” workers.
Both employers and employees would benefit from permanent staff having 
greater opportunities to switch tasks and positions, either in their current company 
or elsewhere in a pool of collaborating firms. This “internal flexibility” can to some 
extent replace “external flexibility”. Both the trade-union movement and one of the 
main Dutch employers’ organizations, the awvn, advocate making greater use of 
such arrangements.
36 Boermans et al. (2017).
37 oecd (2019b).
38 McAllister et al. (2015).
39 van der Zwan & de Beer (2019).
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6.2.5  Opportunities Through the Hybridization of Work
Other forms of flexible labour such as self-employment or working through online 
platforms can offer vulnerable people an alternative into the world of work. 
“Hybridization” – the concurrent pursuit of different activities under different types 
of contract – can also increase opportunities in the labour market. More than half a 
million multi-jobbers in the Netherlands already combine two or more (generally 
part-time) positions; some of them would be unable to make ends meet otherwise. 
Some multi-jobbers choose hybridization as a way to transition into other work, 
either because they want to or they must.40
For some groups, self-employment may be the answer. People with physical or 
mental disabilities may find it easier to work from home and to adapt their daily 
schedule to their own needs, gaining the control in life which comes from being 
their own boss. Ethnic and religious minorities sometimes choose – or are more or 
less forced into – self-employment because no-one will hire them or because they 
would rather work for themselves than in an unwelcoming organizational environ-
ment where they face discriminatory or aggressive behaviour from colleagues and 
managers.41 Such discrimination often takes subtle forms such as “jokes” about ter-
rorism, religion or crime, alienating them from the workplace.42 To gain greater 
control over their work, some choose entrepreneurship.
Nevertheless, self-employment is no panacea for an inclusive labour market. 
Problems arise when people claiming benefits try to make money with freelance 
activities on the side; it is also much more complicated to be self-employed than on 
a payroll. The chances of success are often limited. Those working for online plat-
forms or in the arts struggle more than most to pick up assignments. Combined with 
structurally low rates of pay, this often exposes them to poverty (see Chap. 3). 
Turnover is high in individual self-employment; while many register with the 
Chamber of Commerce as freelance workers each year, the number of deregistra-
tions is considerable.43 Those who move successfully from benefits into self- 
employment are indeed a select group; they tend to be young, with post-secondary 
or higher education or past freelance experience.44
In sum, the flexibilization of the labour market has led to more people in the 
Netherlands working, but not always in good jobs  – especially for people with 
chronic health conditions, for many first, second and third generation immigrants, 
and people with no more than secondary education. This is not only detrimental to 
them; it also strains the social-security system (see sect. 3.1). Flexible workers have 
fewer opportunities for professional development and training and are less 
40 Dorenbosch (2017).
41 Hooftman & Houtman (2017).
42 Waldring (2018).
43 kvk (2019). In 2018, 128,021 people registered and 70,300 deregistered as self-employed.
44 Mevissen et al. (2013); Kok et al. (2018).
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protected. To counter these adverse effects, employers and the government should 
invest more in these workers and in the more flexible apportioning of tasks within 
firms and organizations. Although juggling several part-time positions may allow 
workers to spread the risks and possibly provide stepping stones to other work, this 
is often wishful thinking for the most vulnerable groups.
6.3  Intensification of Work
Is the intensification of work creating new labour market vulnerabilities? Both the 
faster tempo and greater mental and emotional demands on the job can make work 
more challenging and interesting. But they are also linked to increased stress, emo-
tional exhaustion and burnout.45 The intensification of work can effectively push 
people out of the workforce and make it harder for specific groups to remain in or 
return to work.46
6.3.1  New Vulnerabilities
Workers who must deal with constant emotional pressure – for example because 
they interface with clients, customers and patients – are at higher than average risk 
of burnout. The same applies to those with heavy workloads or who work under 
severe time pressure (see Fig. 4.2). While many people can handle short periods of 
intensive work, long-term exposure to stress is unhealthy in many ways.47
The number of Dutch workers suffering symptoms of burnout is on the rise. 
Between 2007 and 2018, the proportion saying they are emotionally exhausted at 
least once a month rose from 11.3 to 17.5% .48 Highly educated individuals, women 
and young people aged 25–35 suffer the most; the self-employed fare better. 
Experiencing some of its symptoms does not necessarily mean that a worker is suf-
fering from full-blown burnout. Nevertheless, more and more reports to the 
Netherlands Centre for Occupational Diseases mention excessive strain and burn-
out, which now outnumber reports of work-related physical illnesses.49 The intensi-
fication of work is accompanied by new forms of absenteeism. Almost half (46%) 
45 Korunka & Kubicek (2017).
46 German sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2016) argues that societal acceleration leads to depression 
and burnout, and highlights the structural exclusion of workers unable to keep up with the flexibil-
ity and speed demanded by modern economic systems.
47 van den Broeck et al. (2010), Bierings & Mol (2012); Schaufeli & Bakker (2013a), Smulders 
et al. (2013).
48 Houtman et al. (2020), tno (2019).
49 ncvb (2018).
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of all sick leave in the Netherlands is now due to conditions at work, the highest 
since 2007. The majority of affected workers (60%) attribute their problems to psy-
chosocial workload – excessive stress or emotional pressure, problems with manag-
ers, customers and so on.50 Workers are also suffering from higher levels of mental 
illness. It is precisely such problems that cause longer-term withdrawal from the 
labour market; over half of disability benefit claimants receive them for psychologi-
cal conditions.51
Intensive working need not lead to emotional exhaustion and absenteeism (see 
also Chap. 2).52 Sufficient autonomy and consultation in the workplace, alongside 
support from managers and colleagues, can ease the burden. If homecare workers, 
for example, were allowed to schedule their own shifts and to work to their own 
standards, they would be better able to cope with the tempo, workload and demand-
ing clients. Whether the intensification of work leads to new vulnerabilities thus 
depends on whether the work is good. Especially young people and women experi-
ence less autonomy at work than their older and male counterparts; their work is 
also on average faster-paced and more emotionally demanding. These trends explain 
why young people and women are more likely to fall victim to burnout.53
Workers’ domestic circumstances are crucial. Children with problems, financial 
worries or the lack of a supportive partner means there is no respite. Single people 
are more likely to report symptoms of burnout54 as many are unable to unwind and 
recover at home.55 Workers can also better cope with more exacting demands if they 
can keep their professional and personal lives separate.56 The Social and Economic 
Council of the Netherlands57 finds that intensive domestic care duties, especially 
looking after young children, makes it more difficult for employees to cope with 
demands at work.
The intensification of work is placing more people at risk, including groups who 
were previously not particularly vulnerable such as single and highly educated per-
sons. While unceasing pressure or emotional strain is hard on anyone, it helps to 
have a degree of autonomy at work and support at home. Good work makes the 
intensification of work more manageable.
50 tno (2019).
51 van Echtelt (2020).
52 Houtman et al. (2020).
53 tno (2018), see Chapter 3.
54 tno (2018).
55 Chandola (2010), Meijman & Zijlstra (2006), van Echtelt (2014).




6.3.2  Exacerbating Existing Vulnerabilities
A demanding labour market makes it more difficult for workers limited by health 
conditions or occupational disabilities  – any form of physical, visual, mental or 
psychological condition that affects the individual’s ability to work. This definition 
extends well beyond the traditional notion of a disability as a visible impairment to 
include for instance people struggling with depression or the aftermath of cancer. 
Everyone – young or old and whatever their level of education – can experience an 
occupational disability at some point in their life.
The Netherlands lags behind many European countries in keeping people with 
occupational disabilities in work.58 Despite the policy focus, their workforce partici-
pation has declined (Fig. 6.4). Many lost their jobs or found it difficult to work in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis; only after the 2013 Jobs Accord between 
employers’ organizations, trade unions and the government did the number of 
employed persons with disabilities tick slightly upwards. Under this social contract, 
125,000 jobs will be created for people with occupational disabilities by 2026, 
including 25,000 jobs in the public sector. Before the Covid-19 crisis, their work-
force participation had not returned to pre-crisis levels; the disparities between this 
group and the rest of the population remain substantial.
People with physical disabilities have slightly better access to the labour market 
than people with mental disabilities59 – the category of people most excluded from 
the labour market. Only one in five persons with a severe mental condition are cur-
rently working,60 while the intensification of work poses particular challenges for 
people already struggling psychologically. For people with chronic illnesses or 
occupational disabilities, intensive activity or complicated, emotionally demanding 
work with a lot of human contact can generate unbearable stress (Fig. 6.5).
The intensification of work poses particular difficulties for people with mild 
intellectual disabilities. An estimated 1.4 million persons in the Netherlands – many 
of whom receive benefits61 – have an iq between 50 and 85 and experience problems 
with self-reliance. While low-skilled work certainly exists in the Netherlands (see 
Table 6.1), much of this work is now out of reach as requirements have changed: the 
pace has quickened while workers need to be able to work independently or in tight- 
knit teams, whereas persons with a mild intellectual disability typically benefit from 
a calmer tempo, less complexity, plenty of security and continuous guidance.62 The 
intensification of work is increasingly distancing even basic work from the needs 
and capabilities of this group.
58 Versantvoort & van Echtelt (2016), van der Zwan & de Beer (2019), oecd (2018a).
59 Nivel (2018, 2019).
60 Schaafsma et al. (2015).
61 van den Berg et al. (2013).
62 Woittiez & Putnam (2016), Woittiez et al. (2014), Sebrechts (2018).
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Fig. 6.5 Labour-market participation of people with and without disabilities, 2003–2017
Source: Statistics Netherlands (With thanks to Paul de Beer)
Table 6.1 Work requirements and the needs of people with an intellectual disability
Work requirements Needs of people with an intellectual disability
Demand Supply
Faster pace Slower pace
Emotional workload Few stimuli
Self-reliance Supervision
Multi-tasking Simple work
Intensive social interaction Limited social interaction
Learning Routine
Sources: Van den Berg et al. (2018), Woittiez et al. (2014), Beukema and Kuijpers (2018)
There is thus a widening gulf between the labour market and workers with men-
tal, psychological or medical disabilities (see Table 6.1). Many researchers have 
concluded that this gulf can only be narrowed if jobs are more individually tailored. 
Many vulnerable people simply do not fit available vacancies. It would be better to 
focus less on the requirements of the work organization and look more at the skills, 
working speed and qualities of the aspiring worker.63
63 See, for example, Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017).
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6.3.3  Reintegration Is More Difficult
The intensification of work can make reintegration into the labour force more dif-
ficult for people who have taken time off. Because people are now working into old 
age and illnesses such as cancer are often recurrent, their reintegration in the work-
place has become a pressing issue. While staying in work or returning to the same 
job works well in many cases, reintegration rarely unfolds smoothly and is often 
accompanied by complaints such as fatigue and concentration problems.64 If the 
pace of the job has accelerated or old know-how has become obsolete, this only 
raises the barriers to a successful return.
Many people who have been away from work for a long time have or develop 
complex problems. Half of all subsistence benefit claimants report that they are 
“sick”66 – a catch-all term for a variety of ailments and issues. An estimated 40% of 
people on unemployment or subsistence benefits must deal with a multiplicity of 
problems in their lives.67 Joblessness is rarely the sole problem; it goes hand in hand 
with debt, health complaints, family issues, language deficiencies and lack of social 
support. These problems also hinder their search for work, especially now that it has 
intensified.
Employers are reluctant to recruit people who are distanced from the labour mar-
ket. Long-term unemployment in the Netherlands is higher than in many other 
countries; once workers have been side-lined, especially older and less skilled peo-
ple tend to remain out of work for long periods.68 For many employers, long-term 
unemployment is in itself a red flag for a person best avoided.69 Having an occupa-
tional disability is an invitation to have doors slammed in one’s face. Only one in 
Box 6.3 Working with an Occupational Disability
Ms. O, with rheumatism, osteoarthritis and deafness in her right ear, says that 
she is happy working at retailer X. “The nice thing is that there is no time 
pressure. The work I do is facing, making sure that the shop looks good by 
placing the different products in the right place. From time to time I can take 
the moments of rest I need, and I set my own working pace. That’s important 
to me because it’s what enables me to keep going.”65
64 See also Polder (2017).
65 Beukema & Kuijpers (2018): 7.
66 cbs (2017a, October 7).
67 Bosselaar et al. (2010).
68 de Graaf-Zijl et al. (2015).
69 de Hek et al. (2018).
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five employers claim they are willing to hire people with a (preferably physical) 
disability; an even smaller proportion actually do.70 Although support from col-
leagues and managers is crucial during reintegration, productivity targets get in the 
way. Not everyone has the time to explain yet again how the computer system 
works, or to jump in when a returning colleague is unable to complete a task.
6.3.4  Limits to the Intensification of Work
There is a human limit to the intensification of work: “Just as an extension of the 
length of the working day is bounded by the number of hours in the day, so human 
physical and mental capacities do not allow an endless expansion to effort.”71 The 
question is whether the Netherlands has reached this limit. Absenteeism due to psy-
chosocial complaints is increasing; people who were not previously vulnerable are 
falling ill – highly educated young women, for instance, who are reporting symp-
toms of burnout in ever-higher numbers. The intensification of work has placed 
many people who were already vulnerable at an even greater distance from the 
world of work. Clearly, people are better able to cope with intensive work if they 
have some autonomy in the workplace and control in their private lives. Again, the 
quality of work is crucial.
6.4  Policies to Help People into Work
“Work, work, work” has been a key policy objective in the Netherlands for decades. 
But is enough being done to ensure that everyone can find and keep a good job? To 
combat many thousands of people dropping out of the workforce, prevention is 
more effective than any cure. This section asks whether the Netherlands’ labour- 
market policies are sufficiently active to help people find and retain work in the age 
of its automation, flexibilization and intensification.
70 Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017). The Netherlands Institute for Social Research notes only 11% of 
employers expect to hire (more) people with occupational disabilities in the next 2 years, the same 
as in 2015/2016 (Van Echtelt et al. 2019a, b).
71 Green (2004): 615.
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Box 6.4 Starting Points for a Preventive Labour-Market Policy
Figure 6.6 summarizes how we can keep the automation, flexibilization and 
intensification of work from exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and creating 
new ones. There are a number of starting points to achieve positive change.
The use of new technologies in the workplace can benefit working people, 
even vulnerable ones, if it focuses on complementarity: encouraging co- 
operation between humans and machines, both in the development of applica-
tions and in their implementation.
Flexible labour markets require responsible employers who actively invest 
in their employees. So long as “permanently temporary” employment does 
not become the norm, temporary contracts need not be a problem. But the 
employer must invest in its temporary staff, including those with disabilities.
To mitigate the negative effects of the intensification of work, greater 
worker autonomy is essential. When people have a real say over what they do 
and when and where they do it, they are better able to be highly productive 
and to deal with emotionally challenging situations. Being able to co-ordinate 
the professional and the personal helps.
All of these aspects of good work offer greater protections against jobless-




























Fig. 6.6 How labour-market developments can reduce vulnerabilities
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72 Vrooman et al. (2017).
73 Eurostat figures show a similar pattern. See also Koning et al. (2017), cpb (2015).












Fig. 6.7 Spending on active labour-market policy as a percentage of gdp, 2004–2017, in the 
Netherlands and other European countries
Source: oecd database. (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=lmpexp#)
6.4.1  Limited Investments
Recent attention has focused on containing costs in the Dutch social-security sys-
tem and on imposing obligations on its beneficiaries.72 In contrast, little has been 
invested in people who have left the labour market. At the beginning of this century, 
the Netherlands was second only to Denmark in its investments in active labour- 
market policy (Fig. 6.7). In the past decade, spending in this area has nearly halved, 
dropping to 0.6% of gdp in 2017.73 This is the same as in Germany, less than in 
France and Belgium (0.9%), and much less than in Sweden (1.3%) and Denmark 
(2.0%). While Denmark maintained and Sweden increased support for the unem-
ployed during the 2008 economic  crisis, the Netherlands cut back  – although 
research shows that active policies have the greatest effect and are most needed 
during crises.74
oecd statistics provide an overview of the various components of active labour- 
market policy. Compared to other European countries, investments in vocational 
education and training are particularly low in the Netherlands, amounting to just 
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0.07% of gdp in 2017 – far less than in Denmark (0.46%) or France (0.28%).75 This 
limited attention to training is striking, especially in light of the technological devel-
opments affecting the workplace and the intensification of work – the more so when 
we see that the majority of people claiming subsistence benefits in the Netherlands 
lack even a basic educational qualification. The Netherlands also commits less 
resources to job search assistance than the Scandinavian countries, France and the 
United Kingdom. Many unemployed persons thus fall through the cracks.76 A sig-
nificant proportion of those without work rarely see a case manager or anyone from 
the Employee Insurance Agency.77 In contrast to the 1990s, virtually nothing is now 
spent on directly creating work.
Why has the Netherlands not maintained the active labour-market policies it ini-
tiated in the 1990s? There are three explanations. First, the focus of government 
policy, particularly labour-market policy, has shifted away from public provision 
towards individual self-reliance.78 In the 1990s, the emphasis was on enforcing 
social-security rules and sanctioning non-compliance; now, the unemployed are 
expected to find the shortest route into work. Unlike the “human-capital” or “train- 
first” approach, this “work-first” approach best serves people who find it relatively 
easy to move into work. In other words, the policy primarily targets those who least 
need it.79
A second explanation is administrative decentralization and the Participation Act 
of 2015, which transferred responsibilities for the labour market reintegration of 
subsistence benefit recipients to local authorities. At the same time, supporting bud-
gets were cut dramatically.80 Local governments had little expertise in guiding peo-
ple into work and were slow in taking up their new tasks. An evaluation of the 
Participation Act found that it led, at best, to a slight increase in workforce partici-
pation. In some respects it has had no effect or even reduced participation, most 
notably among people previously in sheltered employment who are now more likely 
to be at home than in work.81 For “classic” social-security claimants, the chances of 
finding a job have risen by just 1 percentage point. Young adults with occupational 
disabilities are now more likely to be working, but their jobs are often poor, part- 
time and/or temporary; they can barely make ends meet, let alone build a meaning-
ful life.82 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, which conducted the 
75 oecd database.
76 oecd (2017).
77 Inspectie szw (2014).
78 See Veldheer et al. (2012).
79 Martin (2014).
80 Berenschot (2018).
81 For people previously qualifying for sheltered work, the chances of finding regular employment 
have fallen from 50% prior to the law’s enactment to 30% (Sadiraj et al. 2018).
82 Kok et al. (2019).
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evaluation, concludes that the objectives of the Participation Act have not been 
achieved.83
Finally, academic research has contributed to the weakening of active labour- 
market policy.84 Doubts have been raised, especially by economists, about the effec-
tiveness of active labour-market policies, often due to contradictory findings.85 This 
is often due to limitations in the research itself; it is difficult to gauge the effective-
ness of interventions as conditions in the real world of work are hard to keep con-
stant. There is often a degree of partiality in participant selection (or self-selection), 
while the interventions – a training course or a conversation with a case manager – 
differ.86 If we look at the evidence in more detail, some instruments work better than 
others; it also matters who the intended beneficiaries are. For example, active poli-
cies are more effective for those with the fewest opportunities such as the less 
skilled, the long-term unemployed and people with occupational disabilities.87 We 
also know little about whether interventions help people feel healthier or more val-
ued, even when they do not directly lead to finding a job.
6.4.2  What We Know
Meta-analyses of research on hundreds of programmes88 suggests that imposing 
obligations on benefit claimants and penalizing them for non-compliance has some 
effect on people who are not already distanced from the labour market. Education 
and training have less immediate success, but achieve modest results after 2 or 3 
years.89 The most effective form of intervention is instruction in specific skills cur-
rently in high demand, especially in the private sector90 – preferably in the form of 
learning on the job. Temporary wage subsidies tailored to the individual beneficiary 
also have some positive effect.91 Although digitization has penetrated the Dutch 
83 van Echtelt et al. (2019a).
84 Kluve (2010), Koning et al. (2017).
85 Martin and Grubb (2001) find that paying bonuses works better than imposing penalties. This is 
not apparent for Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2013). See Card et al. (2010).
86 See cpb (2016). Policy experiments in the Netherlands and elsewhere have sought to measure the 
effectiveness of interventions; see for example Knoef and Van Ours (2016) and Groot et al. (2019). 
Koning (2011) argues that it remains difficult to measure and stabilize the factors determining 
effectiveness.
87 Card et al. (2017).
88 Card et al. (2010, 2017), Martin (2014), Kluve (2010); see also cpb (2016).
89 Lammers & Kok (2017). This applies more to people with lower educational levels.
90 See also Martin & Grubb (2001).
91 Card et al. (2010).
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job- placement sector,92 face-to-face meetings with a professional adviser helps to 
find a paid job sooner; even one conversation can make a big difference.93
Instruments are best tailored to the type of jobseeker.94 While exhortations and 
penalties may suffice for people who are ready to work, they are pointless for people 
with very limited employment potential, chronic health problems or some other 
form of occupational disability. They need a different approach, one that is personal, 
intensive and long-term.95 This is at long last being recognized in the Netherlands, 
as can be seen in the additional resources channelled to the Employee Insurance 
Agency following successive cutbacks, and by local authorities again focusing on 
personal contact with subsistence benefit recipients.96 In 2016, the City of 
Amsterdam introduced a programme for refugees involving specialist case manag-
ers who focus on understanding their problems, building personal relationships, 
civic integration courses and labour-market guidance. The result has been higher 
workforce participation than in the city’s past and in the rest of the country  – 
although Amsterdam’s thriving pre-pandemic economy has helped as well.97
The intensive approach means more personal contact with qualified profession-
als and a process attuned to the jobseeker’s potential rather than to the brute fact that 
he or she is claiming benefits. Good work means work tailored to the individual in 
such a way that they gain greater control in life. People with limited work prospects 
often face a web of problems, at home and/or with their health; case managers need 
to look beyond the boundaries of labour-market guidance and work with, for 
instance, debt-counsellors and healthcare professionals. Although it has long been 
known that the unemployed are more likely to be ill and vice-versa, “care cannot be 
used for reintegration and reintegration cannot be used for care”.98 Academic stud-
ies furnish evidence to develop more personalized interventions.
6.4.3  What About Employers?
Most employers are reluctant to hire if applicants do not fit the profiles for available 
vacancies.99 They are afraid to incur additional costs due to job and workplace adap-
tations, greater needs for supervision, sickness and absenteeism.100 Research shows 
that potential health issues play a larger role in hiring and retention than age.101
92 Martin (2014).
93 Koning (2006), Koning et al. (2017), Heyma & van der Werff (2014), Lammers et al. (2015). For 
research in Denmark, see Van den Berg et al. (2012). For research in Switzerland, see Schiprowski 
(in press). For research on contact with benefit recipients, see Van der Valk and Fenger (2019).
94 cpb (2016), Kok & Houkes (2011).
95 See also CPB (2016), Lub (2017).
96 Kremer et al. (2017b).
97 Oostveen et al. (2019).
98 Einerhand & Ravesteijn (2017); see also oecd (2014).
99 See, for example, van Berkel et al. (2017).
100 Adelmeijer et al. (2015, 2017), van Echtelt et al. (2019b).
101 Houtman et al. (2013).
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Predictable, stable finances are a prerequisite for employers. Targeted wage sub-
sidies are more effective for enrolling vulnerable workers than general wage subsi-
dies, which also benefit people who would have found work anyway.102 The 
Netherlands, like most European countries, makes scant use of these instruments.103 
Other schemes to help people into work include wage dispensation and the appoint-
ment of a jobs coach. Different financial and legal regulations apply to each category 
of benefit recipient; many employers claim they are unaware of the regulations.104
The job-placement landscape in the Netherlands is fragmented and opaque. 
Figure 6.8 shows just how complicated the current system is. The roles played by 





REGIONAL LABOUR MARKET POLICY (AGENDA) + MARKETING PLAN (BROAD)
Work and Income Implementation Structure (SUWI)
REGIONAL
JOB CENTRES













Regional Public Employment Service
(Focus PW/Banenafspraak jobs deal scheme)
NATIONAL EMPLOYER SERVICE POINT (UWV)
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
• Transparent jobseeker (CV/client prole) and vacancy database
• Digital services for jobseekers and employers (werk.nl, lerenwerken.nl, uwv.nl)
• Information on the labour market







Fig. 6.8 Organization of job-placement services
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102 Card et al. (2017).
103 See also CPB (2016).
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Box 6.5 Individual Placement and Support
An approach known as Individual Placement and Support is often used for 
people with severe mental impairments. Together with the jobseeker, a jobs 
coach determines what kind of work and tasks the person can handle. A suit-
able position is then created in a regular work organization, a process known 
as “jobcrafting”. The new employee receives work, care and guidance for an 
extended period – sometimes even permanently. Shown to be effective, the 
approach is now being tried more widely among subsistence benefit recipi-
ents. The key is close attention to “the whole person” as well as to the work 
environment, where they are likely to need intensive internal supervision. Not 
only workers need coaches; so do their employers, managers and colleagues.
and trade unions differ across situations. Many jobseekers and employers have no 
idea where to turn.
Financial incentives do not suffice to persuade employers to hire as organizations 
must often change to accommodate different types of workers. Those that have 
made “diversity” part of their mission recruit more people from vulnerable groups; 
so do large firms (with over 100 employees), firms that already employ less skilled 
staff and the government.105 Things are often more challenging for small and 
medium-sized firms. Active public labour-market policies must back employers’ 
own hr. policies106 to guide and support individual jobseekers while making the 
necessary adjustments within the organization to create space for them. Tailoring 
jobs for vulnerable workers often requires the involvement of the entire organiza-
tion.107 Effective activation requires long-term commitment from both sides.108 The 
challenge is to innovate in such a way that more vulnerable workers are able to join 
the workforce.109
6.4.4  Good Basic Jobs
While active labour-market policies need to target both potential employers and 
employees, it does not suffice for people without realistic prospects of finding paid 
work. This is why “basic jobs” are back on the agenda, now championed by many 
105 In the “100,000 Jobs Plan” for people with disabilities, supported by employers’ organizations 
vno-ncw and mkb-Nederland, private sector employers are ahead of those in the public sector; 
tno (2015).
106 van Berkel et al. (2017).
107 A Danish scheme using Public Employment Service funds allows paying colleagues to act as job 
coaches.
108 See also oecd (2018a), Froyland et al. (2019).
109 Blonk (2018), Nijhuis & Zijlstra (2015).
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sociologists, lawyers, economists and several Dutch political parties.110 The same 
discussion is taking place in other European countries. Basic jobs are a response to 
the changing face of work, to the “demanding and uncertain labour market” which 
offers insufficient opportunities for one million people in the country.111 “The rein-
tegration into work of the unemployed no longer offers any guarantee of a sustain-
able, fully-fledged job.”112 To some extent, basic jobs are also an answer to the 
campaign for  a basic income. If work is so important to people mentally and socially, 
society should, instead of providing them with income, offer good work.113
Dutch cities such as Amsterdam and The Hague have been experimenting with 
basic jobs for people on subsistence benefits for some time.114 Sweden has its own 
variants such as the 1000 “Stockholm Jobbs” its capital city is hoping to create. 
Similarly, “one-euro jobs” in Germany entail work in the social sector with the 
retention of benefits plus a bonus of 1 euro per hour.115 The idea is that there is a lot 
of socially useful work to be done and that the financing of benefits may as well be 
converted into wage subsidization to create paid work.116 Although these schemes 
incur organizational and supervision costs as well as additional social insurance 
contributions, the local authorities believe that general well-being is enhanced, that 
healthcare spending will fall and that community cohesion will benefit when every-
one is able to be part of the workforce (see also Chap. 2).
The Netherlands has previous experience with subsidized jobs. The best known 
are the 40,000 “Melkert jobs” created in 1994 by the then Minister of Social Affairs 
and Employment, Ad Melkert. To avoid competing with regular work, these posi-
tions – paid 120% of the statutory minimum wage – had to be complementary; the 
idea was that the “Melketeers” would eventually move into “real” work. Half of 
these jobs were with private firms; the other half were in the public sector, where 
city wardens and school caretakers were supposed to improve the quality of 
110 Klosse & Muyskens (2011, November 4); Schippers et al. (2016). de Beer (2015) sees potential 
benefits but is more sceptical. The research unit of the co-governing Christian Democratic party 
(Siegmann 2018), the opposition Labour Party leader Lodewijk Asscher (Asscher 2019), and the 
economists Dankbaar and Muysken (2019) all advocate basic jobs, while Verhoeven and Wilthagen 
(in Wilthagen 2019) call for a “parallel labour market” in which money earmarked for benefits is 
used to fund workers. The proposals differ in how they organize the scheme. Most involve local 
authorities (which administer subsistence benefits) employing people and if necessary, seconding 
them to other workplaces. Verhoeven and Wilthagen favour public-private mixes.
111 Wilthagen (2019).
112 Klosse & Muyskens (2011, November 4).
113 This does not alter the fact that customization is necessary and that the well-being of people 
entitled to subsistence benefits is bolstered by the security these payments provide. The “trust 
experiments” under way in several towns and cities give them the space they need (Groot et al. 
2019). Some people gain more from doing voluntary work while retaining their entitlement to 
benefits. In other cases, the quid pro quo for payments from the public purse is best converted into 
a basic job.
114 van Dodeweerd (2016).
115 van der Meer & Kremer (2018, January 17).
116 Schippers et al. (2016) calculate that an extra €8000 is needed to close the gap between subsis-
tence benefits and wages. This excludes such factors as guidance supervision costs.
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society.117 The Melkert scheme was replaced in 1999 with “id jobs” (from the Dutch 
abbreviation for “entry-level and step-up”). The central government abolished these 
positions with the decentralization of subsistence support in 2003. Many local 
authorities were unwilling or unable to make the investments necessary to maintain 
them and all subsidised labour eventually disappeared. Secretary of State Jette 
Kleinsma saw this as a positive development “because the ultimate goal of reinte-
gration is to obtain regular, non-subsidized work”.118
The basic jobs being proposed now are not meant as a path to regular work, 
although this may at times happen.119 They are primarily for individuals lacking 
realistic prospects in the mainstream labour market who would otherwise remain 
dependent on benefits for extended periods. According to the alderman of The 
Hague who first tabled the idea, the main purpose of basic jobs is to prevent “people 
entering a downward spiral, at high cost to them individually but also to society.”120 
The jobs should provide good work – and so not be temporary – thereby shielding 
their holders from the vagaries of the labour market and giving them some modicum 
of control over their work and in their lives.
In sum, the Netherlands is suffering from a qualitative mismatch between 
employers and jobseekers. People who have been out of work for a long time simply 
do not fit the available vacancies. Overcoming this predicament requires change, 
commitment and support from all sides. But even as the automation, flexibilization 
and intensification of work make this urgent, there is scant public investment in 
active labour-market policy. Renewed policies in this area should focus on good 
work for all, with tailored strategies for different groups of jobseekers and good 
basic jobs as the final piece of the puzzle.
6.5  Conclusion: New Vulnerabilities, New Policy Challenges
Dutch policy jargon includes the frequently heard term “people distanced from the 
labour market”. But in many cases it is the market that has distanced itself from the 
people. How will the three developments at the heart of this book – the automation, 
flexibilization and intensification of work – affect those looking for and trying to 
stay in paid work?
117 Laid down in the 1995 Regulations on Additional Work Opportunities for the Long-Term 
Unemployed.
118 Aanhangsel Handelingen ii 2009/2010, No. 664.
119 Meta-analyses (e.g. Card et al. 2017) invariably show job creation schemes to be ineffective. 
This is due to the “lock-in effect” – additional subsidized work does not lead to regular employ-
ment because the taught skills do not match those required in the rest of the labour market. Like 
the trust experiments with benefit recipients, we need to study the long-term effects of basic jobs 
on health and well-being.
120 Baldewsingh (2016).




All three developments have the potential to make all workers more vulnerable, 
not only those already on the margins. In this respect, the dividing lines between 
social groups are becoming less clear-cut. Automation, robots and artificial intelli-
gence have already increased insecurity for some white-collar workers. The intensi-
fication of work likewise affects society more broadly; although burnout still affects 
more women and university graduates, it can happen to anyone. Temporary employ-
ment, too, is no longer reserved for classic vulnerable groups as the “flexible shell” 
has penetrated to the core of the labour market.
Vulnerable groups including high-school graduates and people with occupa-
tional disabilities may encounter even higher obstacles to labour-market participa-
tion. Once a person has been out of work for some time, it is harder to re-enter the 
workforce; in the jargon, one’s distance from the labour market has increased. Here, 
the automation, flexibilization and intensification of work are largely exacerbating 
the divide between highly educated, healthy and productive workers and less pro-
ductive, less confident people. For specific vulnerable groups, the gulf between the 
demands of the labour market and their own needs is widening; the long-term 
unemployed find it almost impossible to keep up with the changing world of work. 
As a hectic working environment is no place to attempt a gentle re-entry into active 
life, this puts the whole notion of reintegration to the test.
Prevention is better than cure, but the question is whether Dutch labour-market 
policy is preventive enough.121 Keeping everyone in work is an important aspect of 
the quality of work; focusing on good work is the best preventive labour-market 
policy of all.
Technology can serve vulnerable groups and help their members to find and 
retain work. Economist Tony Atkinson122 in Inequality, What Can Be Done? argues 
that the “direction of technological change should be an explicit concern of policy 
makers, encouraging innovation in a form that increases the employability of work-
ers”. This does not happen automatically; focusing on complementarity – on people 
working with machines – is crucial. For their own protection, workers need to be 
involved in transitions and to be able to prepare for them.
Elements of the flexible labour market such as self-employment can offer some 
people opportunities to find and stay in work. Temporary contracts can in theory 
offer flexible workers stepping stones towards greater security – although in prac-
tice revolving-door unemployment is more common. Flexible working offers scant 
protection for people with health issues or occupational disabilities. Investing in 
greater “internal flexibility”  – the ability to move into different work within the 
same firm or within a pool of firms – may be a reasonable response to eroded cor-
porate responsibility.
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The intensification of work is more manageable when people have sufficient 
autonomy and support at work. The high rate of work-related absenteeism and burn-
out would be mitigated to some extent if people enjoyed more control over their 
work and a healthy work-life balance.
Although new technologies and the flexibilization and intensification of work 
open new possibilities for active labour-market policy, the Netherlands in recent 
decades has halved its budget in this area. As a result, the country now lags behind 
the rest of Europe. To reverse the tide, active labour-market policies should focus 
not only on personal training but on the entire work organization. Basic jobs can be 
a solution for people who are still unable to find work.
The three key developments we analyse in this book do not have predestined 
effects on working people; there is no question of technological or economic deter-
minism in their outcomes. The automation, flexibilization and intensification of 
work can be influenced, adjusted, stimulated, inhibited and offset. The next chapter 
looks at how much scope the government, companies and institutions have to invest 
in better work: good quality work for people who are already working and for the 
unemployed who want to work.
 A Day at Work: The Chartered Accountant
David is a chartered accountant at one of the major accounting firms in the 
Netherlands. Its office block is tall with lots of glass; the entrance is elegant 
and access is limited. One needs a pass to open the building’s many gates.
David shares a room on the sixth floor with a colleague. He starts his day 
with coffee as he browses his e-mails. An accountant’s core task, he explains, 
is to provide certainty about the client’s financial situation. Companies and 
organizations are legally obliged to have their annual financial statements and 
other regular reports audited by accountants as a true representation of their 
situation so that other parties – investors, suppliers, the tax authorities and so 
on – trust them. “Accountants have a social function,” David says, “because 
without trust every transaction would fall through.”
David is a partner in the firm and thus a co-owner. Partners receive a share 
of the profits instead of a salary. They are personally responsible for the qual-
ity of their own work and that of the junior accountants under them. If some-
thing goes wrong, they can face disciplinary proceedings with legal force.
David’s first task today is to consult a colleague for advice about a client 
with overseas subsidiaries in a complex ownership structure. They outline the 
situation on a whiteboard, discuss the options and decide which is most real-
istic. He then dashes to his next appointment. Five minutes late, David storms 
into a meeting room where 12 people are sitting around a large table with a 
speaker for teleconferences in the middle and a screen on the wall. They are 
all partners – predominantly male, white and between 40 and 50 years old – 
each sitting behind a laptop and a stack of papers. The atmosphere is relaxed, 
(continued)
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the tempo punishing, the language impenetrable with acronyms and English 
jargon. Someone explains the items on the agenda; much of the meeting con-
cerns quality improvement. One topic is how to respond to the firm’s forth-
coming inspection report by the Financial Markets Authority. The session 
goes on for 3  h with a short toilet and telephone break half- way through. 
Lunch is set out and eaten while talking.
At 1:30 pm the meeting is still not over but David has to leave. In his own 
room, he has a Skype chat with a client about a quote for an annual audit. 
When the client tries to negotiate a lower rate, David is willing to think about 
it, although it has already been adjusted once. After half an hour he has to 
break off and go to another appointment in yet another meeting room. He 
discusses a quality problem with four partners. One of the firm’s main com-
petitors is ahead on this point, they note jealously. They at least need to reach 
the same level.
At 3 pm, David is back at his desk. Only now does he find out that his 
scheduled call has been postponed. He uses the spare time to check his e-mails 
again – 15 new messages since this morning, which is not so bad – to listen to 
his voicemail and to fill in his timesheet. He quickly scans the latest financial 
news on his phone.
At 3:30 pm he calls a fellow partner who will be leaving the firm shortly 
about the handover of his clients and projects. This is followed by another 
scheduled call, this time with someone from his own team. David finds the 
solution being proposed acceptable but warns his colleague not to take on too 
much work.
At about 5 pm, David sinks back into his chair. It has been a hectic day but 
not a stressful one. There are also days when he must check reports compiled 
by his junior accountants, which means spending hours on end behind his 
computer. The dynamism is why he likes his work – alongside accountancy’s 
social function, which makes it a difficult profession. After a number of recent 
scandals, supervision by the Financial Markets Authority has become stricter; 
the bar for audits has been raised. This has increased costs for clients and the 
competition between accountancy firms is fierce. “We try to compensate by 
working smarter”, says David. Ultimately, the pressure falls on the auditing 
accountants who must deliver high quality in as few billable hours as possible. 
While software to review standard financial data is advancing, everything else 
needs to be done by people, including the communication with clients.
At 5:15 pm, a colleague offers David a lift home. Once there, he will spend 
another half an hour answering e-mails.
Accountant, like notary and lawyer, is a regulated profession in the 
Netherlands. Practitioners must be registered with the Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Chartered Accountants. There are currently more than 21,000 
active accountants, 80 per cent of them men. Most hold university degrees 
(continued)
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(chartered accountants), a smaller number higher vocational qualifications 
(certified accountants), in both cases followed by practical training. The 
remuneration varies according to their qualifications, workplace and experi-
ence, in the range of €3000–9000 gross per month. As co-owners of their firms 
and thus entrepreneurs, partners are in a separate category and sometimes 
earn many hundreds of thousands of euros a year. The average (modal) 
income in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, exclud-
ing holiday pay. Accountants are in great demand and there are high rates of 
turnover in the large firms. Recent research by Nyenrode Business University 
points to heavy workloads in the profession, especially for young accoun-
tants, both in terms of hours (an average of eight hours of overtime a week) 
and quality requirements. New technologies including automated data analy-
sis are expected to change the profession, rendering some human tasks 
unnecessary.
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Chapter 7
Room to Choose Good Work
Economic globalization and technological development are often presented as inev-
itable trends to which people and nations can only adapt. By this reasoning, national 
governments no longer have the room to make choices and companies cannot pro-
vide good jobs due to the pressures of international competition. But is this really 
true? Is it realistic to pursue good work for everyone who can and wants to work?
The economist Anna Salomons argues that the digital revolution will not make 
existing work organizations superfluous. We should instead reflect on how we can 
develop ourselves, our institutions and our machines in such a way that human work 
remains human: “if employees are treated like robots, that hinders the productivity 
gains to be achieved by introducing real robots.”1
David Weil concludes The Fissured Workplace by analysing what the fragmenta-
tion and outsourcing of work has meant for employees: greater insecurity, worse 
terms of employment, fewer on-the-job training opportunities and restricted oppor-
tunities for advancement. Yet he is hopeful. We are emerging from a long period 
during which pay, conditions and standards of fairness in the workplace did not 
improve. But by taking advantage of new ways of organizing production, better 
work can be had for all.2
Other experts have argued along similar lines. But is their optimism realistic? 
Are companies and governments really still able to prioritise creating good work for 
everyone? This chapter first addresses globalization (Sect. 7.1) and technological 
developments (Sect. 7.2) before turning to the choices open to companies (Sect. 7.3) 




7.1  Globalization with Policy Space
Economic globalization has transformed the world since the late 1970s. There is 
now greater process interdependence across national borders; the international trade 
in goods and services has blossomed while financial flows have become faster and 
more extensive. Companies are now more likely to operate internationally, produc-
ing and assembling goods and delivering services through cross-border value and 
production chains. Many firms have subsidiaries, affiliates and production units 
abroad; about 15,000 Dutch businesses have a foreign parent company.3 The 
Netherlands, a medium-sized nation with an open economy, now earns approxi-
mately 34% of its GDP abroad4 – a proportion which has remained stable for many 
years. Domestic economic activity thus still accounts for almost twice as much 
income as the international trade on which the country prides itself.5
7.1.1  Winners and Losers
Globalization has long been presented as a development over which we have no 
control. But recent years have shown that its rules can and do change.6 The 
International Monetary Fund has become less doctrinaire about controls on capital 
movements; many international organizations have published reports on the need to 
make globalization more inclusive. In any case, the world economy is nowhere as 
globalized as it could theoretically be,7 and there is scant likelihood that economic 
globalization will receive renewed impetus in the near future. New technologies 
may well make it more attractive to organize aspects of production closer by, while 
some in the affluent world have high hopes for “reshoring” – the return of produc-
tion previously outsourced to emerging economies.
Ever since the Brexit referendum in the uk and Donald Trump’s election in the 
usa, analysts have been warning about the backlash to globalization – perhaps the 
end of the phenomenon as we know it.8 No-one any longer denies that globalization 
3 Boorsma (2018).
4 cbs (2019d).
5 Hueck and Went (2016, January 9); wrr (2013a).
6 Rodrik (2017).
7 Ghemawat and Altman (2016).
8 van Bergeijk (2019); Bremmer (2018); King (2017); Rodrik (2017).
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has losers as well as winners – although they are not always easy to identify.9 The 
obvious candidates are people who lose their jobs when production moves abroad 
and workers who find their pay and conditions undermined by foreign competition. 
Entire communities can suffer losses in income and well-being when a local com-
pany closes its doors and shifts its activities to a cheaper location.10
For people, work is much more than a source of income; not even generous ben-
efit payments can offset its loss. How does one measure and compensate for the 
impact on families and communities of a company closure or relocation?11 According 
to researchers at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Dutch 
losers of globalization are better off than in many other countries. In a recent policy 
briefing on inclusive globalization, they observe that “we are seeing shifts in 
employment across sectors, but unemployment remains low and the levelling effects 
of the tax system, along with the social-security safety net, are mitigating the some-
times painful transition effects of globalization.”12 This is of course not the case 
everywhere, which is one of the reasons why alarming analyses of how robots will 
devastate the future landscape of work in the United States are often used to justify 
calls for a basic income there.13
7.1.2  The Political Trilemma of the World Economy
Concerns about the workings and future of globalization and the revival of national-
ism have fuelled debate on more inclusive ways of organizing the international 
economy, national economies and the welfare state.14 “The question today is what 
type of globalization there will be,” writes Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the 
oecd. “It doesn’t have to be the one we’ve had. We must return people’s well-being 
to the centre of our focus, and ensure that the benefits derived from further intercon-
nectedness of our economies, societies, institutions and cultures are more equally 
shared.”15 At issue is whether and how the policy space available to national govern-
ments should be expanded so that they are better able to pursue domestic priorities. 
Small emerging economies have been hamstrung by globalization much more than 
large, rich economies like the United States or even advanced medium-sized econo-
mies like the Netherlands.
9 Nolan (2018, August 3); Rodrik (1997); Rodrik (2011); Stiglitz (2002); Went (2017).
10 Collier (2018); Rajan (2019).
11 Cass (2018); Goldstein (2017); Rodrik (2018, November 9).
12 Euwals and Meijerink (2018).
13 Ford (2015).
14 See, for example: Block (2018); Collier (2018); Corneo (2017); ippr Commission on Economic 
Justice (2018); Mazzucato (2018); Rajan (2019); Raworth (2017); Rodrik (2017); Went (2018).
15 Gurría (2017, June 6).
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Dani Rodrik’s “political trilemma” posits that it is impossible for far-reaching 
globalization and democracy and nation states to co-exist (see Fig. 7.1); we must 
choose which two of the three we consider more important. In the post-war Bretton 
Woods era, international trade was promoted but brakes were placed on the global-
ization of capital movements (see the lower axis in Fig.  7.1). The idea was that 
national priorities, such as lowering central-bank interest rates to boost employ-
ment, should not be hindered by (the threat of) capital flight. Since the 1980s, 
greater efforts have been made to achieve far-reaching globalization (the left-hand 
axis). As globalization limits the options and policy space available to individual 
nations, Thomas Friedman calls this “the golden straitjacket”.16 The third choice 
(the right-hand axis) is technically possible but implies something like a world gov-
ernment and global democracy that go far beyond the many forms of “global gover-
nance” we know today. In practice, these choices involve gradations.17
National governments largely retain the ability to make their own policy deci-
sions.18 Torben Iversen and David Soskice even argue that “the autonomy of the 
advanced nation-state has increased even as globalization and mutual dependence 
have risen.”19 The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands argued in 2008 
that states should use this policy space to help companies and workers losing out 
from globalization.20 Countries, conclude imf researchers, are in a position to choose 








Nation state Democratic politics 
Fig. 7.1 The political trilemma of the world economy
Source: Rodrik, 2007
16 Friedman (1999).
17 Rodrik (2007, June 27); Rodrik (2011); Derbyshire (2017, July 28).
18 See, for example: Rodrik (1997); Rodrik (2011); Rodrik (2017); ser (2008); Went (2018).
19 Iversen and Soskice (2019): xii.
20 ser (2008).
21 Ostry et al. (2019).
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7.1.3  Lasting Differences Between Countries
Researchers of the “varieties of capitalism”22 have analysed the differences between 
so-called “liberal” market economies like the us, the uk and Australia and “co- 
ordinated” economies like Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. 
What is striking is that all of these countries have continued to develop without 
converging towards an average or lowest common denominator. Despite the steady 
advance of globalization, there remain significant institutional differences between 
nations in areas such as social protection and the taxation of labour. Even a cursory 
glance at the statistics for oecd or eu member states shows that they remain as dis-
similar as ever on numerous indicators, despite  – or perhaps in part because 
of – globalization.23
While Sweden and Japan both have highly open economic borders, “it is difficult 
to maintain that these countries have made identical political choices when it comes 
to issues such as taxes, distribution of income, education or social security”.24 In the 
realm of work, Germany, Belgium and France proportionally have fewer flexible 
and self-employed workers than the Netherlands. These enduring differences 
between countries facing similar pressures from globalization are the result of their 
histories, traditions and preferences – in other words, of path dependencies, institu-
tions and policy choices.25
7.1.4  The Same Picture in the Globalization of Production…
One important difference between the current wave of globalization and the previ-
ous one, between about 1870 and the First World War, is that the production of 
goods and services has now also gone global – at least in part. Firms have divided 
their activities into tasks and subtasks which are then organized into production or 
value chains. This gives them choices. According to Stoker and Garretsen, global-
ization has enlarged the decision space available to ceos: “In a world of open bor-
ders in which markets have largely been liberalized compared with the first few 
decades after the Second World, ceos and corporate boards have huge strategic 
discretion.”26
22 Hall and Soskice (2001).
23 “Although corporations are now organized with greater flexibility and are more decentralized … 
[r]edistribution and welfare states, while they have changed over time, remain different across 
advanced capitalist democracies” (Iversen & Soskice, 2019: 39).
24 Stoker and Garretsen (2018).
25 Admiraal (2018, October 16); de Beer and Verhulp (2017); Kremer et al. (2017d).
26 Stoker and Garretsen (2018).
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Most jobs in the Netherlands are with companies and institutions serving the 
domestic market; pay levels and the quality of work are generally determined 
nationally, not internationally. But local autonomy may be limited by foreign own-
ers or shareholders demanding returns on investment, and by firms favouring an 
international strategy or division of labour as they compete.27 For the 15,000 foreign- 
owned businesses in the Netherlands, the Dutch employers’ organization awvn 
finds that it matters where the parent company is based: “A Japanese firm is very 
different from an American or a French one. French companies often allow a fair 
degree of local freedom: as long as you pay your own way and keep the money com-
ing in, you can do pretty much as you like. Japanese companies tend to be character-
ized by strict conventions and a methodical way of working, with plenty of 
protocols.”28 Statistics Netherlands and the Netherlands Organization for Applied 
Scientific Research report that Dutch local employees of us multinationals work 
more overtime and experience higher workloads and greater levels of mental fatigue 
than staff at non-multinationals.29
7.1.5  …and of Labour
The globalization of labour also has its limits. Immigration to the Netherlands over 
the past decade has largely been due to agreements made within the European 
Union, whose member states have decided that people, like goods and services, 
should be able to move freely across the continent’s internal borders. While only a 
small percentage of Europeans (2.5% in 2010) use this right, Eastern Europeans do 
so far more than others. The largest group of recent immigrants to the Netherlands 
comes from Poland, currently totalling an estimated 370,000 people.30
We again see significant differences between European countries, with some 
drawing many more migrant workers than others. In the Netherlands, labour migra-
tion is encouraged by active temporary employment agencies31 and constrained by 
collective labour agreements, high (minimum) wages, and barriers to temporary 
working and self-employment – especially the enforcement of existing rules and 
regulations.32 Under European agreements about working conditions, wages and 
27 See also Koster (2020).
28 Boorsma (2018).
29 cbs (2019b, March 31).
30 Heyma et al. (2018).
31 McCollum and Findlay (2015).
32 Ruhs (2012); Holtslag et al. (eds.). (2012).
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training, employers and member states have great latitude in determining what work 
is offered, and to whom; the institutions regulating national labour markets have 
replaced the customs posts of yesterday.
Research shows that labour migrants rarely steal jobs from native populations. 
Migrant workers mostly arrive in times of economic growth. There is in effect a dual 
labour market, with newcomers doing the work locals are unable or unwilling to 
do.33 In economically precarious sectors or work organizations, this may lead to less 
investment in training, downwards pressure on wages and fewer opportunities for 
collective action (Box 7.1).34
Box 7.1 What About Flexibility?
Globalization and technological advances allow the monitoring and adjusting 
of production and stock levels in real time and the breaking up of manufactur-
ing processes so that they can be organized as efficiently as possible. But 
these developments, which have encouraged the growth of the flexible labour 
market, do not on their own explain the rapid rise in Dutch self-employment. 
The oecd in its report for the Netherlands Independent Commission on the 
Regulation of Work agrees.35 If globalization and technology were the sole 
drivers of flexible work, there would be fewer differences between countries. 
Can flexible working then be tied to cultural trends? People increasingly value 
having say over their work; the growing number of working women means 
that more people want to combine work with care, while the rise of self- 
employment can in part be explained by freelance workers wanting more free-
dom and control over their own time. The flexible labour market does not only 
emanate from the top down – pushed by globalization and new technologies – 
but from the bottom up. That said, Dutch self-employment is not always a free 
choice; nor is the Netherlands so different culturally from places like Germany 
and the Scandinavian countries where self-employment is much less com-
mon. The number of flexible jobs and self-employed individuals in the 
Netherlands is then primarily the result of domestic political decisions, regu-
lations and policies: everything from dismissal law and collective agreements 
to the system of taxation and social security. These are summarized in Fig. 7.2.
While economic integration can indeed set limits on countries trying to avoid 
capital flight in a crisis, economic globalization does not eliminate the ability of 
countries to define preferences and to act on them. Politicians in many parts of the 
world have become more aware of this in recent years. With the downsides of 
33 van den Berge et al. (2018); Berkhout et al. (2014); Portes (2018, April 6).
34 Ruhs and Anderson (2010); Ruhs (2012).
35 oecd (2019a).





























Fig. 7.2 Causes of flexibilization in the Dutch labour market
Source: Kremer et al., 2017d
economic globalization becoming more readily apparent, there is growing interna-
tional interest in how the policy space available to nation-states can be utilized more 
effectively.
7.2  Technology Does Not Just Happen
Like globalization, technological development is often seen as a force we can only 
prepare for and adapt to, not shape. Although its momentum may seem unstoppable 
to individuals, as the many bank staff who have lost their jobs to computers can 
testify, the bulldozer effect does not apply across the board. Politicians, govern-
ments, companies, engineers, technology workers, stakeholder organizations, social 
movements and others all help define how technology is developed and applied. 
“The future is not something we arrive at so much as something we create through 
our actions in the present” (Box 7.2).36
36 Rushkoff (2019).
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Box 7.2 Technological Revolutions
We know from previous technological revolutions that the rollout and applica-
tion of general-purpose technologies is a lengthy process of trial and error, 
correction, adjustment and adaptation.37 While these technologies have great 
potential, realizing them requires a great deal of investment and, often, orga-
nizational change. Processes must be developed, management must gain 
experience, employees must be trained, software must be adapted and so on.
There is nothing inevitable about how new technologies are applied; it is 
not something society must simply accept. Over time, we have seen changes 
in the (initially mostly positive) attitude towards disruptive online platforms 
such as Uber and Airbnb. Around the world, platforms are now being chal-
lenged by new interest groups, networks and co-operatives formed by their 
workers. Cities such as New York and Barcelona and states such as California 
have begun subjecting platforms to stricter requirements, for example by lim-
iting the number of vehicles allowed to operate on behalf of Uber, Lyft and 
similar companies, or by imposing requirements for drivers’ pay, safety and 
working conditions.
Many communities are now responding to protect local residents and hote-
liers from Airbnb’s explosive growth. Amsterdam is working with other major 
tourist destinations such as Paris and Barcelona to limit the number of days 
homes can be rented out and to obtain more data from Airbnb about tenants 
and landlords. Governments are not powerless against platforms: it is possible 
to regulate them and to respond to their unwanted effects and side-effects 
through policy and enforcement.
7.2.1  Humanizing Work
New technologies were already threatening the quality of work in 1776 when Adam 
Smith wrote that the government should act to prevent the occupations of the work-
ing poor from being reduced to simple, monotonous operations which make people 
“as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become”.38 While 
new technologies can give workers more autonomy and control over the organiza-
tion of their tasks, all too often the opposite happens.39
Digital technology need not lead to the surveillance or control of workers through 
machine-generated feedback.40 There are many examples of robots and “cobots” in 
37 Freeman and Louçã (2001).
38 Best (2018).
39 de Stefano (2018).
40 Head (2018, May 24).
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construction and the automobile industry making work for humans safer, more var-
ied and less physically grinding. There are also inspiring initiatives to help people 
with physical or mental disabilities to find work or to function better in their current 
jobs; many expect such possibilities involving technology to increase in the future. 
Fred Block41 argues that, in principle, the ability to automate repetitive tasks creates 
more room for work requiring human judgement, creativity, problem-solving, inter-
action and contact in fields such as healthcare and care for the elderly.42
Economists similarly argue that algorithms will make forecasting cheaper and 
thus increase the importance and value of human judgement.43 Paul Daugherty and 
James Wilson at the consultancy Accenture point out that while humans have long 
had to adapt to the rhythm of machines, artificial intelligence now offers opportuni-
ties to rehumanize work and to alter the nature of human-machine interactions to 
increase both workers’ productivity and well-being; in the coming age of AI, they 
anticipate huge demand for creative workers with people-skills able make decisions 
within new, fully thought-out work processes.44 This will not be the case every-
where, and it may have to be fought for, but it is one of the possibilities offered by 
new technology.
7.2.2  The Economics of Robots and ai
Whether and how robots and algorithms enter the workplace – and what impact they 
will have on the quantity and quality of work – will depend on numerous factors and 
decisions. To successfully introduce robots to automate routine subtasks, companies 
will need both adequate financial resources and employees able to assess the avail-
able technologies. When a company decides to adopt robots or cobots, it is often not 
clear in advance what this will mean for the number of jobs. In theory:
 – capital (robots and cobots) can replace human labour;
 – the use of technology can increase productivity (and therefore wages);
 – the use of robots can create new human tasks and functions.
In practice, the balance between the above mechanisms will determine whether 
the demand for human labour increases or decreases.45
The story is similar for ai, with parallel predictions for how its entry into the 
workplace will affect functions and subtasks. Again there are many factors at play 
and decisions to be made: about what is or seems technically possible, about what 
actually works and about what is pursued in practice. Although how AI will affect 
the quantity and quality of work has been the subject of intense speculation,46 so far 
41 Block (2018).
42 See also: Colvin (2015); Davenport and Kirby (2016); Dekker and Freese (2018).
43 Agrawal et al. (2018).
44 Daugherty and Wilson (2018).
45 ter Weel (2018).
46 See: Agrawal et al. (eds.). (2019b); Mateos-Garcia (2019, October 7).
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there is scant hard evidence. In theory, the use of algorithms can have many possible 
consequences47:
 – algorithms can substitute capital for human labour;
 – algorithms can increase the relative return on capital, compared with the return 
on labour (for example, as a result of full automation);
 – algorithms can increase the productivity of labour (and therefore wages);
 – algorithms can reduce uncertainty and so create new tasks for human labour and/
or capital;
 – algorithms can create new human work upstream or downstream.
In practice, the overall balance between the above mechanisms will determine 
their consequences for both the quantity and quality of work.48
Just as the introduction of robots is happening more slowly than enthusiasts once 
hoped, the widespread application of ai is not going to happen overnight; practical 
problems need to be solved and adjustments will take time.49 A 2018 report on 
robot-based process automation in The New York Times described how “companies 
are eager to promote the bots as helpful assistants instead of job killers. The technol-
ogy, they say, will get smarter and more useful, liberating workers rather than 
replacing them”.50 Others warn that ai is no panacea: “To a certain type of techno-
crat, innovations offer an irresistible opportunity to do a lot more talking at the 
expense of doing.”51 If the culture, people and working practices of an institution are 
not ready for ai, the chances of success are small; time and space will be needed for 
trial and error.
7.2.3  Co-creation
Many experts argue that companies and institutions will benefit most when humans 
and machines complement each other and work as allies. One example is the robot 
Moxi, developed to make the lives of nurses easier after first carefully studying what 
nurses actually do on the job.52 By focusing on machine-human collaboration, it is 
possible to take advantage of their “complementary strengths”.53 As a Japanese 
47 Agrawal et al. (2018).
48 See: Daugherty and Wilson (2018); Bughin and Manyika (2019, July 25).
49 Cass (2018).
50 Lohr (2018, August 5).
51 Greenway et al. (2018).
52 Schwab (2019, August 7).
53 Daugherty and Wilson (2018).
7.2 Technology Does Not Just Happen
154
saying has it, people give wisdom to machines.54 It is about encouraging co-opera-
tion with machines in a way that is good for people, society and the economy.
Technological applications should aim to make people function better; for this 
reason, they should be developed through “co-creation” wherever possible. The 
Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands underlines the importance of firms 
first consulting with the workers who will be using the applications.55 Without their 
input – as well as that of clients and consumers – firms may end up with technolo-
gies no-one wants or which undermine people’s control over their working and 
personal lives.56 Jacques Bughin and James Manyika of the consultancy McKinsey 
argue that efforts with ai “won’t succeed unless they benefit employees” (Box 7.3).57
Box 7.3 The Human Factor
Anna Salomons argues that “new technologies are not being introduced in a 
vacuum. A company which installs a computer or a robot in a workplace does 
not see automatic increases in productivity: that also requires a change in its 
way of working. For example, the division of labour amongst staff or teams 
may change. Or the physical layout of the workspace may have to be adjusted. 
Or the technology may enable the introduction of new products or services, 
which first need to be invented. Changes of this kind to the production process 
require adaptability and risk-taking, because finding the best new working 
method and developing novel or improved services do not happen of their 
own accord.”
The academic literature on how new technology impels adjustments in the 
workplace “shows that the human factor is indeed of vital importance. 
Employees’ involvement and the way in which their work within a company 
is organized determine the extent to which new technology generates improved 
productivity.”58
How technology is used and the measures taken to reduce its social costs will 
ultimately depend on decisions made by employers and politicians.59 It is up to poli-
cymakers to ensure that new technology leads to more prosperity for everyone, as 
this will not happen on its own. “Economists tend to place great trust in the market’s 
ability to allocate resources in the most efficient way. But most experts recognise 
that the market’s star does not shine as brightly when it comes to innovation. There 
are several reasons for market failures in innovation in general, as well as some 
specific reasons that are important in the context of ai.”60 One is that the market does 
54 Kochan and Dyer (2017).
55 ser (2016b).
56 Melis (2019, February 13).
57 Bughin and Manyika (2019, July 25).
58 Salomons (2015).
59 Gallie (2017).
60 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a).
7 Room to Choose Good Work
155
not price in the social benefits of work, for instance that “employed people are hap-
pier and become better citizens”.61
In sum, we need to recognize that technology does not just happen to us. Robots 
and AI will not determine how humans organize work in the future, how working 
people will interact with machines and algorithms, or whether workers will have 
more or less freedom of movement or control over their work. Ultimately, it is 
people who decide how technology is used and what it means for the quality of our 
work. If we want everyone to benefit from technology, engineers, entrepreneurs, 
employers, trade unions, civil society organizations and governments all have a role 
to play.62
7.3  Investing in Good Work
The responsibility for investing in good work rests primarily with the management 
boards of companies and institutions.63 Firms make strategic choices within their 
sectors,64 about terms of employment and about whether and how to automate (by 
replacing human labour or by increasing its productivity). Investing in workers by 
paying them well and giving them more room to organize their own tasks should 
result in higher engagement65 and productivity as well as less workplace friction and 
spending on the recruitment and training of new staff66 (see also Chap. 2).
In the Netherlands, a case study of 19 companies providing low-skilled work in 
labour-intensive agriculture found both “precarious” employers treating their staff 
as disposable and “socially responsible” firms investing in their workers and trying 
to keep them for longer. There were significant differences in personnel and remu-
neration policies and in employer-staff relationships, which could only be the result 
of deliberate choices by management as the economic environment in which these 
61 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b, March 29).
62 Markoff (2015); ter Weel (2018); Went et al. (2015).
63 “Going beyond formal rules governing the labour market, the future of work and the actual qual-
ity of jobs depends on the working environment at the firm level. Hence creating ‘good’ and 
healthy jobs depends on employers’ initiatives to organize work in a sustainable and productive 
way. While standards can be set by legislation and collective agreements, and while this can be 
supported by incentives given to firms, the ultimate responsibility lies with individual employers 
and management in day-to-day activities. Using different forms of effective employee representa-
tion and participation can help develop good working environments” (Eichhorst et al. in press).
64 One Dutch example is the retail chain Mediamarkt, which for years competed on price. In late 
2018 it implemented a “complete change of culture” to focus on quality (van der Velden & 
Polman, 2018).
65 Economists also call this an “efficiency wage”. See for example the explanation at https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficiency_wage
66 Research by economists at banking group ABN-AMRO on staff turnover in the Dutch hospitality 
industry shows that replacing a full-time cook costs almost €30,000 and a full-time server over 
€15,000. The costs incurred due to staff turnover equal 6% of the sector’s entire sales income 
(Driessen, 2019).
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companies operate is more or less the same.67 In another Dutch example, Frank Pot 
studied the position of workers in short-cycle labour, typical in sectors such as 
cleaning, agriculture and horticulture, meat and fish processing, and in production 
lines and distribution centres. This kind of work generally “involves repetitive 
movements and its pace is often machine-led, with all the risks of rsi [repetitive 
strain injury] and stress that entails”. Although the 1989 Working Conditions Act 
encourages employers to reduce short-cycle labour, few firms have made apprecia-
ble progress; some “seem to prefer class struggle over the co-creation to which the 
Dutch employers’ association awvn is committed”.68
Ferry Koster69 concludes from his review of the literature on labour deployment 
that “financialization and competition may well put pressure on the labour factor” 
but that this competition can be met “by choosing the ‘high road’ rather than reduc-
ing labour to a simple cost item to be cut back as far as possible”. A lot of research 
has addressed the “low-road” versus “high-road” choices companies face in their 
employment relationships, with those choosing the high road offering their staff 
better pay, terms and conditions than are strictly necessary.70 Jeffrey Pfeffer con-
cludes that employers who implement practices good for the well-being of their 
personnel reduce “their own costs from employee medical expenses, absenteeism, 
workers’ compensation insurance costs and the productivity loss from having 
employees who are physically at work but not ‘really there’”. These employers also 
reduce “the costs to society from people’s poor physical and mental health and the 
harm done to individuals”.71
Zeynep Ton’s study of how us retail chains in highly competitive sectors treat 
their employees concludes that certain practices “allow retailers to break the pre-
sumed trade-off between investing in employees and maintaining low prices”.72 
Successful chains like QuikTrip, Mercadona and Trader Joe’s invest heavily in their 
staff but still have the lowest prices, achieve solid financial results and offer better 
customer service than their competitors. Such companies show that, even in seg-
ments where the lowest price is king, “bad jobs are not a cost-driven necessity but a 
choice”. Ton chose to focus on these firms because they employ millions, because 
they have a reputation for paying low wages and because many people who value 
good work believe it is impossible in such companies. To managers, company direc-
tors and entrepreneurs who want to offer good work but are deterred by the costs, 
Ton points out that “offering good jobs can in fact reduce costs and increase profits, 
as long as it is combined with operational excellence”.73
Paul Osterman,74 who has written extensively on the high and low-road 
approaches to industrial relations, similarly concludes that “companies can do well 
67 Kroon and Paauwe (2014).
68 Pot (2018a).
69 Koster (2020).
70 See Koster (2020).
71 Pfeffer (2018).
72 Ton (2012, January–February).
73 Ton (2014).
74 Osterman (2018).
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if they do good”. Nevertheless, evidence for the profitability of the high road alter-
native is thinner than one hopes. While virtuous employment policies may be pos-
sible in many low-wage industries, there is scant evidence “that the ‘high road’ is 
generalizable or that it will be a viable alternative for any randomly chosen com-
pany”. Osterman argues that the government should use regulations and tenders to 
prod employers down the high road. Former US President Barack Obama deliber-
ately visited companies with better working conditions to boost their business while 
ordering federal contractors to adhere to “high-road practices”.75 Osterman further 
advocates empowering stakeholders and trade unions to make it more difficult for 
financial markets to insist on profit maximization.
7.4  A Task for Government
If creating good work is in the interests of employers, why do so many fail to do so? 
Many researchers struggle with this question.76 The business literature points to 
numerous instances of management being unaware of the problems, of not knowing 
what to do, or trying but failing to transform the organization accordingly.77 In con-
trast, economists Dani Rodrik and Charles Sabel trace the shortage of good work to 
systemic failures of the market: the benefits of good work accrue more to society as 
a whole than to individual employers, for whom providing good work may be 
costly.78 In other words, good work has positive externalities and the government 
has a clear role to play.79
Laws and regulations to safeguard better work are advocated by the research 
institute affiliated to the Dutch Christian Democratic Party. Its report on bringing 
greater certainty to the labour market claims that making flexible work more expen-
sive – which the third Rutte government, in power since October 2017, has already 
done to some extent – might even find broad support among employers. The report 
refers to the “hockey helmet” mechanism, described by Thomas Schelling in 1973, 
who observed that most ice-hockey players at the time did not wear helmets during 
matches but nevertheless favoured their mandatory introduction: “They did not 
want to play in them voluntarily, because their peripheral vision was obstructed. But 
with a requirement, everyone would suffer the same disadvantage and the risk of 
75 Osterman (2018).
76 See, for example, Pfeffer (2018).
77 Presentation sheet by Steven Dhondt in 2018, based on Gibbons and Henderson (2013).
78 Rodrik and Sabel (2019).
79 “If the labor market settles on an efficient outcome in which large segments of the population 
lack meaningful work, our response can’t be to say ‘thanks, understood’ and then to wait for those 
displaced people suddenly to transform themselves into something else, or simply to give them 
government aid. Our response must be ‘that needs to change’” (Cass, 2018: 53).
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head injuries would also be limited.” This may also apply to the labour market: 
“Employers themselves want better, fairer regulations for permanent and flexible 
staff. So that those who are already socially aware do not suffer any disadvantage.”80 
The government can ensure that firms that do the right thing are not undercut by 
firms that do not.
But laws and regulations to improve the quality of work are not enough; more is 
possible and necessary. So-called soft regulation encourages companies and institu-
tions to focus on better work. “Economically non-optimum management styles are 
often tenacious in their survival”, observes Frank Pot in an article on how the Dutch 
government, employers’ organizations and trade unions previously sought to influ-
ence technological and organizational change. The government’s task is “to pro-
mote productivity, innovation and quality of life, and hence also quality of 
work” – which requires different forms of organization81 (see Box 2.6).
Harry Garretsen82 points out that “in view of all kinds of external effects”, it is 
plausible that “markets left to themselves generate a suboptimum (= too low) level 
of innovation”. Garretsen sees a role for government intervention, for “supporting 
companies, perhaps through pilot projects, to initiate or step up innovation aimed at 
achieving better, smarter management and work”. To successfully apply new tech-
nologies in the life sciences, nanotechnology, AI and robotics, public policy must 
consider the “complementarity between hard and soft technologies; … between 
technological and social innovation”.83
Tuomo Alasoini84 has studied the conditions under which workplace develop-
ment programmes actually lead to better work in ten European and East Asian coun-
tries, including 16 projects in Finland between 2004 and 2010. He concludes that 
innovations in the workplace are rarely achieved through hard regulation, let alone 
deregulation, but through soft regulation – policy frameworks and recommenda-
tions, information on best practices, the training and education of managers and 
employees, advisory and consulting services, benchmarking tools, and grants and 
80 Siegmann (2018). Lodewijk Asscher, leader of the Dutch Labour Party, also discusses the impor-
tance of new certainties in Opstaan in het Lloyd Hotel (“Awakening in the Lloyd Hotel”): “For 
decades we have heard that it is a good thing that citizens no longer rely upon a protective govern-
ment. Of course everyone knows that not all the old certainties can survive. But is it not now time 
for new certainties, instead of always having to manage by yourself?” (Asscher, 2019: 140).
81 Pot (2019b).
82 Garretsen (2019, September 26).
83 See also wrr (2013a).
84 Alasoini (2016).
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subsidies to companies.85 The Finnish government, for instance, prioritizes new 
forms of workplace organization and better quality work, as do high-tech pro-
grammes in Germany.86
Better work does not come about automatically. Market failings, management 
styles, lack of information, insufficient knowledge and under-resourcing can all hin-
der its emergence. But because societal interests – general well-being and economic 
productivity – are at stake, the government is justified to step in through hard and 
soft regulation. For starters, this would entail working with employers’ associations 
and trade unions to embrace the importance of good work.87 The government can 
also create incentives for stakeholders to reach agreements and take initiative (see 
Box 7.4).88 The state is also a major employer and can lead by example, prioritizing 
good work for its own personnel and ensuring through socially responsible procure-
ment that public tenders are competitive not only in price, but in sustainability and 
compliance with quality-of-work requirements.89
85 Innovation vouchers worth €7500 distributed by drawing lots among Dutch smes in 2004 and 
2005 made “a structural contribution to the advanced innovation activities of small and medium-
sized enterprises” (Lemmers et al., 2019).
86 Pot (2019b).
87 In For the Sake of Security (Kremer et al., 2017d), we highlighted Koen Caminada’s suggestion 
that a moral appeal be made to individuals and businesses employing other people. He believes 
“that it is simply obvious that the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment should let the 
Netherlands know what a socially and morally acceptable minimum rate is. When making an 
agreement with a local contractor, if you then communicate that if they go below x you will enter 
into a contract with them, that is not ok and you are not acting morally. I think that will help” 
(Houweling & Sprengers, 2016: 404–405). Economist Samuel Bowles (2016) shows that stan-
dards and societal and moral preferences matter in the economy.
88 See Mazzucato (2018) on the value of government and of mission-driven public policy.
89 On www.pianoo.nl, a website featuring expertise on public procurement from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Climate, we read: “Organisations that adhere to the principle of social return 
reach purchasing agreements with contractors concerning the creation of additional jobs, work-
experience jobs or internships for people who are disadvantaged within the labour market. These 
include the long-term unemployed, people who are partially disabled or young people with a dis-
ability. By creating additional jobs in this way, the target group can participate according to their 
ability, making use of extra productivity that would otherwise remain unused. Social return is not 
intended to supplant existing jobs.” The site provides further advice, examples and guidelines.
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In sum, firms and institutions choose how to treat their workers; their choices are 
not imposed by globalization, technology or existing labour-market institutions. 
While good work benefits workers, the economy and society as a whole, it does not 
always come about on its own. There is thus a role for government (see the recom-
mendations in Chap. 8).
7.5  Conclusion: Room for Choice
“The future of work”, concludes the oecd, “is in our hands and will largely depend 
on the policy decisions countries make.… With the right policies and institutions, 
the future of work can be one of more and better jobs for all.”93 The findings in this 
chapter support this assessment. Robots, algorithms and global competition have 
not eclipsed the Netherlands’ ability to pursue its own priorities. Companies and 
institutions are able to focus on creating better work for more people.
The government can promote good-quality work both through “hard” regulation 
(and its enforcement) and “soft” regulation. It can create incentives for stakeholders 
to reach agreements and take initiative. As an employer and contracting body, the 
government can also lead by example, by providing better work for its own staff, by 
purchasing sustainably and by imposing quality-of-work requirements in its tenders.
Box 7.4 The Importance of Standards, Laws and Regulations
What constitute normal, acceptable or just working conditions is less clear 
than what laws and enforcement protocols define. This is one of the reasons 
why workers and their representatives must be involved in decision-making 
about automation90 and the organization of work.91 These are also key issues 
for politicians, trade unions, employers’ associations, and professional orga-
nizations in areas such as education and healthcare. Legislation and regula-
tions, collective agreements and social contracts all define conditions and 
performance requirements, enforced as necessary by regulators and inspec-
tors. What society wants to regulate and possibly restrict to guarantee the 
quality of work is constantly evolving, as are laws, regulations and stan-
dards.92 We need ongoing dialogue at the company, sector and national levels.
90 As long ago as 1968, the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands spoke out in favour of 
involving employees in automation: “It is apparent from the hearings that, in most cases, the infor-
mation was provided at the time of the decision or later, and that only a few companies had con-
sulted in advance about the automation before a particular decision was made. [In those cases] staff 
were engaged and so encouraged to help think about the technical innovations and the means of 
their implementation. In principle, the Council regards this form of consultation as the most appro-
priate” (quoted in Pot, 2019b).
91 de Stefano (2018); Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2017); Oeij et al. (eds.). (2017).
92 awvn (2018); Kremer et al. (2017d).
93 oecd (2019a).
7 Room to Choose Good Work
161
 A Day at Work: The Homecare Worker
“You shouldn’t do it for the money”, says 22-year-old Bouchra, wearing train-
ers, casual trousers and a Muslim headscarf. “It’s for the heart. If I leave 
people happy, my day is complete.” Bouchra has been a care worker for 
2 years now. She ended up in the job by accident; being her mother’s main 
care-giver, she was unable to complete her training as an administrative assis-
tant. She started as a domestic help but is now a homecare worker.
She reaches her first client at 7.30 am. “Home care”, she says through the 
intercom. The door swings open. Behind it is a man in his bathrobe, with a 
walking frame. Bouchra has come to wash and dress him and put on his sup-
port stockings.
The man is 93 and, much to his own delight, still has full control over his 
mind. Almost a century, he says, “but I hope I don’t make it that far”. Bouchra 
is taken aback: “But I’ll miss you!” The elderly gentleman is very pleased 
with Bouchra. “Some people have problems with a headscarf. They say, ‘Take 
that thing off your head.’ Incomprehensible. She’s very good.” Within 35 min 
the man is clean, dressed and sitting in the armchair in his living room. “Is 
there anything else I can do for you?”, asks Bouchra, a cup of tea in her hand. 
“She always asks that now”, he says. “And I always say, ‘No, Bouchra, every-
thing’s just fine.’” She then explains that she is not coming tomorrow; Marja 
will be here instead. She will be back again on Tuesday. It does not quite seem 
to get through.
Bouchra rushes to her next appointment. “Clients are always upset if 
you’re in a hurry. You should never look at the clock if they can see it.” On her 
phone she checks who is next on her round and what she has to do for them: 
support stockings 15 min, washing 20 min. Her tasks and time allocations are 
set out in the care plan drawn up by the district nurse – the insurance company 
is watching. Despite repeated attempts by successive health ministers to abol-
ish minute-by-minute registration, home care is still all about time.
Later that morning she has some crackers for lunch at the door of her fourth 
client, a water bottle within reach. It is now noon. “This is a quiet day”, she 
says. This man is her last client of the morning. She rings the doorbell, but 
nobody comes. So she calls the client’s landline. No answer. She calls the 
office. No answer. She checks her phone to see if someone else has already 
called by. No. She looks to see if there is a contact person she can call. No-one 
in the system. “I’ll have to report that to the office, it’s useful to have.” Bouchra 
often finds herself on her own in this job. Finally, a neighbour opens his door.
After much knocking at the door and ringing the bell, they finally hear 
noises inside the flat. The man opens up, confused and wearing only inconti-
nence pants. “Hello sir”, Bouchra says gently. She shakes his hand. “Were 
you in the shower?” She stays until he is sitting comfortably at his table, has 
found and taken his pills and is eating a bowl of cereal. “Someone else might 
have just left, but I wanted to make sure everything was OK.  Otherwise I 
wouldn’t feel at peace.”
(continued)
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This gentleman really belongs in a nursing home, says Bouchra, but there 
are no vacancies at the moment. Everyone is expected to live at home for as 
long as possible. “You have to have serious dementia to be admitted.” As a 
result, many of her clients have multiple and complex problems. “And some-
times they’re angry. Especially when I’m late. If I’m due at 9:30 but don’t 
reach them until 10:30. Because of that they almost miss an appointment at 
the hospital, or their legs are completely swollen because they’ve been wear-
ing their support stockings for too long.” When people yell at her, Bouchra 
tries to stay calm. She understands their frustration. She has never been on a 
course on how to deal with angry clients, but she has taken one about time 
registration on her phone.
Bouchra’s next call is not until 4.45 pm. She hates these split shifts, as do 
her colleagues. The rosters are tailored to the clients’ wishes. It would be nice 
if her route suited her better and there was not such a long break in the middle 
of the day. But she is happy that she finally has a permanent contract. They 
had promised her one after the first year, but it never materialized. Earlier this 
year she asked again, and this time it came. Bouchra is very pleased about this 
because it gives her stability and security. It means she can finally dream 
about buying a house of her own.
About 400,000 people, mainly women, work in home care in the Netherlands. 
While a small proportion are qualified nurses with a professional degree or 
Level 4 vocational qualification, the great majority are classified as care 
workers, social assistance workers or domestic helps, mostly with lesser qual-
ifications. Their gross monthly salary is generally between €1400 and €2750, 
or slightly higher – up to €3300 – for graduates. The average (modal) income 
in the Netherlands in 2020 will be just over €2800 per month, excluding holi-
day pay. Most homecare workers (80%) have a permanent contract and work 
part-time, although half take on extra shifts because the sector is now growing 
again following a period of contraction between 2012 and 2016. Absenteeism 
and perceived workloads are high.
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Chapter 8
Better Work: Conclusions 
and Recommendations
Good work is crucial for our well-being but is under pressure from the application 
of new technologies, the use of flexible employment contracts and the intensifica-
tion of work. In this book we have argued that achieving better work – good work 
for everyone who can and wants to work – is a crucial mission for policymakers, 
employers and labour organizations.
In this final chapter we advance recommendations for how the government and 
other stakeholders can promote better work for more people, including for those 
who would like to work, or work more, but are currently not doing so. We summa-
rize our findings from the previous chapters (Sect. 8.1) before presenting our recom-
mendations (Sects. 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5).
8.1  Good Work Is Under Pressure
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy advised in 1981: “If 
work is to retain its central position in society, the option of improving the quality 
of work must always be available: one of the main lessons of the substantial rise in 
prosperity during the 1960s was that welfare is not just a matter of higher consump-
tion levels.”1 Some four decades later, human labour remains central to the organi-
zation and performance of our economies and to our well-being as individuals and 
societies. The International Labour Organization2 continues to champion a “human- 
centred agenda” that privileges investment in human development and workplace 
well-being. “Decent work for all” is now among the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals, to which governments and companies worldwide are commit-
ted (see Chap. 1).
1 wrr (1981): 159.
2 ilo (2019).
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Governments, academics, professional and employers’ organizations, trade 
unions and citizens around the world have been discussing the changing world of 
work. Concerns often revolve around what technological advances in robotics and 
artificial intelligence will mean for the quantity of work available to humans, and 
what increasingly flexible labour arrangements mean for income security. This book 
has broadened this discussion by focusing on the quality of work.
Paying attention to the quality of work is crucial because good work benefits 
individuals, the economy and society as a whole. While work provides people with 
incomes to live on, it also provides satisfaction, social status and self-esteem, the 
feeling that we are contributing to society. But to truly benefit individuals and soci-
ety, work must meet certain requirements (see Chap. 2). From the international 
scientific literature, we distilled three key criteria for work to be considered “good”, 
which align well with the needs of the Dutch service and knowledge economy and 
with the stated wishes and expectations of the population:
 1. Control over income. Good work provides fair wages and long-term financial 
security.
 2. Control over work. Good work allows workers sufficient autonomy to make the 
best use of their abilities and provides an inclusive and supportive social 
environment.
 3. Control in life. Good work allows sufficient time and space to combine work 
with care responsibilities and a private life.
These three criteria are the necessary preconditions for work to be considered 
“good”. If they are not met, both workers and work organizations suffer, leading to 
social costs down the line (see Chap. 2). When work is not good, people are disin-
clined to stay in their jobs; they may also fall ill, which today increasingly means 
mental illness. Fully 17.5% of Dutch workers reported suffering from symptoms of 
burnout in 2018.3 By European standards, this is far from exceptional. Almost half 
of all sick leave in the Netherlands is work-related – the result of workplace stress, 
emotional exhaustion, or problems with colleagues, managers and clients (see Chap. 
6). The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment estimates 
that unfavourable working conditions are responsible for almost 5% of the total 
burden of disease in the country. The result is both higher healthcare costs and lower 
productivity.
Good work is important not only for the well-being of workers, but for the effec-
tive functioning of companies and institutions, and for social cohesion and the econ-
omy at large. Good physical and emotional health increases workers’ productivity; 
committed and engaged workers means greater initiative, innovation and organiza-
tional performance.
3 Schaufeli (2018).
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8.1.1  We Could Do Better
According to recent research by the oecd4 and Eurofound,5 the Netherlands is often 
mid-table in international indices tracking the quality of work (see Chap. 1). This is 
partly because income security has declined, with 36% of Dutch workers now with-
out permanent contracts. Opportunities for on-the-job learning have stalled, which 
does little to enhance security of employment over the life course (see Chap. 3). 
Almost half of all workers claim that they lack sufficient autonomy in the work-
place, and their numbers are rising regardless of their level of education. Growing 
numbers are feeling perpetually rushed at work and/or that their jobs are emotion-
ally draining. Firms and institutions in the Netherlands as they are currently orga-
nized are thus not always bringing out the best in people (see Chap. 4). A tenth of 
Dutch workers report an imbalance between their private and working lives (see 
Chap. 5).
Good work in the Netherlands is not evenly distributed, with stark differences 
along educational, occupational, gender, health and ethnic lines. Quality of work is 
thus an issue of distributive justice, one with the potential to undermine social cohe-
sion should current trends continue (see Chap. 2). The most obvious division is level 
of education, which is clearly correlated to quality of work. There are also stark 
differences between occupations. Those suffering the most from the combination of 
increased workloads and a lack of control over their work includes public-sector 
professionals such as teachers, nurses and police officers.
Surveys of public opinion find that the Dutch have high expectations of their 
work: their jobs must provide income and security, cordial relationships, interesting 
tasks, opportunities to develop their abilities and to achieve something in life. At the 
same time, most do not want work to always come first and expect to have time and 
space for a private life as well (see Chap. 2). Although most people in the Netherlands 
claim to be satisfied with their work, things could clearly be much better.
8.1.2  Good Work is At Stake
The three macro-level trends we have addressed in this book – the automation, flexi-
bilization and intensification of labour – clearly have the potential to affect the qual-
ity of work. They can make work good or better for some people, bad or worse for 
others, or have no impact at all. In some cases, they exacerbate existing divisions, 
such as between people with and without disabilities. In other cases, they give rise 
to new divisions, for instance between professions.
The introduction of new technologies such as robots and artificial intelligence 
can cost jobs; combined with the flexible labour market, new technological 
4 oecd (2016a).
5 Eurofound (2017).
8.1  Good Work Is Under Pressure
166
applications can push down wages. But technology can also have positive effects for 
workers; much depends on the efforts to support human-machine complementarity 
and whether workers in the face of changing tasks have opportunities to learn on the 
job. While technology can be used to ruthlessly monitor workers and turn them into 
mechanical appendages, it can also create opportunities for people to work more 
independently or to assist them into the workforce. Depending on how and why it is 
applied, technology can both improve or undermine work-life balance.
Flexible work is widespread in the Netherlands; more than a third of workers do 
not have a permanent contract. The consequences are becoming increasingly appar-
ent as new dividing lines emerge. The self-employed professionals who enjoy 
autonomy in their working lives tend to be male, older and well-educated; the flex-
ible, temporary workers whose income security often depends on the welfare state 
are more likely to be female, young and formally less educated.
The negative consequences of flexible work can be limited by welfare state 
arrangements as well as employer investment in workers. The self-employed in the 
Netherlands are largely excluded from the social-security system, denied access to 
everything from occupational disability benefits and labour-force reintegration 
schemes to training and leave. Temporary employees are generally denied meaning-
ful say over their tasks and have limited opportunities for on-the-job learning and 
professional development; not knowing whether they will have a job in 6 months, 
they have few incentives to offer ideas on how to improve their work. Flexible work-
ers with little control over their working hours often find that their jobs disrupt their 
personal lives. Workers with temporary contracts face greater difficulties building 
up decent lives with a home and family than employees with permanent positions.
The intensification of work can undermine the quality of work. The increasing 
pace of work and its emotional toll have been an issue in the Netherlands for some 
time, with almost 40% of workers claiming they frequently or always have to work 
hard and fast, and over 10% reporting that their work is emotionally draining (see 
Chaps. 1 and 4). Professionals in healthcare, education and the police who must 
deal directly with patients, clients and members of the public are affected most by 
the growing demands, while burnout disproportionately affects women and univer-
sity graduates. The intensification of work also creates additional difficulties for 
people with occupational disabilities, those returning to the labour force after an 
absence, people with difficulties at home and those who have little control over their 
work (see Chap. 6). Whether the intensification of work is detrimental thus largely 
depends on whether workers have sufficient autonomy – freedom to shape their own 
activities in the workplace.
8.1.3  Room for Better Work
The negative scenario is not a fait accompli. Speaking at the launch of the Global 
Commission on the Future of Work, ilo Director-General Guy Ryder stated that 
“the future of work is not decided for us in advance. It is a future that we must make 
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according to the values and the preferences that we choose as societies and through 
the policies that we design and implement.”6 In its report for the Netherlands 
Independent Commission on the Regulation of Work, the oecd likewise concluded: 
“the future of work will largely depend on the policy decisions countries make”.7
The Borstlap Committee8 in its 2019 advisory report to the Dutch government 
underlined that national actors can still give direction to the labour market. Despite 
facing similar pressures from globalization and new technologies, European coun-
tries continue to differ in their labour codes, tax regimes, and embrace of flexible 
work and self-employment  – a product of their national institutions, histories, 
choices and preferences. What the labour market looks like – now and in the future – 
largely depends on our priorities and decisions.
8.1.4  Good Work for All
Knowledge and service economies rely on human capital. As the Netherlands 
Scientific Council for Government Policy argued in its 2013 report Towards a 
Learning Economy, the Netherlands, if it wants to invest in its earning power, needs 
to nurture, develop and mobilize all the human capital at its disposal. Especially in 
light of demographic change, this means all people: young and old, male and 
female, healthy and unhealthy, whatever their educational attainment.
We can manage the automation, flexibilization and intensification of work in 
such ways that more people will have good jobs. Algorithms and robots can take 
over routine and disagreeable tasks while good forms of flexible labour – greater 
flexibility for employees and by employers  – can make it easier to cope with 
demanding jobs or to combine work with private life.
8.2  More Control over Income
The Netherlands has never had so many people in work. This at least was the case 
on the eve of the Covid-19 crisis. But although unemployment is low by European 
standards, too many people remain side-lined from the labour market. Given the 
loosening of relationships between employers and workers and the need to invest in 
human capital, the Netherlands needs to renew its social-security system and rein-
troduce an active labour-market policy attuned to contemporary realities. This sec-
tion explains how this could be done.
6 Ryder (2017, August 21).
7 oecd (2019a).
8 Commissie regulering van werk (2019).
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8.2.1  Prevent Unfair Competition Between Workers
The flexible labour market has become synonymous with uncertainty. Any modern 
economy needs a degree of flexibility which can be useful, even necessary, to cope 
with peaks and troughs, absences from illness and the unique requirements of spe-
cific projects. When making a film, it makes sense to hire a temporary production 
assistant, a freelance screenwriter and catering staff through an agency. But at pri-
mary or nursery school, parents and children need familiar faces. Employers need 
to offer contracts appropriate to the nature of the work.
With temporary work now so widespread in the Netherlands, it is doubtful 
whether the benefits still outweigh the economic and social costs (see Chap. 3). But 
as these costs are borne primarily by flexible workers and by society, individual 
firms do not include them in their cost-benefit analyses when considering whether 
to create permanent jobs.
Working people on different types of contract should not be competing against 
each other. Eliminating such competition requires regulation; a start has been made 
with the 2019 Work in Balance Act which raises employers’ social-insurance con-
tributions for temporary workers and mandates transition payments after firms ter-
minate or fail to renew a temporary contract. Higher costs for flexible work are also 
meant to encourage work organizations to enter into alliances to offer their employ-
ees greater security and to make permanent staff more widely deployable across a 
pool of organizations (see Chap. 6).
The principle of the level playing field should also apply to the self-employed. 
The Dutch government has proposed introducing minimum rates for freelance work 
and granting collective bargaining rights to the self-employed, both currently 
banned under competition law. The Authority for Consumers and Markets announced 
in 2019 that it will allow freelances to agree minimum rates between themselves 
and to enter into their own collective agreements.9 What this means in practice 
remains to be seen.
Freelance workers can now leverage their benefits that accrue from the tax code 
to compete with regular employees.Current deductions are meant to enable free-
lances to take out insurance against occupational disability  but the windfall for 
employer payroll costs has unintentionally swelled the number of the self-employed 
(Chap. 3). The Netherlands needs a model of social security that does not encourage 
such unfair competition but provides security for all workers.
9 acm (2019, July 23).
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8.2.2  Develop a System of Contract-Neutral Basic Insurance 
and Benefits
The social-security system created in the Netherlands after the Second World War 
was tailored to members of the active workforce (then primarily men) either having 
permanent jobs or being unemployed and thus entitled to make claims on the sys-
tem. This model no longer suffices. The flexibilization of the labour market means 
that today’s workers are more likely to have a succession of employers or clients and 
to juggle learning, work and care responsibilities throughout their active lives. This 
requires collective guarantees for all workers regardless of the type of contract they 
have. Social insurance and benefits need to be linked more to individual citizens and 
less to their form of employment or to specific agreements between employers and 
employees. Everyone should be minimally insured against all risks from old age to 
incapacity to work; on top of these standard arrangements, people would be free to 
take out additional insurance. Such a system would be an answer to the flexible 
labour market, although the government must remain alert to any new inequalities 
arising between people who can and cannot take out additional cover.
With a system of basic insurance and benefits, people would invest more in them-
selves, would dare to take risks, would be able to start families earlier and would be 
healthier overall (see Chaps. 2 and 3). Provisions would go beyond traditional 
social-security benefits – the state pension, occupational disability benefit and so 
on – to include allowances for care, education, on-the-job learning and other com-
binations of education and work. Investment in personal and professional develop-
ment is essential to any modern, universal system of social security. Working people 
must adapt to changes in the labour market and must be supported to do so.
It is in the public interest that everyone takes part in this new contract-neutral 
form of social security. Like employees with permanent contracts, the self-employed 
and flexible workers would be entitled to basic security and benefits, with the choice 
to insure themselves more comprehensively. There are many reasons why everyone 
needs to participate. It is impossible to predict whether freelancers doing booming 
business now will still be so lucky 10 years from now, or whether they will have 
enough of a cushion by then to support themselves in case of a setback. The Corona 
crisis offers a clear illustration. The self-employed are hit hard by the Covid-19 
pandemic lockdowns. The course of a life rarely runs entirely to plan; a divorce or 
disability can quickly cause wealth to evaporate.
If self-employed individuals were free to opt out, unfair competition could per-
sist. Those most likely to opt out would be self-employed professionals with high 
incomes and low occupational risks who have the least to gain from such a collec-
tive system. Allowing them to opt out would drive up premiums, raise the question 
of why only the self-employed can do so, and undermine public support for the 
system. The self-employed worry about both the consequences of occupational dis-
ability and the costs of compulsory insurance; any new system must be attractive for 
them. If everyone participates, economies of scale will keep the costs in check (see 
Chap. 3).
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The post-war welfare state is no longer adequate for today’s world of work. What 
is needed is a modern system of risk-sharing and protection for all categories of 
workers. This means that the responsibilities placed on employers, working people 
and the collective need to be reallocated. Some responsibilities such as paying for 
parental and care leave are more appropriately borne by the public purse. In other 
cases, employers should have more responsibility: who for instance is better placed 
to ensure that workers are adequately supported to reintegrate after long-term illness 
or have the time and resources for professional development? Employers should be 
less responsible for matters more logically arranged collectively, and more respon-
sible for matters directly related to work.
8.2.3  Update Active Labour-Market Policy
The changing labour market is side-lining vulnerable workers. To improve income 
security, more needs to be invested in guiding people into work and from one job to 
another. Given current demographic projections and the predicted structural short-
ages of labour, any exclusion of people who can and want to work (more) must be 
combatted. This requires a renaissance of active labour-market policy (see Chap. 6).
First, guidance to job seekers needs to be more individually tailored. While 
financial incentives may suffice for those who are already employable, they are 
largely ineffective for people who have genuine difficulties finding work. Regardless 
of the benefits they receive, people without work need more opportunities for seri-
ous training. The long-term unemployed need more intensive personal coaching, 
which currently often takes place in a vacuum without enough attention to serious 
language training or healthcare. Guidance also needs to continue after the entitle-
ment to benefits ends.
Second, getting as many people into work as possible requires intervening in the 
supply of jobs. While many jobs have been created in recent decades, many unem-
ployed individuals do not fit the vacancies, and this cannot always be remedied 
through the right training or better matching. The intensification of work, which has 
pushed some people out of the labour force (see Chap. 6), requires investment in 
new approaches that transcend traditional supply and demand thinking. Work orga-
nizations can create tailor-made jobs  – technology-assisted positions in which 
robots or other digital aids help integrate individuals into the workplace. Another 
promising approach is Individual Placement and Support (see Box 6.5), which 
focuses on both the individual and the workplace and involves continuous supervi-
sion from employers, managers and colleagues. Employers need certainty when 
hiring; they too need to be supported through clear guidance and simpler long-term 
financial compensation packages. To combat revolving-door unemployment, it is 
reasonable to make state support conditional on companies entering into long-term 
commitments rather than only offering temporary contracts.
Third, employers and the government should be more pro-active in helping peo-
ple remain in work and, when necessary, to switch to new work. Workers must 
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anticipate changes arising from new technologies; employers should help them 
through perpetual on-the-job training and retraining. The Employee Insurance 
Agency and local authorities should get involved earlier when people are at risk of 
unemployment or burnout, rather than – as currently – waiting until they have to pay 
out benefits.
Finally, active labour-market policies need adequate funding. The Dutch econ-
omy has the downside that it excludes those unable to satisfy its exacting require-
ments. Funding for active labour-market policies have been steadily declining over 
the past decades; far more should be allocated than the 0.7% of gdp spent in 2016. 
Denmark, for example, devotes 2% of its gdp to active labour-market policies (see 
Chap. 6).
8.2.4  Good Basic Jobs for People on Benefits 
with Few Opportunities
As work is vital to human well-being, the default safety net should not be benefits 
but the right to a basic job. Creating these jobs is the final element in the approach 
we propose so that all those currently “distanced” from the labour market can find a 
way into work. A wage imparts self-esteem and feelings of belonging to society 
much more than benefits ever can (see Chap. 2). Work is so important psychologi-
cally and socially that people who can work should no longer be side-lined with 
payments for doing nothing.
Local governments in the Netherlands, including those in The Hague and 
Amsterdam, have been creating basic jobs for some time. Similar schemes exist in 
Sweden and Germany, while debate over comparable forms of work creation has 
reappeared in other European countries such as Belgium and the uk. Basic jobs 
must offer vulnerable people the security they lack in the regular labour market and 
protect them from the “permanently temporary” employment trap. This means con-
tinuity and permanent contracts. People entering or re-entering the labour force 
after long periods on benefits typically need support in multiple areas of their lives. 
Basic jobs are not necessarily designed as paths into regular work. The framework 
for assessing their success should also consider other goals such as social contact, a 
sense of belonging, gains in health and self-esteem.
The ultimate question is what value society places on everyone being able to 
have better work. It will probably be necessary to rely on the public purse to keep 
some people working. While basic jobs may eventually pay for themselves through 
lower costs for healthcare and social security, they are, first and foremost, meant to 
contribute towards our well-being.
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8.3  More Control Over Work
Ensuring that people gain greater control over their work is an often-neglected 
aspect of good work. Greater commitment is required from all sides to take advan-
tage of the opportunities for innovation and productivity opened up by new tech-
nologies (see Sect. 7.3). At present, the responsibility for adjusting to change largely 
falls on individual workers. But better work requires companies and institutions to 
change as well, to organize work and allocate powers and responsibilities in differ-
ent ways. This section explains how this could be done.
8.3.1  Develop a Programmatic Approach to Good Work
To realize the economic potential of emerging technologies, innovations in the 
workplace must complement innovations in technology. Better collaboration 
between workers – and between humans and machines – will lead to better work as 
well as productivity, which in the Netherlands has been stagnating.
This programmatic approach encompassing workers, technology, training and 
care will require coordination between multiple government ministries: the 
Ministries of Finance; Social Affairs and Employment; Economic Affairs; 
Education, Culture and Science; and Health, Welfare and Sport. Promoting good 
work will require all kinds of “soft regulation”: publicity campaigns, setting goals 
and standards, establishing frameworks, making recommendations, disseminating 
information about best practices, education and training for managers and staff, 
accessible advice for employers and employees, benchmarking, making binding 
agreements (good work codes) initially on a voluntary basis, subsidizing companies 
to hire external expertise, and so on. The government, employers’ associations and 
trade unions also need to pressure employers to report annually on the quality of 
work they offer, and what they are doing to improve it (see Sect. 7.3).10
Good work organizations are the key to improving the quality of work. Trade 
unions and employers need to focus more on social innovation in the workplace – 
on structuring work organizations in a way that brings out the best in people. In an 
economy that depends on “human capital”, this is in everyone’s interest. As compa-
nies and institutions come in all shapes and sizes, a programmatic approach to good 
work will have to be multifaceted, mobilizing professional organizations, academic 
institutions, industry bodies, local authorities and so on. Companies and institutions 
without the capacity and expertise to choose or develop suitable applications of 
technology should be able to turn to experts for help.
Any programmatic approach to better work must focus on creating “work com-
munities” that support employee engagement. The introduction of robots, cobots 
10 As suggested by Duncan Gallie. This would require developing standards; the 12 indicators in 
the “Good work wheel” in the interim conclusion to Part 1 (Fig. 5.5) are an example.
8 Better Work: Conclusions and Recommendations
173
and AI into the workplace makes collaboration, problem-solving, asking questions 
and other human skills all the more important. While this may make work more 
interesting, these are also the aspects of work that are the most psychologically 
demanding. As routine tasks are automated, it is important to guard against cogni-
tive or mental exhaustion as the job now only consists of intensive duties.11 Here 
again, it is important to have access to labour experts and other specialists who can 
help design new jobs and keep work functions practicable.
Because contemporary jobs can be subject to numerous far-reaching changes, it 
is important not to wait until they disappear before offering workers opportunities 
for professional development, training and retraining. The Netherlands’ recently 
instituted individual learning rights do not go far enough as those most in need of 
further training are often the least likely to receive it (see Chap. 3). Both formal and 
informal on-the-job learning opportunities need to be better integrated within work 
organizations than is currently the case.
Initiatives in other countries can serve as inspiration. Finland formulated its own 
vision of good work early on: to have “the best working life in Europe in 2020, with 
the highest labour productivity and the greatest joy at work”.12 The Finnish Centre 
for the Advancement of Technology – now Business Finland – has been supporting 
socially innovative firms since 1983. In Belgium, the Social and Economic Council 
of Flanders has taken the lead in promoting good work.13 With employers’ associa-
tions and trade unions worried about intensifying work, the council launched a “fea-
sibility index” to guide policy. A 2016 study found that “psychological fatigue”, 
“well-being at work” and “work-life balance” had deteriorated since 2013; only 
“learning opportunities” were meeting expectations. The regional government and 
its partners agreed on a plan to turn the tide, focused on the “innovative work orga-
nization” (see also Box 2.6).
8.3.2  Strengthen the Position of Workers
Working people can shape and enforce better work. The more say workers have in 
their company’s employment practices, the more likely they will have meaningful 
control over their work. The position of workers within companies, in collective 
bargaining and in corporate governance needs to be strengthened (see Chap. 4). One 
way is to strengthen the position of the trade unions in the collective-bargaining 
process. Good worker representation and organization is ultimately in employers’ 
interests, as is recognized by the Dutch employers’ association awvn.
Workers can also gain power within structures of governance. Highly visible 
initiatives in France, the United States and the United Kingdom have sought to 
11 Metta et al. (2018).
12 Tekes (2014).
13 Houtman et al. (2020); Pot (2018b).
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reserve more places on company boards for staff or trade union representatives (see 
Chap. 4). Such possibilities already exist in the Netherlands. The staff councils of 
firms of a certain size have an “enhanced right of recommendation” in one-third of 
appointments to the supervisory (non-executive) board; better use of this preroga-
tive could be made in practice. As investors have recently amassed sway over cor-
porate decision-making, the idea is to restore the balance between the interests of 
different stakeholders, with greater weight for the interests of workers.
Existing legal frameworks, such as the Staff Councils Act, should facilitate better 
work for all workers, including those on temporary contracts and the self-employed. 
Staff councils have a broad range of statutory duties including the exercise of advi-
sory rights in reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions and a right of consent when 
decisions concern the quality of work. Their broad remit requires that staff councils 
be sufficiently resourced.
Finally, greater support should be given to existing and new forms of business 
and organization in which workers themselves hold the reins. These include self- 
organizing platforms for gig workers, freelance work communities, firms in which 
employees share in the profits and decision-making, social enterprises and co- 
operatives. Supporting such initiatives – particularly when they encounter legal or 
fiscal hurdles  – will give workers more opportunities to shape better work for 
themselves.
8.4  More Control in Life
Workers need to be able to look after their children, while the ageing population 
means that parents and partners in need of care are becoming more common. The 
world of work is going to have to pay more attention to the world at home. Dutch 
policies have largely focused on the right to work part-time – an important criterion 
for good work. But working part-time must be a real choice, not a compulsion due 
to full-time jobs being unavailable or too demanding, or due to the lack of quality 
childcare or elderly care. Work-life balance in the Netherlands is still largely seen as 
a private matter which people must arrange for themselves. Given the coming struc-
tural shortage of labour, the country must invest in making work and care responsi-
bilities easier to combine. This section explains how this could be done.
8.4.1  Invest in Good Care Facilities for Children 
and the Elderly
The Netherlands is caught in a “part-time trap” with care for young children and the 
elderly organized to facilitate part-time work. If the number of hours people work is 
to be a genuine choice, the government must invest in affordable, quality childcare 
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accessible to all. While it has been known since the 1990s that early-years childcare 
is at least as important for child development as school, the quality of Dutch child-
care is still not up to standard. It is expensive, especially for middle-income earners; 
the personnel are often poorly qualified and there is high staff turnover. Quality, 
development-oriented public childcare would help parents who want to work lon-
ger hours.14
There is an ever-greater need for accessible, quality care for the elderly and the 
chronically ill. Particularly in light of the ageing population, it is essential that the 
policy emphasis on informal care-giving does not come at the expense of profes-
sional care in the home. More and more working people are looking after partners 
or parents on a regular basis. If especially those with full-time positions are to 
remain working, the government will have to invest in social-care infrastructure that 
includes support for working informal care-givers so that their work is not adversely 
affected by the situation at home.
8.4.2  Make More Working Hours Easier to Secure
People sometimes work part-time because their jobs are so mentally or physically 
exhausting that a full-time position would leave them drained. Some employers 
such as homecare providers, cleaning firms and distribution centres no longer offer 
full-time work. Other workers, especially people with occupational disabilities, are 
denied extra hours even when they are keen to work them (see Chaps. 5 and 6). 
While the 2016 Flexible Working Act stipulates that workers can ask their employer 
for more as well as fewer hours, the right to work more is overshadowed both in 
policy and legal enforcement by the right to work less. Increasing one’s formal 
hours should be made easier, not least as it can signal that a person is regularly 
working excessive overtime or that an employer is unnecessarily creating new part- 
time jobs when it has staff who would like to work more. The collective agreement 
for the disabled care sector stipulates that employers are obliged to offer their 
employees a contract with extended hours if, on average, they have worked in excess 
of 10% more than their agreed hours during the previous 12 months.15 In general, 
work should be organized, arranged and supported in such a way that it can be 
undertaken on a full-time basis.
14 wrr (2013a).
15 See Bosschart (2019, September 25).
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8.4.3  Provide Long-Term Paid Care Leave
People need financial certainty and control over their working lives to take care of 
ailing parents, young children or sick partners. Their numbers will only increase in 
the future. Working people today generally have other responsibilities – sometimes 
a range of more or less permanent, often unpredictable, care obligations (see Chap. 
6). The Dutch solution – encouraging part-time work – means that informal care- 
givers do so on their own account. This means that those who work part-time and 
care for a chronically ill partner are at high risk of poverty. Long-term paid leave is 
part of the social-care infrastructure needed to ensure a future of better work.
If everyone is to have a chance to care for their loved ones, collectively-funded 
long-term paid leave arrangements are essential  – certainly for new parents and 
informal care-givers. Here the Netherlands lags behind many other European coun-
tries (see Chap. 5). In Germany the period of government-funded parental leave is 
14 months, which the parents can divide between them. In Sweden it is 16 months, 
with the government paying a basic allowance, topped up by employers. In both 
Sweden and Germany, the labour-force participation rate is at least as high as in the 
Netherlands. While arrangements for paid informal care leave across Europe leave 
much to be desired, the ageing workforce means they will soon be as necessary as 
parental leave.
Such collective schemes should be open to the self-employed, as they are in 
Sweden. At present, the self-employed in the Netherlands find it almost impossible 
to access provisions of this kind. Employers’ organizations and trade unions need to 
negotiate more comprehensive arrangements for care in their collective agreements, 
including allowances for informal care-giving. Flexibility at work, including flexi-
bility in working hours, is crucial to allow caring for sick parents or partners.16 
Fewer people doing more work in the future will only be possible if jobs are better 
tailored to workers’ care-giving needs.
8.4.4  Provide More Control Over Working Hours
Employers are increasingly asking their staff to be flexible at work. New technolo-
gies often make these requests seem natural. Many employees work overtime, vol-
untarily or otherwise, because they cannot complete their tasks within the allotted 
time (see Chap. 6). Others are answering work e-mails from home, late at night after 
the children have gone to bed. Employers need to ensure that they allow their staff 
to lead uninterrupted private lives. Control over one’s working hours is crucial, and 
16 Banking group ing’s recently concluded collective agreement includes personalized flexibility 
“to increase happiness at work”. It is now easier for people to take time off; nor will they face a 
backlog when they return. The idea is that a pool of “happiness providers” takes over the tasks of 
colleagues temporarily or suddenly called away.
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the blurring of the boundaries between work and private life can keep employees 
from recovering properly. In the interests of both the work organization and work-
ers’ health, it is essential that overtime be limited and that a clear line be drawn 
between work and personal life. This line should be made clear in employment 
contracts and collective agreements,17 especially for workers who lack individual 
bargaining power. The new collective agreement for the disability care sector stipu-
lates that workers are entitled to be unreachable on their days off.18
8.5  Better Work as an Objective of Public Policy
Over the past century, the Dutch state has been involved in every period of major 
technological change by enacting legislation on social security and working condi-
tions and by subsidizing research and small and medium enterprises.19 This remains 
the case today. In the final analysis, the government – as legislator, enforcer, funding 
body and employer – has a responsibility to promote better work (see Sect. 7.3). 
Coordinated action by national and local authorities is necessary to ensure that good 
work becomes possible for everyone, including those currently on the margins of 
the labour market.
The government must keep good work high on the public policy agenda. By 
doing so, it will set a benchmark for the rest of society. An obvious first step would 
be to include progress towards better work in the national Monitor of Well-Being, 
published each year since 2018 on Accountability Day when the national govern-
ment and its ministries present their annual reports to Parliament. Figure 5.5 shows 
how this data could be transparently presented. In the accountability debate in the 
House of Representatives in 2019, Prime Minister Mark Rutte promised that his 
Cabinet would “explore whether the Monitor could be more extensively used during 
the policy cycle itself”.20 Coverage of the three dimensions of good work – income 
security, control over work, and work-life balance – in the Monitor of Well-Being 
would ensure that good work for everyone receives the attention it deserves from 
policymakers and stakeholders.
The government is needed to enforce labour-market legislation and regulations 
(see Chap. 4). While the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate has previ-
ously focused on wage payments and compliance with flexible work regulations, 
the broader pursuit of good work requires a more intensive, wide-ranging role for 
regulatory and enforcement bodies. At present, the inspectorate still focuses mainly 
17 See the white paper by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2017).
18 See Bosschart (2019, September 25).
19 Pot (2019b).
20 For the further development of the Dutch Monitor of Well-Being, see also the letter from the 
directors of the three national planning agencies to both houses of Parliament on 15 May 2019: 
www.scp.nl/Nieuws/ Brief_planbureau_over_Brede_welvaart.
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on physical working conditions and the observance of health and safety regulations,21 
and pays scant attention to issues such as control over work and psychosocial com-
plaints. Although the existing legislation on working conditions provides a starting 
point, it merits review for how the law could be modernised to better protect income 
security, workplace autonomy and work-life balance. As with the renewal of the 
social-security system and active labour-market policies, consideration should be 
given to how inspections and regulation can help improve the quality of work.
8.5.1  The Government Spends Public Money and Is 
an Employer
The government spends large sums of public money which it can use to indirectly 
support better work. What is the point of the government imposing temporary con-
tracts on its security, cleaning and catering staff? The government does not close 
buildings or canteens overnight, or stop cleaning and guarding them. So why does 
it employ people on terms that imply it might?
When awarding contracts, the government can encourage or oblige suppliers to 
employ members of vulnerable groups. Sustainable or socially responsible procure-
ment means attention not only to the price of goods and services, but to how their 
purchase affects society and the environment. The government can set an example 
by demanding that tenders be competitive not only in price, but in quality of work.
As an employer in its own right, the government should set an example in its 
personnel policies. Especially public-sector workers in education, the police, health-
care and social care combine relatively low pay with ballooning workloads and 
diminishing workplace autonomy (see Chap. 3). From general practitioners to 
primary- school teachers, university staff to homecare workers, many are struggling 
with symptoms of burnout (see Chap. 4). And it is not only the employees who are 
affected: the services and amenities they deliver are vital to us all. Publicly financed 
work needs to be valued, organized and funded differently, placing greater trust in 
workers and their collaborative abilities. The government should be the first to start 
using the programmatic approach proposed above to improve the quality of work 
for public-sector professionals.
21 In its report Supervising Public Interests: Towards a Broader Perspective on Government 
Supervision, the wrr (2013b) counselled looking beyond the incidents of the day. Serving the 
public interest requires reflective, agenda-setting supervisory bodies that mirror and feed the pub-
lic debate.
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8.5.2  Finally: Better Work Is everyone’s Concern
Providing good work for all is a social mission for everyone. While new technolo-
gies, flexible labour markets and the intensification of work threaten to undermine 
the quality of work, they also have the potential to create better work and enhance 
our well-being as workers and citizens. Employers, governments, industry organi-
zations, trade unions and even individual citizens as workers, colleagues and con-
sumers all have a role to play.
In this book we have analysed what good work is and why it is important, where 
the Netherlands currently stands and how improvements can be made. We hope that 
policymakers, researchers, employers, trade unionists and ordinary citizens every-
where may draw inspiration from this analysis.
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